

Mercurino di Gattinara
and the Creation of
the Spanish Empire

Rebecca Ard Boone



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MERCURINO DI GATTINARA AND THE
CREATION OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE

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CREATION OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE

BY

Rebecca Ard Boone

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To Christopher Boone

INTRODUCTION

In 1529 Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara, Grand Chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire under Charles V, could with reason consider himself the most powerful man in Europe. He directed policy for the largest collection of lands under any single monarch since Charlemagne. Under his guidance, imperial armies subdued their enemies, the emperor concluded peace with the pope, and treasure fleets laden with silver made their way from the New World to Spain. All events had miraculously fallen into line exactly as he had predicted. As he completed his autobiography in this year, the imperial fleet set sail for Italy, the stepping stone to world domination and universal peace.¹

The five chapters in this book serve as a critical introduction to the autobiography of an exceptional Renaissance statesman. A self-proclaimed prophet of empire, Gattinara felt that the hand of destiny had guided his course. At the same time, he wanted to take personal credit for an exemplary political career built upon boldness, brilliance and guile. He aimed for universal monarchy, a Spanish empire encompassing the whole world. His plan, a blueprint for global empire, is the subject of this book. Gattinara's extraordinary command of what today might be called 'soft power', the use of attraction and co-option to supplement coercion or force, made his vision of empire compelling. He promulgated revolutionary and utopian promises of peace, justice and reform and aligned himself and his emperor with the movement of spiritual regeneration erupting throughout the continent. His statecraft vividly illustrates how humanism as an intellectual training advanced territorial aggrandizement in the sixteenth century.

The fifteenth-century Venetian diplomat Ermolao Barbaro, in his treatise on the office of the ambassador, had written, 'the first duty of an ambassador is exactly the same as that of any other servant of a government, that is, to do, say, advise, and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state.'² European diplomacy thus sets the context of Gattinara's autobiography. His habit of mind and vocabulary indicate that he remained, at heart, an Italian diplomat in the world of Renaissance politics. Despite his embrace of Christian apocalypticism in the form of dreams and prophecies, he based his

policy on rational analysis, speaking exactly the same political language as his fellow Italians: Seyssel, Contarini, Machiavelli and Guicciardini.

Gattinara's many talents and abilities accorded well with the chaotic age of the Italian Wars, 1494–1530. Historians have celebrated him as 'that great statesman whose political perceptions embraced the universe'.³ But his expansive view of global politics and cosmopolitan perspective supplemented other, more personal, faculties. This study shows how he used empathy, social perception and emotional intelligence to persuade others to follow his course of action.

From relatively humble origins in the Piedmont in northern Italy, his successful legal career had gained him the attention of the duke of Savoy, who hired him as the legal counsel for his wife, Margaret, the daughter of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I. She recognized his talent and kept him as an advisor and diplomat until 1518, when her father appointed him as grand chancellor for her nephew, Charles I of Spain.⁴ The next year the king of Spain became Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. From 1519 to his death in 1530, Gattinara guided the ship of state in the formative years of the Spanish empire.

As the head administrator and coordinator of the Holy Roman Empire, he resolved to end the scourge of war by reducing the number of rulers in the entire world to one, namely, Charles V. He repeatedly asserted that the constant spilling of Christian blood would end when the ruling heads of Christendom submitted to the imperial authority of the emperor. The goal of political unification espoused by Gattinara had circulated as the ideology of the Ghibellines, the aristocratic and imperial faction in medieval Italy. Gattinara successfully managed to apply this vision to Spain, a composite monarchy in which the king ruled a number of independent kingdoms, each with its own laws, traditions and institutions.⁵ This incongruity of political fact and ideal could only be resolved with a significant leap of imagination. Accordingly, Gattinara mined numerous sources of biblical prophecy to create a narrative in which Jesus Christ had designated the Spanish king and Holy Roman Emperor as the world monarch who would unite all of Christianity, defeat the infidel and initiate the millennium. The grand chancellor portrayed himself as the prophet who 'prepared the way of his lord'. In his propaganda, he painted a glorious future to contrast with a dismal present to bolster the messianic claims of Charles. He undermined the traditional authority of the papacy and nourished the movement of Christian humanism with its revolutionary approach to spirituality and its appeal to pacifism.

As is usually the case, the establishment of peace and justice on earth required the military conquest and political domination of Charles V. Gattinara's advent into what he termed the 'Garden of Empire' was the first step towards the universal empire ordained by God. When crafting state policy, he related all of his problems and concerns to the 'pacification and liberation' of Italy. This goal was a gargantuan task requiring revenue sources from unruly subjects to support the

diplomatic and/or military pacification of enemies, as well as the persuasion of the emperor himself. Using the common language of diplomatic reports, he broke these tasks into smaller ‘problems’ or ‘obstacles’ for which he devised specific ‘remedies’. He balanced diplomatic manoeuvring of heads of state with social policy. His age witnessed a continuous eruption of social violence: revolutions in many Italian city-states, the Comuneros Revolt in Spain and the religiously charged Peasants’ Revolt in Germany. Gattinara understood from these examples that state policy needed to take into account the humane treatment of the populace. He fought for a lighter tax burden, for the administration of justice and for military discipline. Even in the New World, he worked to provide effective administration. While he recognized Spain’s newly conquered American subjects as fully human, he primarily viewed them as a potential revenue source to fund his invasion of Italy.

Contemporaries intensely scrutinized the influence of the grand chancellor on the emperor and questioned the depth of his humanitarian sentiments. Fellow courtiers in Spain scoffed at his penchant for astrology and obscure prophecies. Venetian ambassadors wondered whether he aimed to liberate or enslave his own homeland. The Florentine historian Francesco Guicciardini provided the most vivid character analysis of Gattinara in his *History of Italy*: he depicted Gattinara as a savvy and prudent Odysseus, using empathy, reason, eloquence and deceit to gain his objectives.

Predatory Humanism

The study of Gattinara illustrates how the humanist educational programme that developed in fifteenth-century Italy facilitated the territorial expansion of the state. The reconciliation of humanism with predatory conquest explains the apparent inconsistencies in Gattinara’s political career, particularly the juxtaposition of his humanitarian ideals with his pragmatic approach to conquest. His training in the literature, history and philosophy of antiquity made him more effective in doing, saying, thinking or advising whatever was necessary to further the political interests of Charles V. His mastery of statecraft included the ability to synthesize information about military intelligence, finance and administration. His education in Roman law ensured competence in drafting treaties and legal opinions. But equally important, his emotional intelligence provided him with psychological insights that gave him an edge in negotiating, advising and constructing effective propaganda, in short, everything necessary for the construction of an empire. The grafting of these skills onto the great northern monarchies gave new potency to acquisitive and predatory forms of state power.

In addition to effective persuasion, the study of literature and history trained the student to see diverse perspectives at the same time. This was an important

ability for lawyers, who needed to argue both sides of an argument. Diplomacy required the same turn of mind, because diplomats had to know and support the legal claims of their own state against others. However, the ability to search for evidence, construct arguments and complete the case was only part of their education. One had also to use imagination to guess the opponents' strategies; a good diplomat could understand all of the possible motivations, interests and even fears of their enemies and allies. Softer qualities of rulers, such as personality and character, also mattered. Both literature and history provided access to a storehouse of characters and situations from which to learn.

The feudal tradition, still relevant at the courts of Savoy and Burgundy in Gattinara's time, intensified the obligation of personal loyalty. Honour required a vassal to provide military service to his lord. The demands of war had changed, however, requiring more substantial intellectual and organizational abilities to supplement brute force and courage. Though the reality of war had changed, feudal attitudes towards honour had not. Each lord pushed for his own advantage, just as in the Middle Ages, but he did so through an ever-growing entourage of jurists, propagandists, astrologers, artists and inventors. Intellectual service increasingly replaced military service in the sixteenth-century court.

This superior educational training enabled political advisors like Gattinara to draft convincing statements about peace and Christian brotherhood. At the same time, a sense of personal obligation and professional duty seemed to pull them towards war. Modern readers may find it disconcerting to see public calls for unity and peace countered by secret plans for constant warfare, with little regard for the lives of so many subjects. But Gattinara did not stand out among his peers in the Italian Wars for inconsistency. Few, if any, major figures emerged from the Habsburg–Valois conflict with undamaged reputations for integrity.

This analysis does not seek to examine the deeply held personal beliefs of Mercurino di Gattinara. Instead it provides insight into the political meaning of his public statements. Like politicians today, sixteenth-century statesmen spoke a coded language. Sentiments that appeared morally genuine actually conveyed messages about power. For example, the call for 'a council to reform the Church in its head and members' did not necessarily indicate a wish for religious reformation when uttered by diplomats like Gattinara. When he said this he intended it as a direct political threat against the pope, who understood it precisely as such. Others had made similar threats on numerous occasions since the fourteenth century. Gattinara differed from his medieval predecessors mainly in his superior ability to cloak many political threats with humanitarian and spiritual and philosophical sentiments.

This book argues that humanism as it was practised by Gattinara and others in the Renaissance enabled policymakers and their states to be even more aggressive and predatory than in the past. The intellectual tools developed during the

Renaissance bolstered state power by improving technology and organization. But they also played a valuable role in nourishing the arts of deception and manipulation. The example of Mercurino di Gattinara shows that soft power can have hard consequences for those in the path of imperial conquest.

The Autobiography

The purpose and intended audience of Gattinara's autobiography are not clear. He may have intended it exclusively for his descendants, as the founding father of a dynasty he aimed to create in his domains in northern Italy. Or he may have written it for a larger audience, in order to establish his role as the founder of Charles V's divinely inspired world monarchy. Either way, his autobiography is overwhelmingly political in nature. He provided very little personal information illustrating a life outside of public affairs. In narrating the story of his political career, he wanted the reader to admire the virtuosity in diplomacy and statecraft that allowed him to rise to great heights of power. At the same time, he wanted to portray himself as a man of destiny.

Echoing the ancients he drew from, Gattinara wrote about himself in the third person in the tradition of Caesar's *Commentaries*. Like Caesar, he focused his narrative on war. The work has a tone similar to the autobiography of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who also expressed his sense of divine destiny and a desire to highlight his diplomatic skills. However, unlike Piccolomini, who included charming descriptions of personal events and travels, Gattinara, after describing his adolescence, never revealed a life outside of business. And unlike Benvenuto Cellini, the swashbuckling goldsmith, he did not include any sex or art in his narrative. Nevertheless, Gattinara, like Cellini, recounted numerous assassination attempts and made claims to divine qualities and supernatural powers. Moments of levity hardly ever occur in the narrative of the grand chancellor. He made no references to several people who had a major influence on his policy decisions, according to his political and personal correspondence. For example, the autobiography never directly mentions such contemporaries as Hernán Cortés, Martin Luther or Erasmus. Most likely, he understood their enterprises as potentially subversive of state power. Such omissions lend credence to the idea that he intended his autobiography for a public audience.

The autobiography also provides a study of Charles V from Gattinara's perspective. Although historians argue about the actual influence the grand chancellor had over the emperor, it is clear that in his own mind, at least, the grand chancellor held enormous sway over Charles. In his autobiography, Gattinara clearly portrays himself in control of state policy. Although the emperor had at one time distanced himself from his main advisor, he generally followed where Gattinara had led him, at least according to the reports of other contem-

porary diplomats. At one point, Gattinara had confided to an ambassador at court that he had the emperor under his spell.⁶ He believed he had a superior ability, perhaps even a supernatural ability, to move others to act according to his wishes.

If the work lacks charm, literary sophistication and references to the most important historical movements of its time, then why should anyone read it? While clearly as subjective and biased as any autobiography, it allows the reader access to a different mental universe. The mind of a master diplomat and statesman of the Renaissance is not a particularly pleasant space for a reader to inhabit, for Gattinara often expresses hatred and mistrust in vitriolic and unsettling language. Portraying his own motives as pious and transparent, he accuses his opponents, especially Cardinal Wolsey and Francis I, as tricky and deceptive. However, he takes great pride in his own subterfuge, especially his skill at diplomatic entrapment and emotional manipulation; this feeling comes through clearly in the narrative. A modern reader sensitive to the starvation, rape and slaughter caused by marauding armies throughout Italy will probably find Gattinara's description of these soldiers as agents of God unsettling. Like his contemporary statesmen, he viewed political action in terms of winners and losers. In this sense, the autobiography provides perhaps the best description of the game of Renaissance diplomacy as it was experienced at the time.

Finally, the text reveals how key elements of his character – his ambition, defiance and emotional acumen – relate to the enterprise of empire-building. His autobiography depicts a Renaissance iconoclast, a man who stands alone and sees what others cannot see. He scorns kings and popes. He controls and directs the only authority appointed by God to rule men on earth, Charles V. In his spiritual world, where all events reveal the will of God, he holds nothing sacred. His connection to his Maker is direct and internal. His voice and his vision, both morally righteous *and* predatory, completely suited the project of imperialism in the Western world.

1 BIOGRAPHY

Having grown up amid war and hardship, Mercurino di Gattinara, like many others, responded to the chaos by trying to impose order on his adult world. The deliberate nature of his decision-making revealed itself in his childhood. A belief in the hand of destiny led him to view every event in his life as fitting into a larger scheme, not only in the trajectory of his own personal narrative but also in the plane of sacred history. The confidence that fate had selected him for a larger purpose enabled and developed another important aspect of his temperament: his opposition to authority. As he resisted the pressure of family, tradition, royal and ecclesiastical forces, so he also weakened the opposition to his own power. This account of his life, combined with his autobiography, reveals his energy and sense of purpose. Ambition dominated his character and directed his course as a ruling passion.

The town of Gattinara, the most likely birthplace of Mercurino, suffered a tumultuous history in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.¹ The wars between the Francophone dukes of Savoy, the Visconti of Milan and the marquises of Montferrat took their toll on the small city. In 1426 Amedeo VIII of Savoy took definitive possession of the commune and appointed a *podestà* as representative of the duchy. The noble families, including the Arborio, also submitted to the dukes.² Gattinara's grandfather and father both served in the office of *podestà*. His father, Paolo, married Felicita Ranzo, the daughter of Mercurino Ranzo, president of the *Consiglio cismontano*, the highest council in Piedmont. Soon after the death of Paolo's father-in-law, however, the family seemed to have declined in importance and wealth. Nevertheless, in 1473 the noble family quarrelled with the commune over control of the rural population. The noble families also claimed exemption from both the taxes and the statutes that governed the *borgo*. Representatives from Savoy compromised on the first claim, but not on the latter. Years later, Gattinara presented the legal opinion to Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian in 1513 as justification for the creation of a county under his own feudal dominion.³ The contest underlines the social tension inherent in that region between the nobility and the commoners of the region. Savoy in these years also suffered from conflicts between French-speaking *Savoyards*

and Italian-speaking *Piemontesi*. Gattinara spoke Italian as his mother tongue, but later spoke French as an official of the Savoyard court. This familiarity with multiple languages, cultural differences and social tension provided him with experiences that would prove useful later in his diplomatic career.⁴

The family suffered economic hardship when Paolo died, leaving Felicita a widow of twenty-eight, with seven children. To help with her young family, an orphan from a prominent family in Vercelli moved into the house. Andreeta Avogadro and Gattinara developed a close relationship. Despite a significant age difference (she was over twenty, he fourteen), the two secretly married. He thought the marriage would please his mother, but she and other relatives strongly disapproved. They sent Gattinara away to live with his paternal relatives in Vercelli. His situation further improved when he moved in with his maternal uncle, Bartholomeo Ranzo. The Ranzos were a more prosperous family with a long legal tradition, and his uncle encouraged the young man to study literature and law.

At the age of twenty-five, Gattinara decided to pursue a degree in law at the University of Turin. His mother disapproved because of the cost, providing evidence of his family's humble circumstances. According to the autobiography, she tried to dissuade him by pointing out that all members of the Arborio family who had tried to study law had failed, wasting their time and money. His expenses would also place an economic burden on his brothers and sisters. Despite her arguments, Gattinara pursued jurisprudence. His legal studies soon paid for themselves, as he used his knowledge of the law to research the rights of his orphaned bride, Andreeta, who had waited patiently at his mother's house for ten years until they could be formally married in 1490. Relying on her dowry to pay for his studies, he sued her relatives for her inheritance. He brought seven successful suits against them, and won enough liquid assets to pay for his education.

The aggressive legal pursuit of Andreeta's interests won him the enmity of her family, who carried out the first of many subsequent assassination attempts against him. In his autobiography, he recounted how he miraculously escaped two poisonings and two attacks by gangs of armed men.⁵ He also sued his own relatives and won land his mother had sold. Although he was only in his twenties, the course of his life had become clear. In marriage, education and career, he had resisted the control of his whole family. He challenged a rigid social order in which family elders made decisions for the young, so they treated him as a threat to their traditional authority. The desire to escape from them may have played a part in his decision to enter the university. Since universities were 'corporations' with a legal status independent of families and individuals, they provided a sphere of action outside of parental authority.⁶

Gattinara had chosen the profession of law so that he could, as he said in his autobiography, 'live without poverty and die without anxiety.'⁷ His successful practice increased his reputation and financial standing. One case in particular

pitted him against three of his own law professors. He boasted of defeating and 'surpassing his masters'.⁸ His legal talents won the recognition of the duke of Savoy, Philibert II, who even offered him a place on his privy council. According to Gattinara's autobiography, the young lawyer, impressed neither by the authority of the duke nor by the generosity of his offer, declined, preferring to make a modest living from trying cases than take an office that required either poverty or corruption.⁹ When Philibert II married Margaret of Austria, the daughter of Maximilian I, in 1501, he asked Gattinara for his services as a legal advisor for his wife. Permitted to continue with his legal practice, he agreed. When Philibert II died three years later, Gattinara stayed in the service of the duchess. Before serving Margaret, he had asked permission of his 'natural prince and lord', Charles II of Savoy. According to his account, the duke proposed he serve both of them, but Gattinara replied that he 'could not serve two masters'. Granted permission to serve Margaret exclusively, he aggressively pursued her dowry against the claims of Charles II. Thanks to his legal acumen (and pressure from her powerful father), she kept the jurisdiction of a significant amount of territory, including Bresse, to which she appointed him as president. As he prepared to move his family there, a gang of fourteen assassins, partisans of the duke, attacked him as he knelt at the altar on Good Friday. Once again miraculously saved, he granted each of them pardon.¹⁰ These were not the last assassination attempts he would survive.

In the Service of Margaret

Gattinara moved to Margaret's court in Bresse in 1505. His career advanced significantly when she inherited the lands of Burgundy at the death of her brother, Philip the Handsome, in 1506. In 1507 she moved to Flanders to govern the provinces and take up the tutelage of her nephew, Charles. She sent Gattinara as a representative to her father's court, and from here he embarked on several diplomatic missions. Promoted to president of Burgundy in the next year, he convinced Maximilian to donate the lands of the county of Burgundy to Margaret. Subsequently, he was made president of the Parlement of Dôle, and moved to that city.¹¹

The Free County of Burgundy, the *Franche-Comté*, had a very peculiar recent history as ground zero in the fight between the kingdom of France and the empire. The string of French-speaking lands stretching from the Low Countries to the Alps had been divided since the ninth century between the duchy of Burgundy, a vassal state of the French king, and the county of Burgundy, a free county of the Holy Roman Empire. In the fifteenth century, the great princes of the French kingdom demanded more autonomy for their holdings in the French 'commonwealth'. One of these vassals of the king was Charles the Bold (1433–77), who sought to unite the two Burgundies with the Low Countries into one independent kingdom. In a series of wars against Charles, Louis XI

prevented this consolidation. When Charles was killed in the Battle of Nancy in 1477, his daughter, Mary of Burgundy, inherited the duchy, the county of Burgundy, almost all of the Low Countries, and Artois and Picardy, among other lands. Because she married Maximilian of Habsburg, who became Holy Roman Emperor in 1491, her two children would inherit both the imperial and French domains. One of her children, Philip of Habsburg, died in 1506; the other was Margaret, future advisee of Mercurino di Gattinara.¹² Thus when Gattinara moved to Dôle, the capital of the county of Burgundy, the French-speaking imperial territory still remained in dispute between the Habsburgs and the Valois.

The history of Burgundy and Savoy illustrates the fluidity of political loyalties during the Italian Wars (1494–1530). The alliances shifting due to marriage and diplomacy provide one level of complication. The legal right to property by marriage or inheritance was recognized in the carefully constructed courts packed with jurists like Gattinara trained to argue ‘the law’. But since that law pertained to the rights of their patrons, rival claimants and their jurists hardly ever recognized it. Feudal law itself complicated land disputes, and divided loyalties meant that one vassal might serve several lords. For example, Maximilian I as count of Flanders had to do homage to the French king. Although individuals often claimed only one ‘sovereign lord’, they acted as free agents, moving from one lord to another when offered a better deal. Ultimately, in this era the force of arms determined who held a certain territory. Battles raged on an almost daily basis, and diplomats’ constant negotiating and jurists’ legal wrangling served only to provoke more fighting. This conveniently allowed the sons of old noble families to fulfil their primary function as warriors.

Gattinara did not serve his lord in war as a soldier. In his lengthy correspondence with Margaret, he complained about being shut out of discussions concerning military affairs between Maximilian and his advisors.¹³ Such exclusion must have served to remind him of his humble origins. Nevertheless, his letters manifested a social confidence that bordered on impertinence. In the following statement, he spoke bluntly about his honour in a letter responding to complaints she had made to her father concerning him:

I cannot believe you would have so little confidence in me that you would consider me so mean as to wish to consent to or hear anything contrary to the honour of the emperor, or that would harm you or your house, which I would never do or even say, not only for the affection I have always had for serving you but also to not injure my own honour, which I have always striven to keep, and would like to keep for the future more than any other good that you or any other prince would know how to do me; because goods can be taken away from me, but as for honour, it is not in your power, or in any other prince in the world to take away.

By making honour an intrinsic part of his character, rather than an attribute granted externally from a ruler, he placed limits on the authority of the prince over him. He asserted his own value as an advisor, and made his own agency clear to his patron. Concerning negative rumours about himself and his fellow ambassadors, Gattinara turned an accusation made against him and his associates into a charge against the duchess herself.

If ... by some sinister subordination, you suspect or disbelieve either M. de Gurce, M. de Burgo, or me, I tell you, Madame, in all humility, that you are not worthy to have such advisors.¹⁴

Margaret must have valued Gattinara's advice. He not only stayed in her service, but he was also promoted to president of the Parlement of Burgundy in 1508.

Diplomatic negotiations consumed the following years. Gattinara drafted the accord that solidified the League of Cambrai against Venice and shortly afterward participated in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Blois. The treaty, brokered between Ferdinand of Spain and Maximilian I and arbitrated by Louis XII, named Charles of Burgundy as king of Castile at the death of his mother, Juana de Castile, called *la Loca* due to her mental instability. Gattinara remained with Ferdinand in Spain for the next year, promoting the friendship between the two rulers, explaining the treaty to the *cortes* and gathering intelligence.¹⁵ He returned to Dôle in 1511.

Gattinara must have been conscious of his status in the county as a foreign *robin*, for at this time he invented a false lineage attributing his family origins to the ancient Burgundian nobility.¹⁶ The Arborio, in this tale, originated from a Burgundian ancestor named Arbois, who was granted a fief in Gattinara by Frederick Barbarossa.¹⁷ To support this pedigree, Gattinara entrusted his agents to buy a castle two miles outside of Dôle named Chevigny. At this time he also solicited the title, Marquis de Gattinara, and gained several feudal domains in the Piedmont. However, the local nobility did not recognize him as one of their own.

The nobility of Dôle held on to power in the county by dominating the Estates General. One noble in particular, the Marshal Vergy, controlled the region. Completely unwilling to share power with Gattinara, he brought several lawsuits against him involving the legality of the sale of Chevigny, and accused him of unscrupulous behaviour. John Headley has written extensively on this conflict between Gattinara and the independence of the local nobility, framing the case as a study of the institutional process of state-building in which the powers of centralization (the parlements) engaged in a legal battle with the old feudal order. In his view, Gattinara acted as an official engaged in the process of centralization at the heart of state-building. He prosecuted noble malefactors in the service of justice and law. In his *remonstrances*, or formal complaints, he put the judicial representatives of the prince before the sword nobility.¹⁸ Another

perspective sees the origin of the contest in Gattinara's attempt to seize control for himself at the expense of the local Burgundians. In this view, the local nobility fought not against the centralizing process but against the president personally. The conflict concerned two powerful men, not two systems of political power.¹⁹

The conflict caused Gattinara to lose his position, for Margaret did not support his claims against the nobility, who stacked the courts against him. His fall from grace after such a meteoric rise in fortune had a profound impact on him. It seemed as though he had lost everything, as he even had to sell his tableware to pay his creditors; Andreetta, his wife, had died during the conflict. Assassination attacks continued throughout the controversy. Nevertheless, he survived.

With nowhere else to go, he spent some time fulfilling a vow in a Carthusian monastery outside of Brussels, which he entered in 1515 or 1516. Coincidentally, or perhaps not coincidentally, the charterhouse at Scheut stood at the epicentre of imperial politics. Ferdinand of Aragon had died in 1516, making Charles, the nephew of Margaret, heir to the thrones of Castile and Aragon. Gattinara was among many jurists and counsellors looking for a position with the new king.

While in the monastery at Scheut, Gattinara portrayed himself as Job, saying, 'The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, as it pleases the Lord, let it be done'.²⁰ Completely shut off from the outside world, he immersed himself in the works of Christian apocalypticism. The fruit of this study appeared as a small book, or *libellum*, dedicated to Luigi Marliano, a Milanese doctor and close advisor of Charles, but destined for the king. Describing the book as a supplication, he included a dream he had had about the future of the world monarchy and the triumph of Christianity to come in the person of Charles.²¹ The presentation copy was lost for several years and only recently found by John Headley in the British Museum. It was Gattinara's first major attempt to produce a work of writing beyond the format of a legal document, report or diplomatic dispatch. Despite its appearance as a humanist educational tract with messianic undertones, it was essentially a job application. Between 1513 and 1519 numerous works in the genre of 'mirror of princes' appeared, including Machiavelli's *Prince*, Claude de Seyssel's *Monarchie de France* and Budé's *Institution du Prince*. Erasmus had also dedicated his *Institutio principis christiani* to Charles in the same year. These treatises echoed themes from the humanist educational treatises of the fifteenth century. However, the work did not gain Gattinara immediate employment, and he prepared to return home after fulfilling his vow at the monastery.

The disgraced counsellor made his way home in a journey recounted with a particular narrative force in his autobiography. Margaret refused to re-employ him as president, and he refused to accept any other offer of employment. He did, however, accept a severance package of 6,000 gold coins, with a yearly salary of 1,000 gold coins to retain his good will. He went first to Germany to plead his case to Maximilian, then continued on to his native Savoy. According

to his account, his aides criticized his excessive expenditures, but he informed them that he trusted in the Lord. In Savoy, his 'natural prince and lord', Duke Charles II, offered him the presidency and chancellorship of the duchy. Gattinara accepted the offer and looked forward to living among his relatives and serving them in this office. However, as he stated, 'fate determined otherwise'. All along his journey, he had been followed by three messengers, who came to him in succession. They informed him that four of his enemies in Flanders had mysteriously died. Among these was Jean le Sauvage, grand chancellor of Charles of Spain. Maximilian offered Gattinara the position. In his narration, suffused with divine providence, he answered the call of destiny.²²

Grand Chancellor

In October 1518 Gattinara swore the oath of office by placing his hands between those of Charles in Saragossa, Spain. The grand chancellor's first order of business was to consolidate the power of King Charles. Establishing a court at Aragon rather than Castile, Gattinara essentially worked to merge the Franco-Burgundian system of governing with that of the Aragonese. He sought to streamline the bureaucracy by eliminating costly and redundant offices as well as appointing a comptroller general for the purpose of financial accountability.²³ Gattinara intended only to cut costs with these reforms, but a happy consequence of reducing the number of courtiers was to bolster his own power within the court.²⁴

The adolescent Charles entered Spain in the fall of 1517. The death of Ferdinand of Aragon the previous year had precipitated a crisis of succession. His daughter's mental instability excluded her from succession. Philip the Handsome, the father of Charles, had died young in 1506. Despite his claim as legitimate heir, Charles appeared to be a foreigner, having grown up in the Low Countries. Many in Spain preferred his younger brother, Ferdinand, who had been raised in Spain. Some argued that Charles could only enjoy the title of regent as long as his mother survived. Although Charles accepted the royal crown of Castile and Aragon at Brussels in 1516, the coronation carried no legal weight because he did not abide by the protocol of the kingdoms. In particular, he had not sworn to uphold the traditional rights and customs of these lands. In order to assume authority, he had to go to Spain and be recognized by the *cortes*, the main representative institutions, as legitimate sovereign.²⁵

In Spain, once recognized by the *cortes*, Charles encountered even more challenges to his authority.²⁶ His Flemish entourage clashed politically and culturally with the natives of Spain. The great magnates of Castile, for example, expected great favours, benefits and offices from their king. When Charles distributed these lucrative positions and patronage to his Burgundian and Flemish courtiers, the Spanish grew disaffected. They called these courtiers *flamencos* and the chief

courtier, Guillaume de Croy, Lord of Chièvres, 'El Chivo'. Disliked by the Spanish, Chièvres was also the chief adversary of Gattinara. The latter saw the Spanish as potential allies in his quest for ascendancy at court. Unlike the Burgundian *flamencos*, Gattinara had lived for eight months in Spain and understood the customs and political structures of the realm. Whereas the Burgundians tended to see Spain as a treasure trove of lands and benefices to be parcelled out to loyal servitors, the grand chancellor understood the complicated social dynamics at play in a fundamentally urban and commercial political environment.

The Comuneros Revolt

Even before the death of Maximilian I in January of 1519, the issue of the imperial election inflamed tensions in Spain and within the court itself. Several of Charles's counsellors advised against the imperial election, considering the expense and complications not worth the trouble. The Spanish were concerned, with great justification, that their money would fund not only the election but also the military engagements necessary to defend so many lands. Gattinara sided with the imperialists and argued that the imperial title was esteemed beyond all others as it was 'ordained by God himself, foreseen by the prophets, predicted by the apostles, and approved in word and deed by Christ our Saviour by his birth, life and death'. In the hands of a powerful prince, he maintained, the title could be a stepping stone to world domination, or *orbis monarchiam*. Playing power politics, Gattinara added another reason: if the empire fell into the hands of the French, Charles would not be in a position to maintain his own Austro-Burgundian or Iberian lands.²⁷ The opinion of Gattinara prevailed, and the court made provisions to leave Spain for Germany, adding to the discontent already simmering in Spain. Not only did this require new taxes, but it also symbolized a movement of power away from Spain and towards Germany. The announcement in November 1519 of the king's voyage to Germany was the spark that started a major civil war, the Comuneros Revolt.

Many in Spain were unwilling to pay for the imperial election. Gattinara described in his autobiography how Chièvres, the king's main advisor, wanted to extract an additional tax, or *servicio*, from the *cortes* in 1520. Gattinara counselled against it, claiming that it would provoke a popular rebellion. His prediction proved correct, for the popular uproar 'resulted in nothing but a revolution, which threatened to exterminate all the kingdoms'. He added, 'They could not collect the *servicio*, and popular unrest consumed the remaining royal revenues.'²⁸ In reality, the Comuneros was much more than a popular revolt against taxation. The revolt arose out of a power vacuum in Castile after the death of Isabella in 1506. Three unpopular regents in a row ruled Castile: Ferdinand of Aragon, whose empire-building required too many taxes; Cardinal Cisneros,

who was weak; and Adrian of Utrecht, who was mistrusted as a foreigner. Under these, aristocrats had enriched themselves at the expense of the lands and constitutions of the cities, or *comunidades*. The towns sought a legal remedy for these confiscations, but the rulers, unlike Isabella, did not support a judicial system that would enforce the rule of law. This was the major complaint of the patrician leaders, according to the petitions to King Charles in the *cortes* of Valladolid in 1518. They wanted the king to uphold justice.²⁹ By 1520, fourteen cities had banded into a *Sacra Junta* that acted as the administrative authority for all aspects of the government. They had won several military victories, but divisions arose within their coalition. Juana, the mother of Charles under whose authority they ruled, failed to support them. When popular sentiments erupted in the cities, the urban elite began to fear them. The aristocrats increasingly opposed the insurrection.

At first the aristocrats had supported the petitions of the *cortes*. They were infuriated by the crown's insistence on granting benefices to the Flemish entourage that they believed belonged to them. In addition, they disliked foreign rule and supported the movement as a way to express discontent with the crown. However, when it became clear that the rebellion contained elements calling for radical land reform and an attack on their own privileges, they switched to the royalist side. They then put their own mercenary armies in the service of the crown. Royalists won a series of military victories in 1521 and crushed the rebellion. Although the crown executed the ringleaders, the vast majority of the rebels received pardons. Charles never again attempted to rule without the support of the notables of Spain.

Meanwhile, aristocrats in Valencia found themselves the target of another insurrection only tenuously related to the uprisings in Castile. This was the *Germanías*, or Revolt of the Brotherhoods. Here there were social tensions between the land-owning aristocrats (who held large numbers of Muslim serfs) and the city council. Under the direction of the city council were numerous guild militias, or *germanías*, which had been granted the right to bear arms by the crown in order to protect the population from corsairs. In 1519 these militias rose in revolt against the aristocrats, who sought protection from the crown.³⁰ The revolts, although unsuccessful, show the degree to which communities held tightly to local privileges, customs and liberties.

From 1519 to 1521 Peter Martyr d'Anghiera wrote nearly fifty letters to the grand chancellor on the subject of the revolts in Valencia and Castile. In every account he stressed the social dimensions of the revolt, fought, as he said, 'under the name of liberty'.³¹ In addition to the threat of losing the kingdom, there was the very real consequence of losing tax revenue from the disorder. Gattinara's response to the conflict reveals his understanding of the importance of social harmony to the collection of revenue.

The Imperial Election

The crowning of Charles of Habsburg as Holy Roman Emperor was not a foregone conclusion in 1519. His grandfather, Maximilian I, had followed the path of his own father, Frederick III, the first Habsburg to hold the imperial title. He had linked the dynasty with empire in massive propaganda campaigns, but there was no legal foundation for the connection. The vision of a house destined to unite all of Christendom under one rule for the purpose of defeating the infidel and establishing world peace went back hundreds of years, but the portrayal of the Habsburgs as this house began only around 1450. At that time Frederick had hired humanists and historians to propagate the mythological origins and destiny of the family. Through wise marriages, Maximilian was able to begin the execution of this dream.³² Perhaps that explains why he hired and maintained Gattinara, a man capable of articulating the dream as well as converting it into political reality. He needed someone who could comprehend the idea from the highest philosophical level to the most mundane administrative detail. Nevertheless, the coronation rested upon an actual decision taken by the seven electors of the empire who determined the imperial selection. Moreover, these electors responded more to hard cash and matrimonial bribes than to abstract visions of world destiny. Charles was not the only candidate; he competed against Francis I and Henry VIII, both of whom had amassed huge resources.

In the imperial election of 1519, three kings and their advisors battled on the diplomatic field: Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey, Francis I and Antoine Du Prat, Charles V and Chièvres and Gattinara. Seven electors and Pope Leo X decided the outcome. The rivalry between Habsburg and Valois stood at the nexus of the problem. Francis I spent a great deal of money and effort to win the imperial crown. He had two advantages: a large, rich state whose unity had been trumpeted by ambassadors since the reign of Charles VIII, and its geopolitical position as counterweight to the ridiculously large inheritance of Charles V. Even before the threat of Charles and his domains, the propaganda of both Maximilian and Ferdinand II stressed the goal of world domination. In 1513 the French ambassador to the pope used this fear to rally the support of Leo X for France by stating, 'Have regard, Holy Father, for the great ambitions of some princes who would like to have all of Christendom in their hand'.³³ On the other hand, France was growing, and it had as many enemies as it had directions in which to expand. The other powers, England and the papacy, held power as the arbiters of this contest. Leo X could have leaned either way. Wolsey schemed to use this as a source of strength. In fact, Henry VIII also competed for the crown. The seven electors favoured Charles, but also had reason to encourage the others for the imperial crown. It made all sides offer more money and promises of

matrimony to win the prize. Charles V ended up spending nearly a million gold gulden, released by the Fugger banking firm.³⁴

When he realized that Charles would win the imperial crown, Pope Leo X offered to make the grand chancellor a cardinal. Gattinara refused it, explaining that he 'never wanted to tie himself too closely to the Church, for he knew that the clergy would soon be punished for its corruption. He preferred to work towards the reform of the Church itself'. Eventually the 'two great luminaries of the world' could together accomplish the task of reducing to the world to 'one flock and one pastor'.³⁵ In these years, Gattinara viewed the papacy as the traditional enemy of the empire.

Gattinara acted as chief diplomat on this voyage.³⁶ In 1520 he accompanied the emperor to negotiate with Cardinal Wolsey in England, which resulted in the Treaty of Canterbury. Shortly thereafter, he followed him to the fabled meeting in Calais, in the 'Field of the Cloth of Gold', where Charles I, Henry VIII and Francis I met to arrange for a final peace in Christendom. According to Gattinara, 'Cardinal Wolsey tried to dominate the proceedings, considering himself the main arbitrator among them, able to determine the future as he wished'.³⁷ The fine food and jousting impressed the participants, but a lasting peace eluded them. Within months of pledging peace, war erupted on several fronts.

From there Gattinara made his way to the Diet of Worms in 1521, where Martin Luther and Charles V confronted each other directly. Curiously, Gattinara's autobiography did not mention the Protestant reformer by name. Instead, he focused his attention on how he raised revenues and hired soldiers for the Italian campaign in order to promote and restore the interests of the empire.³⁸ He also negotiated an alliance between the emperor and Pope Leo X against the French. A plague at Worms took the life of Chièvres, leaving Gattinara without a rival in the imperial court.³⁹

Governing an Empire

After the Diet of Worms, Gattinara turned from diplomacy to administration. The Holy Roman Empire did not exist as a unified entity but rather as a vast array of territories and states. The lengthy enumeration of titles at the top of every official document relating to Charles provides an idea of the inherent confusion:

Charles, Always August Emperor, king of Germany, of Castile, of Aragon, of the two Sicilies, of Jerusalem, of Hungary, of Dalmatia, of Navarra, of Granada, of Toledo, of Valencia, of Galicia, of Seville, of Mallorca, of Cerdeña, de Cordoba, of Murcia, of Jaén, of the Algarbes, of Algeciras, of Gibraltar, of the Canary Islands, of the Indies, islands and terra firma of the Ocean Sea; Archduke of Austria, duke of Burgundy, of Brabant, Lotharingia, Carinthia and Carniola, of Luxembourg, of Limburgh, of Guelders, Athens and Neopatria; Count of Brisa, of Flanders, of Tirol of Habsburg, of Artois and Burgundy; Count Palatine of Hainault, of Holland, of Zeeland, of

Ferut, of Fribuque, Amuque of Rosellon and Cerdana; Landgrave of Alsace, Marquis of Burgundy and of the Holy Roman Empire, of Oristan and Gociano; Prince of Catalonia and Swabia; Lord of Frisia, of the Marcas, of Labono, of Puerta, of Viscaya, of Molina, of Salinas and of Tripoli.⁴⁰

In German lands he was emperor, but in Spain he was king. His Spanish subjects did not recognize his imperial authority. Gattinara always addressed Charles as 'Your Majesty'. This title implied divine attributes, a supernatural quality he tried to establish in the imperial propaganda, but in Spain, Charles himself always signed documents simply as 'Yo El Rey', a purely secular title. In addition, Charles carried the titles of duke, archduke, count and margrave. Each of his titles represented customary rights and duties and required him to recognize clearly delineated traditional liberties and legal customs of the states and kingdoms he governed. Thus, the new ruler had to adopt symbolic forms of power: seals, titles, heralds, coats of arms and mottos, of which *Plus Ultra* was the most famous. The enormity of his governing task derived from the plural nature of his power. An army of scholars, musicians, artists and architects created a mythology of empire that inspired monarchs throughout Europe.

Gattinara, as the grand chancellor of all the 'kingdoms and states' of the emperor, dealt with the most important documents relating to policy, finances and salaries. He dreamed of creating one court for all of these realms, but doing so imperilled traditional customs and rights. Early modern Europeans lived in traditional societies; they revered their ancestors and obeyed the old customs as a fundamental act of filial piety, as well as the foundation of self and group identity. The grand chancellor had to balance his desire for centralization against local interests based on these traditions. He portrayed himself as the protector of local customs, but his primary aim was to make the government more efficient in collecting revenues for the specific purpose of taking Italy. This is why he wanted to reform the councils and courts of justice and to centralize the finances of the realm. In a memorial to Charles V in 1525, Gattinara specifically demanded more power within the court:

That all the secretaries of the court be subordinated and obedient to the [office of the chancellor] and do not meddle with proposals in the council, nor report anything, nor present nor read memorials to the council without orders from me as chancellor and that these secretaries do not dispatch nor cause to sign by His Majesty any letters whatsoever of state or of grace, if these letters have not been so ordered by His Majesty or by me in his name and that they first be seen and signed by me and that to this effect His Majesty does not conclude nor command to dispatch anything whatsoever of state or of grace when I am not present.⁴¹

His enemies at court suspected that he sought more power for himself but cared little for reform. The question of his authority revolved around the issue of the office of chancellor in Spain. Nobody doubted the authority of the office in Bur-

gundy, or the authority of his Flemish predecessor, Jean le Sauvage. However, Ferdinand and Isabella never had a grand chancellor, and many proposed that the office went against Spanish law. Charles, increasingly independent, refused to let the chancellor control all communications with ambassadors and viceroys and the right to review all provisions, graces and favours. He preferred to distribute the authority for these among many individuals.⁴² Despite increasing coolness between the emperor and his chancellor, however, Gattinara still held the reins of foreign affairs in his hands.

The grand chancellor realized that efficient administration and sufficient resources alone would not win wars. The people of Spain in a variety of institutional and social contexts had to support the effort; the law and custom required the *cortes* to approve revenues. However, even if they approved, taxes still needed to be collected from the public, who required persuasion. The grand chancellor suggested that Charles not resist the *cortes*, but rather exploit every session to win the hearts of his subjects. As president of the *cortes* of Castile, he never hesitated to press his concerns. Gattinara also wrote speeches for Charles to give to the *cortes* from his throne. In one speech from Valladolid in 1523 drafted by Gattinara, Charles declared that he would set his own life and all he owned on the preservation of the Christian faith, and that the Spanish kingdoms were the leaders of all his realms, stating, 'The hand of God will be upon the Spanish people and will give them peace and honour beyond all peoples in Christendom'.⁴³ Around the same time, the emperor and the grand chancellor began to correspond with each other in Spanish instead of French, which had been the emperor's maternal tongue. The strategies bore fruit, and Castile began to see itself as the centre of a world empire.

The empire included America, another, perhaps even more potent, source of revenue for war. As the ships came in from the New World, Gattinara read and affixed his seal to their reports of cargo. In addition to gold and silver, however, the New World produced revenue as a source of new land. Islands especially were sold as fiefs to raise money for soldiers and weapons. Although this situation encouraged a decentralization of power more in keeping with feudalism, Gattinara ardently supported strong centralized control of the new subjects. Recognizing the need for impartial justice, he supported Bartolomé de Las Casas, who publicized the brutality of the conquistadors in America in his *A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. His concern with the welfare of the new subjects, however, had more to do with the efficient consolidation of resources.

With his fellow council member, Peter Martyr d'Anghiera, Gattinara was among a handful of people knowledgeable about the immense possibilities of the New World. Moreover, he did not just understand the treasure of the New World; he also made use of this intelligence. For him, world domination was an actual possibility precisely because it could be funded by treasure from

New Spain. He knew from his apprenticeship with Maximilian I that finances determined the outcome of war. Years of unrest in the Italian Wars and in the Comuneros Revolt taught him that rebellion and social disorder produce no revenue.

From Pavia to the Sack of Rome

In the four years before 1529, Gattinara concentrated nearly all of his attention on the invasion of Italy. The Battle of Pavia, on 24 February 1525, appeared to make the invasion more likely, as the imperial army enjoyed its most stunning victory against the French. So complete was the victory that the French king, Francis I, was taken prisoner. However, Pavia created complications for the grand chancellor because it greatly changed the dynamics of power in Europe. Before the victory, most of the major players had arranged themselves against France, especially Henry VIII of England and Pope Clement VII. After the French had been so thoroughly routed, however, the major powers felt they had more to fear from the empire, which found itself without any enemies. The rest of Europe began to fear that imperial propaganda touting world domination might become a reality.

Gattinara understood the fear of imperial domination, especially as experienced by the Italians. For this reason, he counselled the emperor to ease the fears of the French and the Italians by releasing the king with few restrictions and restraining himself from too much interference in Italian affairs. The Burgundian counsellors argued against his position and put punishing stipulations in the treaty that released the French king. So opposed was the grand chancellor to the Treaty of Madrid that he refused to attach his seals to the document. Charles V grudgingly broke with custom and tradition by affixing them himself. Gattinara found vindication shortly afterward, when Francis I repudiated the entire treaty and the Italian powers allied together with France and England against the empire in the League of Cognac, also known as the Holy League.

By 1526 Gattinara abandoned diplomatic means of conquest to focus on propaganda and the preparation of a fleet. In the propaganda war of 1526–7, he took a light approach to the Lutheran heresy in order to recruit German foot soldiers for the invasion. Propaganda, mainly written by his secretary, Alfonso de Valdés, promised reform of the corrupt Church and the calling of a council to reach the ‘evangelical truth’. He tried to hire Erasmus in his fight against the papacy, but with little success. These works were an attempt to use social resentment and religious fervour to rally the people to the imperial side.

Imperial troops invaded and brutally sacked the city of Rome in May 1527. For over five months, the city endured widespread rape, slaughter and famine. In addition, Lutheran soldiers destroyed religious images and desecrated the sac-

raments. Gattinara recognized the stain placed on the imperial reputation, so he advised his emperor to either approve the sack as an attack on a 'predator, a disturber and usurper of Christianity' or declare his sorrow at the unfortunate events and try to restore peace through a general council. While the emperor expressed regret, Valdés composed a dialogue that absolved Charles from blame and defended the sack as an act of God's vengeance against corruption. Gattinara continued to push for an Italian invasion and the secret construction of a fleet.

The emperor, refusing his advice, became estranged from his main advisor. Gattinara decided to return to home to Piedmont. He was in Genoa enduring a difficult episode of gout during a terrible siege when the emperor requested his return to Spain. He returned amid peace negotiations between the emperor with France and the papacy. Gattinara still wanted Charles to invade Italy. Although the emperor had agreed to make the Italian voyage, other counsellors had convinced him to go about it differently. Gattinara described his meeting with Charles in dramatic terms. In anguish, he lay sick in his bed. The emperor came to his bedside to consult with him. When the emperor told his chancellor that all of the preparations for the long-awaited invasion of Italy were complete, Gattinara strangely seemed to advise the emperor against the invasion of Italy:

Caesar visited the sick man to confer about his Italian journey. He told him how the fleet had been prepared, and that he hoped to have fleet ready before Christmas of 1528, and that he hoped to leave Spain by mid-January. Gattinara smiled and said he did not believe it. It would be enough for him if he could do it before the end of spring, 1529. Caesar was a little disturbed. Before he had considered Mercurino the biggest supporter of the journey to Italy, but now many people had told him that he was strongly against this voyage.⁴⁴

Gattinara gave many reasons for disassociating himself from a policy that was unpopular with the Spanish. As he stated, there was no lack of people who 'made death threats, and others tried to stir up the people to kill him'.⁴⁵ But his primary aim in denying the voyage was to encourage the emperor to follow through with it. By describing the voyage as nearly impossible, he intended to stoke the enthusiasm of the young prince. When he expressed doubt that the emperor 'would change his mind again, and go back on the voyage to Italy', he intended for his expression of no confidence to incite the emperor to prove his doubts wrong. His psychological trick worked. As he explained, 'the things Mercurino said, and how he said them, lit a fire in the mind of Caesar himself for the voyage. They gave him such stings that just as a free running horse, he did not need any other spurs'.⁴⁶ Whether the meeting ever took place in the way he described is impossible to know. However, it reveals that the grand chancellor wanted his audience to appreciate his ability to manipulate the emotions of his much younger emperor.

After the meeting between the gout-ridden counsellor and the emperor, the imperial court made preparations for the invasion. The court moved to Barcelona, from where they were to embark. In this city the papal nuncio, the bishop of Vaison, arrived to seek reconciliation with the emperor. Gattinara was among three counsellors charged with negotiating the settlement known as the Treaty of Barcelona of 1529 linking the Spanish empire with the papacy.

That the conflict between the emperor and the pope would be solved by a treaty of union between them should not be surprising. Although Italy had suffered and would suffer more, the pope had much to gain personally from an alliance with the emperor. The main goals of Clement VII were to secure the interests of his family, maintain Florence as his patrimony, keep the Church intact under the leadership of Rome, and preserve the dignity of the papacy. He succeeded in all of these goals with the help of Charles V. The grand chancellor's strategy of conquest through the appeal of personal interest over public good had won in the end.⁴⁷

Ten days after the conclusion of the treaty, word reached Barcelona of the destruction of the French army in Italy. This was further proof of the divine approval of his plans. In the words of Gattinara:

The fact that everything happened at the same time, as though interwoven, from so many different parts of the world, all directed towards the same end, beyond the possibility of human hope, sent according to divine will, as they said, brought a great deal of admiration into the hearts of men. It seemed almost as if Caesar's affairs had been directed miraculously by God himself.⁴⁸

After this statement, the autobiography ends abruptly after a short discussion of the practical details of the plan to embark. The last few lines of the autobiography are these:

Everyone appointed to make the journey with Caesar would come together. One by one, they would enter their assigned ships and galleys with their horses, arms and all of their supplies. They would board their respective ships or galleys on the eve or vigil of the feast of St James. On day of St James itself, they would be ready to set sail when the admiral of the fleet ordered it.⁴⁹

His autobiography ended with the fulfilment of his lifetime goal: the imperial invasion of Italy. Significantly, his autobiography ends with a vision of order and arrangement. Everyone and everything converged and followed directions given from above to their assigned locations. Clearly he intended this image of the ship as a metaphor for the ship of state.

Little time remained for the grand chancellor. He devoted his days in Barcelona to the completion of his last will and testament. In his remaining ten months, he was able to attend the imperial coronation in Bologna, put his

domains in order and receive the cardinal's cap. He died in Innsbruck in 1530. In his will, he specified the location for his sepulchre, under the floor directly in front of the altar of the church of St Peter in the town of Gattinara. He himself wrote the inscription that adorns his gravestone:

Qui vivens publicis semper negociis oppressus exitit – hic moriens pedibus etiam se publice calcandum statuit.

(He who while living was oppressed by public affairs decided while dying to be pressed upon publicly by feet.)

The curious epitaph suited the curious historical figure. Although he was forgotten by history, the policy decisions that Mercurino di Gattinara carried out with precision and audacity nonetheless changed the course of events and affected the lives of generations.

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2 PREPARING THE WAY OF THE LORD

As early as 1516, the Habsburg dynastic servant wrote a prophetic work directed at the new king of Spain, entitled *Supplicatory Oration including a Dream of the Last World Monarchy and the Triumph of Christianity, Broadly Stated, with the Means of Accomplishing It*.¹ The work contains a curious amalgam of biblical prophecy, humanist rhetoric and political realism, exemplifying the relationship between the author's identity as a prophet and his function as a diplomat and counsellor. According to his treatise, the means of reaching world domination included not only practical experience and humanist scholarship, but also the heavy application of religious mysticism and utopianism to muster public support for the new regime.

The second decade of the sixteenth century witnessed a blossoming of treatises dedicated to the education of princes. Machiavelli, Erasmus, Seyssel and Budé elaborated the genre of the 'mirror of princes'. These guidebooks traced their ancestry back to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, a biographical treatise on the art of governing based on Cyrus the Great. Although a few appeared in the Middle Ages, the genre flourished in fifteenth-century Italy. They purported to instruct and spur the new prince on to virtue and contained practical advice on the organization of counsel, finance and foreign affairs, while simultaneously showcasing the wisdom and competence of the author. Although many authors intended their work for a limited audience, Gattinara sought publication for the *Oratio Supplicatoria*. He dedicated the treatise to Luigi Marliano, a Milanese diplomat, advisor, physician to Charles, and author of the motto *Plus Ultra*. In the preface, he indicated that he hoped it would reach the 'ears of a certain adolescent', but also asserted that the book 'would engage a diverse readership of many kinds'.² He hoped that the reader would add his talent and authority to the work, both emending and recommending it, and decide for himself whether or not to publish it.³ Accordingly, the work seems more characteristic of propaganda than actual political counsel or advice. Perhaps he did not think the sixteen-year-old king could tell the difference.⁴

Gattinara began the work with a short Italian sonnet that underlined the supra-rational foundations for his belief in universal monarchy: dreams, voices in the night, prophecy, and knowledge infused in the unlearned.

If one can have knowledge of future things
 If divine secrets may be known
 If by prophecy they can be believed or revealed
 If by the images in dreams, or preoccupations
 If by revelation, or by scripture
 If by nocturnal voices, or unknown spirits
 If by wisdom infused in the foolish
 If by planets, signs, or even stars,
 If by calculations of true science
 If by living reason and right conjecture
 If by speculation or experience,
 One can have information or understanding
 About the Predestination or Prescience
 Of him who from the beginning of time was chosen
 To accomplish the fulfilment
 Of true universal monarchy
 Here within you will find the doctrine
 Leaving aside the vices and evils
 The mouth harp, flute and *forcete*
 Following virtue to the world elected
 What God had permitted
 By his commandments and true laws
 To congregate his flock under one shepherd⁵

Interestingly, Gattinara set his grand prophetic dream within a larger, more mundane work. He began by tracing his ancestry back to the Burgundian nobility, an obvious fabrication, and continued with several pages lamenting his unjust treatment as President of Burgundy, a post from which he had recently been relieved.⁶ The local nobility of this region had brought a suit against him concerning the purchase of a castle near Dôle. The trial became so contentious that Gattinara's adversaries attempted to assassinate him. To give thanks for his deliverance from his enemies, he made a vow to visit the Holy Sepulchre. The vow was commuted to a monastery near Malines in 1516. His treatise to Charles was written during this retreat.⁷ Part of this personal introduction served to vindicate himself and his reputation, since the affair had led to his resignation. He may have also emphasized his unpleasant situation to portray himself as a misunderstood and mistreated prophet. He described his mental state in detail, as astonished, anguished, tortured and disturbed.⁸ From this personal narrative, he shifted to a consideration of the current state of humanity in general. He stated:

I contemplated the calamity of peoples common everywhere, the neglecting of divine ritual, the disrespect of religion, the extinction of faith, the absence of hope, the reduction of charity, the weakness of fortitude, reluctance of justice, measuring out of moderation, overthrow of restraint, perversion of customs, desertion of virtue, abhorrence of good arts, exuberance of wickedness, the growth of all evils.⁹

He related how in the course of his personal struggles, a voice in the night came to him in a dream. It offered a solution to his questions concerning the origin of all the evils in the world. A spirit, or perhaps a ghost, provided him with the answer he sought. The source of all earthly misfortunes was a 'plurality of princes'.¹⁰ The phrase *pluralitas principatuum* had appeared numerous times from the time of Aquinas and Dante, and had been repeated often by later medieval publicists.¹¹ Gattinara then explained his vision of universal monarchy and the culmination of the End Times, when Charles of Burgundy would conquer the infidels, travel to Jerusalem, and in words borrowed from Pseudo-Methodius,

The king of the Romans will ascend Golgotha, where the wood of the holy cross was fastened, and the Lord endured death for us. And the king will take the crown from his head and put it on the cross. Stretching his hands to the sky, he will hand the kingdom of the Christians to God the Father¹²

Throughout the *Oratio*, Gattinara emphasized the religious duty of the king. Indeed, he went beyond explaining the religious mission of the king to describing the king himself as divine. He introduced a discussion of the lineage of Charles with the following:

When our omnipotent Saviour Jesus Christ descended to the earth for the salvation of human kind, he only sent before him one precursor, John the Baptist, to prepare his way. However, for this new salvation of the Christians and to bring the sheep back to Christ so that there might be one flock and one shepherd, he gave your Catholic Majesty two precursors in order of succession to likewise prepare the way to this monarchy, namely, your paternal and maternal grandparents.¹³

Gattinara deliberately blurred the lines between the sacred and the earthly in his *Oratio*. When referring to his father, Maximilian I, he advised Charles to say, 'I and my father are one', an unmistakable reference to the statement by Jesus in John 10:30.¹⁴ The use of messianic images and language served to set the young prince on a supernatural and super-historical plane of existence.

It may seem strange that an embattled provincial bureaucrat like Gattinara would portray himself as prophet of the victory of Christ against the Antichrist and the beginning of the End of History. However, his form of self-promotion was not outside of Renaissance norms.¹⁵ His treatise is basically the sort of text one would expect from a sixteenth-century jurist and diplomat/counsellor looking for employment and claiming supernatural powers of prophecy.

Despite his carefully constructed persona of embattled prophet, however, there are strong reasons to doubt that Gattinara's vision came to him in a dream. Foremost is the fact that much of the prophecy in the work is taken word by word from Giovanni Annio of Viterbo's late fifteenth-century work, *Tractatus de futuris christianorum triumphis in Saracenis*.¹⁶ Following Viterbo, Gattinara outlined four stages of the Church and claimed that in the last stage (coinciding with the fifth monarchy of Daniel) a universal monarch will enable the Christian people to triumph over the Saracens. His named sources included the prophecies of Malachi, Zachariah and St Bridget, as well as the scriptures, astrology and classical sources. In the years between 1490 and 1530, a prophetic and visionary religiosity permeated popular culture, especially in Renaissance Italy.¹⁷ In addition to the publications of Florence and Venice, there were transcriptions often made by jurists in the Piedmont and Lombardy in towns such as Asti and Vercelli.¹⁸ The library of the duke of Savoy contained several Joachimite manuscripts.¹⁹ In addition, Gattinara surely encountered numerous prophecies in the Belgian monastery at Scheut. Works of imperial apocalypticism were numerous and in plentiful supply when Gattinara composed his own work of prophecy.²⁰

The exact sources of prophetic ideas are difficult to trace because apocalyptic thought is almost always pseudonymous, meaning that newer texts were generally attributed to older sources. The prophetic tradition of the 'Last Emperor' stretched back a thousand years. Although Gattinara used biblical sources such as Daniel and Zachariah to support his argument, the appearance of a saviour emperor does not appear in the Bible. It was only in the fourth century, when Constantine converted to Christianity, that this prophecy was used to validate a significant change in the tradition, from seeing Rome as the enemy (as in the Revelation of John) to seeing the good Christian emperor as a saviour who would defeat the enemies of Christ.²¹ Such ideas were grafted onto older prophecies, such as those of the Tiburtine Sibyl. Although the original prophecy has been traced back to the reign of Theodosius, embellished copies from the ninth and tenth centuries (from northern Italy) included visions of the Last Emperor not present in the original. Gattinara almost certainly worked from the copies.²² The addition of the defeat of the Muslims to the emperor prophecy appears first in Pseudo-Methodius, an eighth-century Syrian reacting to the recent conquest. His vision of the saviour emperor on Golgotha, which appears in the *Oratio Supplicatoria* mentioned above, was printed and reprinted repeatedly from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century.

Imperial propagandists grafted the emperor prophecies onto those of Joachim of Fiore (1135–1202). Like the Tiburtine Sibyl and Methodius, Joachim was claimed as the author of many pseudonymous prophecies. Although Joachim did not champion a saviour emperor, he had predicted that 'new orders of spiritual men' would arrive at the end of the sixth state of man to initiate a golden

age: the seventh age of man. This would be a time of *jubilatio* in the frame of human time, after the defeat of the Antichrist, but before the Last Judgment. Joachim's affirmation of the possibility of peace and a renovation of institutions had political implications. Most importantly, it encouraged people to believe in the possibility of improvement in human affairs. Thus propagandists could use Joachimist prophecies to promise readers a better world free from war, oppression and corruption. This utopian ideal was then linked to the emperor prophecies. Only a saviour emperor could establish a worldwide empire to guarantee peace and the reformation of the Christian religion.²³

After the prophetic vision, the treatise took the form of a commonplace book, as Gattinara assembled numerous examples from antiquity of the classic virtues such as clemency, magnanimity, liberality and justice. Despite frequent references to Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Cicero, Valerius Maximus and others, the work mainly relied on the humanist educational treatises of the fifteenth century as its source material. Those in turn relied on earlier compendia and epitomes of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages. At the time it was common practice to compile copious amounts of commonplaces from contemporary works without citing them. The work was intended to serve a contemporary purpose while maintaining the veneer of ancient knowledge.²⁴ This section of the *Oratio Supplicatoria* borrowed entire passages from Bartolomeo Platina's *De Principe*, a work dedicated to Federico Gonzaga in 1470. It, in turn, had been based largely on the work of Poggio Bracciolini and others.²⁵

The remainder of the work served to highlight Gattinara's abilities as a statesman, rather than a prophet. He provided an account of the territories inherited by Charles, including the newly discovered lands in America, and then he analysed the strengths and weaknesses of foreign powers, including France, England, Burgundy, the states of Italy and Hungary. An assessment of the army in terms of its composition, discipline and resources was followed by a discussion of religion and its role in the unification of his subjects. He spent a great deal of time advising Charles how to appoint qualified advisors who would not be corrupted by ambition. He also advised Charles to hire skilled jurists with experience of other lands – people just like him.²⁶ Gattinara, bringing his rhetoric back to reality, qualified his statement on what he meant by world domination:

I do not mean that Caesar should be given ownership of everything in particular, nor that each and every kingdom and domain be put into his hands, nor that kings and princes should be robbed of their kingdoms and domains. But I think that all kings and princes ought to recognize the superiority of the empire, and they should agree to it as they are legally bound. And their disputes, which are the cause of so many wars, will dissolve under the authority of the monarch.²⁷

He probably knew that this much more limited vision was equally unlikely to happen in a world still dominated by the warrior ethic and feudal practices. However, this limitation initiated a new, more reasonable, tone into the treatise.

Although Gattinara applied the veneer of antiquity and biblical prophecy very thickly to his *Oratio Supplicatoria*, and indeed to all of his published works, he eschewed these sources of authority in his private political counsel. In his lengthy memorials to Charles, written from 1519 to 1526, he alleged no impressive authorities. Instead he dealt with issues of justice, finance, counsel and military strategy in the same straightforward manner as Claude de Seyssel.²⁸ Both Turinese jurists shared the realist political perspective that characterized Italian diplomacy of the early sixteenth century. Florentines such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini as well as Venetian ambassadors all spoke the language of political realism in their dispatches and memorials.

Whether Gattinara believed in his own imperial ideology is a complicated question. When Gattinara argued that Jesus Christ ordained the Holy Roman Empire by being born in the age of Augustus, or that Charles V was a semi-divine messiah who would unite the world under one government to bring peace to all of Christendom, he was well aware of opposing perspectives. In either case, he used this utopian ideology to destroy, both militarily and rhetorically, any opposition to the personal rule of Charles V.

Although the treatise was addressed to Charles of Spain, its immediate context was the Italian Wars that began with the French invasion of 1494. Gattinara adhered to the Ghibelline ideology of the Middle Ages, which supported the rights of the Holy Roman Empire over the independent Italian states. This vision placed an emphasis on unity, particularly the unity of Christendom under one government. It saw the 'plurality of princes' as the cause of all wars. If one prince ruled supreme, imperial publicists asserted, peace would reign on earth. This was the vision of Dante's *Monarchia*, a work which Gattinara would later promote in his battle with the papacy ten years later. It was also expanded by both Maximilian I and Ferdinand of Spain in the generation before Charles V, in opposition to the Valois dynasty of France. The French monarchy was seen by many in Italy as a counterweight to imperial claims of world domination.²⁹ This was especially so in several Italian city-states that had traditional alliances with France and the papacy. This faction, the Guelphs, tended to promote a political vision based on independent self-government. Instead of emphasizing unity, they found justifications for political fragmentation. The accepted belief in the unity of truth was reflected in its political equivalent: empire. Sources emphasizing this unity provided a perspective that competed directly against the plurality of competing ideas and interests. This plurality corresponded with the political reality of the Italian state system in the early fourteenth century, and therefore the argument of imperial unity made sense. In the early sixteenth century, the reality of

independent emerging nation-states paralleled the Italian situation so that the argument of imperial unity, and the concomitant goal of world peace, fit the circumstances perfectly. Moreover, the argument of unity (whether of truth or empire) derived from religious belief, and therefore did not leave room for any legitimate opposition. This made it extremely compelling political propaganda.

The widespread popular appeal of biblical prophecy in the early sixteenth century made it an important tool for garnering support for political agendas. In addition to the imperial tradition of prophecy associated with the Habsburgs, the grand chancellor also worked with the strain of Spanish apocalypticism associated with the House of Aragon. Ferdinand of Aragon, the maternal grandfather of Charles V, was the heir to a prophetic tradition reaching back to the early 1300s. Gattinara had many occasions to encounter these prophecies during his time in Spain as an advisor to Maximilian I, or during his retreat to the Belgian monastery around the year 1516, precisely when Spanish courtiers were streaming into the Low Countries after the death of Ferdinand to find employment with his heir, the future Charles V. The Catalan region was especially fertile ground for prophecies centring on the House of Aragon.³⁰ Like Joachimite prophecies in Italy, the Catalans looked to a last world emperor who would recapture Jerusalem, bring peace and justice, and gather 'all sheep under one shepherd'. From the end of the thirteenth century, prophets such as Arnau de Vilanova, as well as his intellectual progeny, predicted that this last world emperor would be from the Iberian Peninsula.

Evidence that Gattinara was influenced by the Catalan tradition of biblical prophecy, and Arnau de Vilanova in particular, is found in the Gattinara family archives in Vercelli, Italy, where there is an extract of six pages recently edited and published by Giancarlo Boccotti.³¹ The principal theme of the extract is the coming of Christ and the Antichrist on the Day of Judgment. Other themes are the corruption of the Church and the conversion of the infidels.³² At the top of Gattinara's transcription is a title: 'Extract from an old manuscript, found in a monastery in Brussels with the title: *The Victory of Christ against the Antichrist*; author unknown.'³³ Gattinara indicated the date of the book as 1315. The first five parts of the extract cover issues regarding the Day of Judgment, the coming of the Antichrist and the renovation of the Church. The last section, written by a 'nearly illiterate' holy man, includes an apocalyptic vision. The vision was, in fact, a well-known piece of medieval prophecy associated with Arnau de Vilanova known as the *Vae mecum*. It first appeared in his *De mysterio cymbalorum ecclesiae* sometime around 1305.³⁴ The following five selections taken from the final section of the work refer to the Holy Land, Italy, Germany, France and Spain, respectively. The vision begins:

See the world in a hundred years, because it is far from my dignity. See the inhabitants of Syria torn to pieces by their profane studies. To my indignation, a profane people will throw them from the coastline. And the land will be wilderness until a new David will come to repair the altar of Zion.

The nest of donkeys, Italy, will be bitten by lions and wolves, born in its own woods, and the blood will run from the nails torn from the thumbs, and having experienced the earthy chasm, will learn to recognize the medicine for its thirst.

Germany will be crowned with sadness, and with its neck broken, will drink from the heat of its fury with gigantic priests, in whose sea a multitude of beasts will stir up a storm exposing the navigators to dangers. Now the confusion of the princes will put the tranquillity of the people at risk.

The serpentine arms of the king of the bees will constrict the flanks of its subjects and stretching from sea to sea, will fold themselves around them. An immoderate feast! Indeed the king who gulps down the menstrual blood of his bride will ruin the throne, strangled with his own cord. From the throne runs the hatred of neighbours, rising up from the arid business of the false treaty. Nor will the ambitious pollution of blood be transmitted without impunity to the deserving sons.

Spain, nurse of the Mohammedan perversity, will be butchered by a fury ebbing and flowing, for its kingdoms rise up one against the other. And when the colt of the mare will reach twenty-one years, the devouring fire will multiply, until the bat devours the ashes of Spain and subdues Africa, crushes the head of the beast, and accepts the monarchy.

The son of man, of the bat, rises with impetuous repentance to the sieve of mortal men, to separate the sons of Jerusalem and the sons of Babylon with a bitter sword. And the dragon, concluding his extreme sentence in his fury, remains deceived and conquered in eternity. And these are the words of the revelation.³⁵

The reference to the bat indicates a connection to Catalonia. The bat, or 'bird of the evening', was an allusion to the West, the land of the setting sun. The animal also devoured 'mosquitoes', a word clearly representing Muslims in Spain due to its similarity to the Spanish word for mosque, *mezquita*. The tradition of describing the king of Spain as a bat had a long tradition in Catalan sources.³⁶

The author of this passage, Arnau de Vilanova, was a Catalan mystic and physician who wrote numerous tracts about the eminent last days and the coming of the Antichrist. Linked with the Spiritual Franciscans against the Dominicans and Scholasticism, he advocated the preaching by laypersons (like himself) and the reformation of the clergy.³⁷ Politically, he served the courts of both kings and popes as a physician and advisor. In particular, he followed the House of Aragon, linked at that time with Catalonia, and served both John II and Frederick III of Sicily. He maintained that the last world emperor was destined to expel the infidels from Spain and unite the world under the Christian faith, and he would finally defeat the Antichrist in Jerusalem. Arnau shared with the Spiritual Franciscan movement an intense mysticism and belief in the coming of a new age on Earth. The Spiritual Franciscans' adherence to the idea of poverty and criticism of the Church hierarchy led to their persecution by the papacy in the early

fourteenth century.³⁸ Because this movement positioned itself against the pope, it provided ideological support for the claims of the empire against the papacy. Quite possibly this explains a great deal of Gattinara's interest in the prophecy of Arnau de Vilanova. Like Arnau, the grand chancellor was a layman using prophecy and mysticism to criticize the Church from the outside.

The *Vae mecum* prophecy in Gattinara's papers reveals how closely the years around 1300 mirrored those around 1500. At issue in both eras was the conflict between the emperor and the papacy and between the House of Aragon and France. In the years before 1250, Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, had tried to establish not only dominion in Sicily but in northern Italy as well. In response, the papacy invited the House of Anjou (Charles of Anjou was the brother of the French king) to invade Sicily. As Frederick's Hohenstaufen dynasty weakened, a bloody uprising known as the Sicilian Vespers in 1282 wanted Peter III of Aragon to take the throne. This resulted in the fight between France and Spain over Italy that would last for more than 200 years.³⁹ This rivalry was the main issue in the first years of the reign of Charles V, at least before the eruption of Lutheranism north of the Alps. The contest between the empire and the papacy also raged in Gattinara's time, a fight involving the propaganda of 'reform' that culminated in the Sack of Rome in 1527. Thus the grand chancellor could use Arnau to revive prophecies eerily relevant to his own age, so much so that the modern editor of this piece, Giancarlo Boccotti, concluded that Gattinara had invented the prophecy himself.⁴⁰

By the 1520s Gattinara was well acquainted with the Catalanian/Aragonese tradition of biblical prophecy, which continued steadily from the 1300s to Gattinara's time, but reached a high point in the reign of Ferdinand II.⁴¹ The Polish ambassador to Charles V, Johannes Dantiscus, or Juan Dantisco as he was known in Spain, mentioned Gattinara's prophetic beliefs in a letter destined for the Polish king:

War is made [in Spain] on the basis of predictions, and they believe in them, especially the Grand Chancellor, who sometimes speaks of them proudly at the table. He said that many years ago there was a hermit from around Constantinople who pronounced a prophecy that began, 'rise, bat, rise, rise'. He attributes and applies this phrase to this emperor. Among many other words, this prediction contains these: 'You will humble all the tyrants and the three kings with your own blood'. When the Grand Chancellor proclaimed these words as an oracle, perhaps upset on account of the discomfort I manifested, he wanted to know why I was offended. I said that I had heard other prophecies about an enormous wave of peoples from the north.⁴²

The comment refers not to the *Vae mundo* of Arnau, but to a text published much later in 1496 by the Valencian astrologer and doctor Jeroni Torrella. The entire work, *De rege valentino*, includes a prophecy purportedly attributed to a hermit from Constantinople in 1455, which begins with the line '*Surge, vespertilio, surge, surge*' written in reference to Ferdinand of Aragon.⁴³ Thus it is

clear that Gattinara was well acquainted with a tradition of messianic imperial prophecies, from both the Holy Roman Empire and Spain, which stretched back hundreds of years.

In addition to the imperial tradition of prophecy discussed above, there were other prophecies enlisted in the cause of social and political revolt against the ruling regime. The threat of social revolt bolstered by prophecy erupted precisely when Gattinara took office in Spain. Contemporaneous with the Comuneros uprising against Charles V was the Germanías revolt in Valencia. In 1519 a revolt of local militias, *Las Germanías*, gained strength and courage from a curious messianic figure known as *El Encubierto* (The Hidden One).⁴⁴ This leader claimed to be an illiterate shepherd contacted by Enoch and Elijah to lead a crusade to reform the clergy and take Jerusalem. He seemed to be the saviour who appeared in the prophecies contained in the contemporaneous work *De la Ven-guda de Anticrist* by John Alamany. *El Encubierto* ordered all of the wealth of the nobility confiscated and given both to the militias for the holy crusade and to aid the poor. He did not acknowledge Charles V, stating that he would only become as much as God wished. He also added, 'I will demonstrate how he is king and is not king'.⁴⁵ The Hidden One was decapitated in May 1522, and the Inquisition burned his body, ending both his reputation as a saviour and his social rebellion. Although later chronicles claimed that he was a pretender to the throne who claimed to be king, in reality he envisioned a purified society without any king at all. This perspective was unacceptable and therefore suppressed in Spain until the Romantic era revived its historical memory. Gattinara's experiences in these years taught him the importance of popular support and the power of prophecy, thus his desire to promulgate those prophecies explicitly linking a messianic figure bringing peace, justice and prosperity to the lineage of the king.

In her study of prophecy in Renaissance Italy, Ottavia Niccoli described the transition of prophecy from its origins with the common folk to its co-option by the governing classes. What was once mythic and visionary became propaganda when it reached the religious and political elite. Biblical prophecy flourished throughout Renaissance Italy. However, after 1530, when Charles V consolidated his power in Italy, prophecy was associated with heresy and suppressed by the government.⁴⁶ With imperial power firmly established and bolstered by the Inquisition, the consent of the people became less necessary. However, Gattinara, who died in 1530, operated in that window of time when political elites still required popular support for their political and military agendas.

Although it is relatively easy to connect Gattinara's political motivations to his use of biblical prophecy, it is very difficult to ascertain whether prophecy directed his policy or whether his policy directed his prophetic activity. The fact that he relied almost exclusively on modern versions of well-known imperial prophecies written by other politically motivated actors rather than the

scriptures themselves provides support for the former proposition. He left no independent work of biblical exegesis, and one could hardly be surprised that, given his tireless and extremely well-documented activity in the service of his political office, he had little time for sustained meditation on the scriptures.

Throughout his political career, Gattinara cultivated an intense interest in the occult, weaving more controversial sources of knowledge into a traditional emphasis on the scriptures. In an age when astrology and numerology were fashionable at all of the courts of Europe, the grand chancellor appeared more involved than most. His abundant correspondence with his friend, Peter Martyr d'Anghiera, reveals a deep concern with both prophecy and astrology.⁴⁷ More significant, perhaps, was his friendship with Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, a doctor and specialist in occult philosophy who wrote the famous *De occulta philosophia* in 1517.⁴⁸ Gattinara and Agrippa probably spent time together first in Dôle in the years 1508–9, when Agrippa gave lectures on occult theology at the university and Gattinara was President of the Parlement of Dôle. Both managed to earn the contempt of the locals in this region.⁴⁹ The grand chancellor's patronage would eventually secure Agrippa an imperial post as historiographer and archivist in 1529. Agrippa even spoke at his friend's funeral, which included eulogies to Gattinara as '*Hermes maximus*'.⁵⁰ His use of the Greek translation of the name 'Mercurino' underlined a connection with Hermes Trismegistus, the 'thrice-great Hermes' believed to be the most ancient source of knowledge in the Western occult tradition.⁵¹ Although Agrippa recanted his attachment to the occult later in his career, the question remains why Gattinara remained close to him. Perhaps he wanted to associate himself with the trappings of mysterious power, or he might have served as a 'court sorcerer', a figure not totally uncommon in royal courts throughout the Middle Ages.⁵² Perhaps he also considered himself a magician in the Renaissance sense of the word, as a *magus* whose secret knowledge and heightened abilities enabled him to harness the forces of nature to control affairs on earth.⁵³

Despite his mystical aura, Gattinara's natural habitat was the highly charged political world of the early sixteenth-century Spanish court, a hostile environment for supernatural musings. According to his own autobiography, he received a great deal of ridicule from his fellow courtiers, who accused him of 'devoting himself to vain astrological predictions' and 'trusting in apocryphal prophecies'. He answered these accusations with the statement, 'true astronomy and prophecy is what prudence produces, the elements of which should be the memory of past events and the consideration of present affairs'. He then added a quote from Cicero, 'It should be far from a wise man to ever say: I should not have imagined that.'⁵⁴ In his response to his fellow politicians, he seemed to deny that he based his policy on a non-rational belief in the supernatural causes of events. Of course, the context of these statements played a large role in his apparent denial

of magic and prophecy. The quotes appeared during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Madrid. Within the high counsel of government, he felt the need to make clear that his position rested on solid reason, or prudence, based on experience and observation of facts. To indicate this, he used the rhetoric of contemporary Italian politics, which he reserved for secret, highly restricted, audiences at the highest level of government. He did not attempt to impress his fellow diplomats with imperial prophecies during treaty negotiations. Despite his professed belief in mystical and occult sources of knowledge, he recognized that the expression of such beliefs was inappropriate in certain contexts.

The main goal of the *Oratio Supplicatoria* was to lay the foundations for legitimate power. Gattinara, having been educated in a political battleground, did not take political obedience for granted. He understood the benefits of a psychological approach to the problem of loyalty. His ultimate strategy in the work was to make subjects feel like a part of a larger, unified, whole. Rather than appealing to individual interests, he focused on harmony, downplaying social tension. Religiously, he used the metaphor of the flock under the good shepherd. Individuals were encouraged to see themselves as elements of a larger, cosmic harmony. Readers were drawn into a narrative of linear history. History was moving forward in a line that started with the birth of Jesus (which coincided with the creation of the Roman Empire) and continued until the present time. In the future, Charles would unite all of Christendom and initiate an era of peace and harmony. The emphasis on *renovatio* and *reformatio* made it a compelling psychological strategy, because it placed the reader in a story of triumph. The subject could share in the glory of the dynasty. A focus on reformation and a new world order gave people hope.

Using a rhetorical strategy that portrayed the current state of affairs in as dim a light as possible, he could contrast the bright future offered by the saviour-emperor. In the *Oratio*, Gattinara urged the king, 'You need to restore the empire and build the last Christian monarchy to put an end to all the evils. Justice, which has flown to the heavens, can return to the earth, and a true peace can be achieved in the world.'⁵⁵ By placing hope in the future rather than providing an analysis of the past, Gattinara appealed to the emotions of his readers. Placing his argument on a supra-historical plane made it impervious to rational critique, which was precisely his aim. His opponents must have found it difficult argue against prophecies and whispers in the night. They would find it harder still to argue against the soldiers and ships making their way to Italy.

3 GATTINARA AND AMERICA

In the Royal Library at Turin, a bound manuscript collection of over 800 folios testifies to the geographic diversity of the grand chancellor's interests. Never indexed or catalogued, the collection includes letters to and from Charles V, Francis I, Henry VIII and Clement VII, as well as treaties, marriage contracts, orations and diplomatic reports. Most contain the marginalia of Gattinara himself, who seems to have surveyed and processed every line. In the middle of this collection of miscellanea lies a curious document in Spanish entitled 'La gran ciudad de Tenustitan'.¹ Written just after the fall of Tenochtitlan, it contains a list of Aztec cities and provinces, including their populations and resources. In the margins, Gattinara had written the population counts in Arabic numbers and added them. Testifying to the random quality of the compilation, the next document appeared in Italian with the title 'The expenses required for a fleet going by sea from Genoa to the Peninsula.' This document also included calculations in Arabic numerals indicating how much money it would cost to invade Italy.² The juxtaposition of these two sets of calculations, one counting the population of Mexico, the other the budget for an invasion of Italy, might have occurred purely by chance. However, they illustrate the relationship between America and Italy within the imperial strategy of the grand chancellor. He looked to the New World for resources to conquer Europe. As gold arrived on the treasure ships coming into Seville, his goal of universal monarchy moved beyond the realm of propaganda and into possibility.

In 1981 Luigi Avonto published *Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara e l'America*, a study that included documents found in archives in Turin and Vercelli. He outlined the role the grand chancellor played in reforming the administration of the New World and analysed Gattinara's intervention in three cases: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Diego Columbus and Hernán Cortés. In Avonto's interpretation, the humanitarian impulses of Gattinara contrasted with his interests in state centralization and economic exploitation as well as his dedication to the ideal of universal monarchy.³ This chapter largely builds on Avonto's investigation, while providing additional evidence to support a conclusion slightly altered

from Avonto that presents Gattinara's concern with the humane treatment of indigenous peoples as a key strategy in his consolidation of power.

After the discoveries of Christopher Columbus, certain members of the Spanish court mistrusted the motivation and activities of explorers in the New World. One of these, Juan de Rodríguez Fonseca, chaplain to Isabella and archbishop of Burgos, founded the *Casa de Contratación de las Indias* in 1503. This body regulated the trade coming into Spain and required careful records of cargo, new lands, peoples and resources recently discovered.⁴ Judicial matters concerning the New World were entrusted to a subcommittee of the *Consejo de Castilla*. As grand chancellor, Gattinara joined this committee upon the assumption of his duties in 1518. When Fonseca died in 1524, the grand chancellor helped to establish a new administrative council, the *Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias*, which would preside over affairs in America until the eighteenth century. He appointed as president the Dominican friar and confessor of the king García de Loaysa. In addition, in 1528 Gattinara was appointed chancellor for life of the *Audiencias* of Española and Nueva España, by which title he held the seals of the Indies.⁵

Very few people in Spain had more information about affairs in the Indies than Gattinara. He was one of a handful of people who could comprehend the possibilities of the New World. His close friend, frequent correspondent and fellow Italian, Peter Martyr d'Anghiera, had written the first history of the New World, *De Orbe Novo*, based on information from the *Casa de Contratación* and the Council of the Indies at the court of Castile.⁶ He also had access to the reports of treasure derived from Mexico. In the Archive of the Indies, there are over 450 *cedulas* (reports) from the New World from 1518–22 alone, with Gattinara's signature on them.⁷ The vast majority of these reports are lists of cargo from ships coming in from the New World, the index of which indicates the extent of Gattinara's wide imprint.⁸ An estimated amount of over 17,000 kilograms of gold had arrived on ships coming into Seville by the end of the 1520s.⁹ He was also one of the first to understand the extent of the empire conquered by Cortés. The above-mentioned account of the population and resources of 'Tenustitan' named fourteen cities and twenty-four provinces under Aztec rule. In addition, it described Totutepeq as a rival empire with jurisdiction over thirty provinces and around 300,000 inhabitants. According to the document, the population of New Spain, or Mexico, added to around 1.6 million inhabitants.¹⁰ Fully knowledgeable of these resources, Gattinara made protecting them a priority at the Spanish court.

Gattinara's first major encounter with the affairs of the Indies involved Bartolomé de Las Casas's plan for peaceful colonization of the Indies. The grand chancellor strongly supported the 'Apostle of the Indies' who had publicized the atrocities committed by the Spanish in the New World. Las Casas had spent most of his adult life in the Indies as a soldier, priest and enterprising *encomendero*, working within the *encomienda* system (from the verb *encomendar*,

meaning to entrust), in which indigenous peoples were entrusted to Spaniards as forced labour in exchange for protection and conversion to Christianity. However, in 1514 he underwent a conversion experience, sold his farm in Española and dedicated his life to promoting the humane treatment of the indigenous peoples.¹¹ He was not the first at the Spanish court to advocate for the Indians, however. King Ferdinand had issued the Laws of Burgos of 1512, intended to protect them against the oppressive Spanish colonists. After his death, however, the regent, Cardinal Cisneros, leaned towards those who strove for the enslavement of the Indians through the *encomienda* system. When Charles I arrived in Spain with a new set of counsellors, the court leaned towards establishing justice for the indigenous peoples.¹²

Gattinara, who arrived in Spain in 1519, played a large part in this policy change. From July 1519 to January 1520 Las Casas presented his proposal for peaceful conversion and Spanish coexistence with the indigenous peoples to the court of Charles V. He argued against enslaving the inhabitants, preferring to implement a system in which the inhabitants paid tribute directly to the crown. Specifically, he sought permission to penetrate the land of Cumanà, in present-day Venezuela, with fifty men to establish a peaceful settlement of 10,000 Indians, which would serve as a base for future exploration and as a source of tribute for the crown. He wanted a grant of 1,000 leagues of coastline for settlement, and he estimated the revenue of this settlement to be at least 15,000 ducats by the third year, and 60,000 ducats by the end of the decade.¹³ He clearly wanted his plan to appeal to officials at court whose main interest was money. Indeed, the commercial nature of the plan was criticized by some of his contemporaries, who questioned whether a clergyman should use the lure of profit to promote his project. He replied that if he had to 'buy' Jesus Christ in order to protect him from abuse and to love, serve and cherish him, he would do it.¹⁴

In his *Historia de las Indias*, Las Casas detailed his actions in the Spanish court to promote his plan. In a narrative that places him in a heroic struggle in opposition to fierce enemies, Las Casas described Gattinara as a 'modest and kind man'. He recounted how he had solicited him specifically to convene a council to discuss his case, along with the forty members of the council.¹⁵ Many at court sought to discredit him, particularly Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca and his entourage. They quickly drafted a thirty-page memorandum of accusations against him and his project. In response, Gattinara did much to aid Las Casas, allowing him to see the charges against him so that he could better defend himself, calling in further witnesses such as Diego Columbus, and requesting that Juan de Quevedo draft two memorials addressing the issue of the mistreatment of the Indians. Finally, Gattinara requested on behalf of the king that Las Casas be granted at least some of his demands, such as 260 leagues of the 1,000 requested.¹⁶

The utopian scheme approved by the council failed when put into practice. Las Casas had wanted to replace the *encomienda* system with settler colonization. He believed that Spanish colonists would coexist harmoniously with the indigenous peoples and attract them peacefully to the Christian faith with trinkets and good will. The colonists enlisted by Las Casas in Seville had been poor peasant farmers. Not surprisingly, when they reached the *tierra firme*, they refused to farm and instead engaged in the sort of deception, aggression and enslavement of the Indians that characterized the conquistadors. Disheartened by the experience, Las Casas retreated to a Dominican monastery and entered into the Order of Preachers. He would only emerge ten years later to continue the fight for the humane treatment of the Indians.¹⁷

The differing interpretations of Las Casas and his peaceful colonization plan are numerous. Many of his contemporaries condemned it as well intentioned, utopian and impossible. Lewis Hanke, writing in the mid-twentieth century, highlighted the plan as evidence that the Spanish crown had sought to do justice in its conquest of America.¹⁸ More recently, Daniel Castro suggested that the altruistic motives of Las Casas served only to provide a more humane form of exploitation; indeed, it was a form of 'ecclesiastical imperialism'. Castro pointed out that everything Las Casas did facilitated the Church and crown's goal of centralized power over both natives and colonists.¹⁹ In addition, it recognized the need to preserve the native population as labour, the most fundamental of all revenue sources. Spain, even in its own *Reconquista*, had not originally aimed to annihilate the Muslim population. Deportation had only occurred much later, when the Christian population was sufficient to replace it. The preservation of the Indian population was always an objective of the crown's official policy.²⁰ Whether out of humanitarian or economic motives, Gattinara's support of Las Casas indicated that he considered the indigenous peoples as fully human and true subjects of the Spanish empire.

In addition to protecting the interests of the indigenous peoples against the predations and abuses of the conquistadors, the Spanish crown sought to protect its own interests from the emerging feudal nobility in America. In order to keep authority over the newly discovered lands, it had to rein in the demands of the explorers and conquistadors. When Diego Columbus fought for the privileges granted to his father by Isabella in 1520, the crown issued a declaration severely curtailing his dominion in the New World. Christopher Columbus, having been granted the title 'Admiral of the Ocean Sea', had expected to keep a virtual monopoly over all the lands discovered in America, and to pass on his title and privileges to his heirs. His son, Diego Columbus, the second Admiral of the Ocean Sea, continued to fight for these at the Spanish court. To settle these claims, the court issued a statement in 1520, the *Declaración di La Coruña*. This document, which contained Gattinara's signature, greatly reduced Columbus's holdings. It granted

him only islands, with no jurisdiction on the mainland. In addition, it required him to submit to the *residencia*, a legal commission appointed by the crown that investigated the conduct of Spanish officials in the New World. He could not appoint his own officers, but had to present a slate of candidates from which the king would make a selection. The document not only limited the power of the admiral himself, it also curtailed the autonomy of regional subjects in America. Article 22 of the *Declaración* prohibited representatives of the cities and towns from assembling for the purposes of formulating petitions for the government. Avonto has seen this as an effort to eliminate challenges to the authority of the 'universal monarchy' envisioned by Gattinara. Undoubtedly, the officials under Charles V intended to consolidate the sovereignty of the emperor in order to maximize revenues. Diego continued unsuccessfully to contest the ruling. His statement of grievances, the *Relacion o memorial de los agravios en que el almirante de las Yndias pide ser desagraviado sobre que ay pleyto entre él y el fiscal de sus magestades*, was found among Gattinara's personal papers.²¹

Another dispute handled by Gattinara arose in 1522, when the king appointed him as head of a special commission to investigate the claims of Diego Velásquez, governor of Cuba, against Hernán Cortés, conqueror of Mexico. As governor, Velásquez had appointed Cortés to lead an expedition in the Yucatán, but did not give him the right to claim territory on the mainland. When Cortés landed at Vera Cruz, he claimed the land not under the authority of Velásquez but directly under Charles V himself. The governor of Cuba denied Cortés's legal right to do this and sought the rights and privileges of the conqueror for himself. With Gattinara presiding, the commission issued a sentence from Valladolid on 22 October 1522. Velásquez had no claim on the land discovered in Mexico because his mandate had expired once he appointed Cortés as commander. The commission also absolved Cortés from the accusation of rebellion, recognized his conquest and appointed him governor of New Spain. It decided to grant Velásquez only reimbursement for the expenses of the army and navy. In addition to sending reinforcements to maintain the conquest, the commission gave instructions to treat the indigenous peoples humanely, evidence that Gattinara had taken the message of Las Casas to heart.²²

In the next eight years, Gattinara monitored affairs in Mexico, or New Spain as it was called then. The court had appointed Cortés governor and expected him to act as a loyal administrator in the interests of the crown. By 1525, however, officials began to suspect Cortés's motives. Rumours circulated that he intended to break off from Spain and rule the newly conquered territories himself.²³ Word had also reached the court that Cortés had left Tenochtitlan to lead an expedition to Honduras. Dissention and turmoil among his appointed magistrates in the capital encouraged conspiracies among the local inhabitants. The crown was in real danger of losing the whole territory.²⁴

The grand chancellor seems to have viewed him as a threat to the interests of Charles V. Although he never mentioned Cortés in his autobiography, he discussed the conquistador extensively in a long memorial to the emperor from September 1525 about the expedition to Italy. This lengthy memorial provided specifics on every aspect of preparations for the Italian invasion. The keystone of the invasion, and his personal obsession for years, was a powerful fleet of ships. His reference to Cortés appears as part of a stratagem involving the preparation of this armada. He suggested that Charles V prepare the fleet destined for Italy under the pretence of consolidating power in Mexico:

The decision about the voyage [needs] to be secret, and the preparations for it should be made under false pretences. I think you can hide it very well by indicating that your Majesty wants to make a powerful armada to seize and reduce the land discovered by Cortés to true obedience to you. Also, you want to put it in order so that you can enjoy the great riches in it. Because once Cortés's departure is known, as well as other news already made public that requires you to give prompt remedy to the malice of Cortés, everyone will believe that such an armada was disposed for this reason, and not for your Majesty's voyage to Italy. From this pretext, you will also derive another benefit, because you will put fear into the relatives, allies and friends of Cortés. They will come out and by such means without even launching the armada you will bring Cortés around with great advantage to your majesty. He will be reduced to being a good administrator, and more amenable to reason.²⁵

The passage uses the verb *reduzir*, in the sense of bringing subjects into obedience to authority, twice: the first instance refers to the inhabitants of Mexico, the second to Cortés himself. In the eyes of Gattinara, both presented the same problem in that they needed to be brought back under the authority of Charles V. The next year Gattinara appointed Luis Ponce de León (not the discoverer of Florida) as the judge of a *residencia* commission to investigate the administration of Cortés in Mexico City. Incidentally, Gattinara's letter gave instructions for the official to determine whether it would be 'more convenient to have the Indians pay tribute to the crown, as they had done under Montezuma, or should they be entrusted in *encomienda* to local Spanish residents.'²⁶ This shows the grand chancellor's concern with the new subjects, but from the standpoint of efficiency in the consolidation of resources.

When Cortés arrived in Spain in 1528, whatever enmity Gattinara had originally felt for Cortés had evidently dissipated. The conquistador frequented the circle surrounding the grand chancellor at the Spanish court. He maintained strong ties of friendship with the Polish ambassador, Johannes Dantiscus, one of Gattinara's closest friends and his frequent dinner companion. Cortés and Dantiscus evidently shared a love of poetry, women, good food and lively parties.²⁷ However, there is no evidence that the grand chancellor engaged in these

festivities with his friends; it would have been unlikely given his poor health in the last two years of his life.

In conclusion, Gattinara's involvement in the administration of New Spain provides an illustration of his predatory humanism. Evidence suggests that he had a real concern for the well-being of indigenous peoples. He regarded them as human beings who deserved justice and efficient administration. He did not have to take this position, as there were certainly many at court who argued that the savagery of the Indians made them natural slaves and incapable of salvation. Others refused to acknowledge their humanity at all, and described them as deserving only of extinction.²⁸ The grand chancellor used his power at court to defeat these positions. He helped to point the direction of the Spanish court towards the recognition of the indigenous peoples as true subjects of the crown, and provided administrative and legal structures, even if Spanish administrators did not ultimately succeed in enforcing policies that protected them from abuse and mistreatment.

Gattinara's regard for the humanity of the indigenous peoples certainly derived in part from his humanist background. Familiarity with literature and history encourages a more cosmopolitan perspective by enabling a reader to experience the world from multiple perspectives, and the practice of critical thinking tends to lead an individual out of prejudice and closed-mindedness. Moreover, the humanist education of the sixteenth century, with its foundation in the literary works of ancient Greece and Rome, also glorified war and conquest. Ancient histories contained practical lessons on empire-building and colonization. Anyone familiar with these would have known that the Roman model of conquest advocated neither slavery nor extermination of native inhabitants.

Efficient administration and law also mattered to Gattinara because he experienced first-hand the political turmoil that ensued in the absence of these structures. He did not believe that a state could maintain conquest by force alone. The Comuneros Revolt in Spain revealed an eruption of violence in response to a heavy-handed rule that did not take into consideration local rights and privileges. Additionally, the chaotic situation in northern Italy, ravaged by incompetent Spanish and French occupational governments, had taught him that one could not expect obedience from those lacking security and justice.²⁹ This turmoil led his Renaissance contemporaries to explore the nature of obedience in the absence of political authority. For him, the problem of maintaining subjects in obedience in America had the same complexity as the political problem of 'maintaining and enlarging' the state in Italy or anywhere else. In the case of America, as well as that of Italy, Gattinara wanted to avoid a fight wherever he could. He assumed that the native population would fight to preserve its customs and political interests, just as the common people of the small town of Gattinara had opposed the encroachment of noble power in the fifteenth

century, the cities of Castile had risen up against Burgundians, and Italy had fought the French and the empire in the sixteenth century. Learning from these examples, he sought to avoid the appearance of tyranny. Doing so required an administrative structure that took into account the humanity of the indigenous peoples. He took a stand against the mistreatment of the subjects of New Spain, not because he took the humanitarian message of Las Casas to heart, but because years of unrest in Savoy, northern Italy and Spain had taught him that rebellion and social disorder impede the steady stream of revenue pouring into the state coffers. Moreover, money spent on wars to maintain territories already held by the ruler would be better spent on the conquest of new territories.

His main concern was not America but Italy. The immense treasure coming into Spain allowed him to dream of world domination, with Italy as the 'keystone of Empire'. The gold and silver allowed the crown to draw money from Genoese bankers to fund the fleet destined for Italy. It is possible that without money from the New World, Spain would not have been able to carry out the invasion.

On the surface, Gattinara's policy of protecting and exploiting the indigenous peoples at the same time appears somewhat contradictory. However, reconciling these concepts made more sense in his age, as it was saturated with Christian imagery and pastoral metaphors. After all, exploitation and protection exactly describe the two main tasks of the shepherd as he carefully guides his flock of sheep.

4 ENEMIES OF THE FAITH

The rivalry between popes and emperors that plagued the Latin West throughout the medieval era continued unabated into the Renaissance. During the Italian Wars, the papacy had vacillated between supporting French and imperial claims in Italy. Giulio de Medici had been the imperial candidate for pope, and he owed much of his fortune to the support of Charles V. After the defeat of the French at Pavia, however, nothing stood between Italy and the threat of imperial domination. The fear of Charles's rising power induced Clement VII to ally with France, England and the Italian powers in the League of Cognac, or the Holy League. Against this coalition of almost all of the crowned heads of Europe, the grand chancellor worked to build a campaign of public support. His propaganda war against the Holy League sought to engage the public by promising reforms of justice and religion. Mobilizing all the forces of contemporary Christian humanism at his disposal, he used revolutionary and utopian rhetoric to facilitate his diplomatic objectives. This chapter looks at three works involved in this propaganda war, all of which were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books by the end of the sixteenth century: the *Pro Divo Carolo*, Dante's *Monarchia* and Valdés's *Dialogue of Lactantio and an Archdeacon*. The three works represent a deliberate effort to subvert traditional authority in order to facilitate imperial conquest.¹

Between 1526 and 1529 the empire of Charles V faced resistance from both the Lutherans and the Catholic Church, two groups of people who also opposed each other. It made diplomatic sense for the grand chancellor to play one enemy against the other. In a lengthy secret memorial to Charles V in July 1526, Gattinara made it clear that he understood the threat of the Lutheran revolt to the empire.² Although the general theme of the memorial is the importance of the voyage to Italy to secure the goal of universal peace, he also gave practical advice concerning everything necessary to the preparation of the invasion. These included a powerful army, a powerful fleet, money and aid from the emperor's brother, Ferdinand, who ruled over the German lands as the *infante*. Of Germany he stated, 'The empire remains in much confusion and in the greatest danger, because of the revolts and disorders of the cursed sect of Luther'. These posed an even greater threat due to the absence of Ferdinand, constrained to fight the

Turkish invasion of Hungary.³ The memorial indicated that he viewed the Peasants' Revolt of 1525 primarily through the lens of Italian affairs. Although he acknowledged the danger of the empire losing these lands altogether, he mainly saw the disturbances as obstacles to the recruitment of soldiers to fight in Italy. To remedy this situation, he devised a plan that would 'have a great impact and cost nothing'. He suggested that the emperor publish a new edict expressing his desire for universal peace, and for uniting the armies against the Turk in Hungary for the benefit of the republic of Christendom. This edict would also give full amnesty to all Lutherans willing to leave the errors of the Lutheran sect and return to the lap of the Mother Church.

Since your majesty cannot go there with his person or his forces, he needs to make provisions as necessary to remedy so many evils, trying at least to find some means of pacification in the nation of Germany. So that he can hope to have some aid and service for the benefit of the public, I have counselled your majesty to make this public edict with the order to publish, proclaim and declare it, as well as affix it to all the customary places in all of the cities of Germany ... and have this edict dispatched in a divided form with the usual clauses, one part in Latin and the other with the same substance in German.

The edict would give full amnesty to those willing to renounce the errors of Luther in favour of the decisions of a universal council.

All those who have been or are infected and guilty of the errors of the condemned Lutheran sect, and who have been imprisoned by the imperial ban, or have suffered other punishments contained in the Edict of Worms or in other subsequent edicts, and who by their own free will want to leave that sect and return to the lap of our holy mother church, submitting to the truth of evangelical doctrine to be determined by the first universal council of Christians that will be convoked ... Each and every one of them of whatever condition or estate, your majesty remits and pardons them.

A few lines later, Gattinara explains the need for a general amnesty:

With clemency and amnesty from penalties, we can secure them and more easily draw them from their errors. In particular, we can give them the right way to determine the truth of the evangelical doctrine upon which the sect is principally founded. With their reduction and quick submission we can aid and remedy this sect. I believe we can gain some good support from cavalry and infantry who can join with the *infante* for whatever you want to do, whether to aid Hungary or move forward to help the situation in Italy, appearing to act for the public benefit of Christianity. And this can be a torment for the pope to lead him more easily to reason, fearing that bringing them back and joining with them would give more urgency to the calling of the council which is the thing that he fears most.⁴

Undoubtedly, the grand chancellor provided justification of his plan on moral grounds. However, the mention of infantry and cavalry almost immediately after

the goal of conversion leads one to suspect his ultimate aim. The notion of the council as a *torcedor* to 'torment' the pope also reveals the practical intentions of the edict of amnesty in terms of diplomatic leverage. Gattinara did not mention the social unrest in Germany or his edict of amnesty in his autobiography.

The conflict with the papacy, the French and the Holy League led to the outbreak of war in Milan in May and Siena in July 1526. Both sides blamed the other for breaking an eight-month truce. This was the true beginning of a propaganda war against the papacy. Recounting the origin of the *Pro Divo Carolo*, Gattinara narrated in his autobiography:

the pope tried to deflect blame for the conflagration from himself and redirect it onto Caesar. He wrote papal briefs to Caesar containing some justifications and certain trumped-up arguments. He ordered these to be published in order to inform the minds of the public on 20 August 1526. Mercurino responded to these with such ardent efforts that the spears thrown by the pope were turned against the head of the pontiff himself, and he took all the blame. Similarly, the French cleverly put out a similar defence, using false arguments to excuse their own treachery, explaining how they should not be held to keep faith with Caesar, or to observe sworn oaths. Against this, also with the effort of Mercurino, a powerful counter-argument was made that undermined the stain of lies. It revealed the perfidy of the king of the French, weakened his false excuses and brought them into a clearer light. All of these works were typed, printed and published in a fairly lengthy volume. It can be read nearly everywhere, so it seems better to pass over the work in silence rather than to reference it further.⁵

Interestingly, Gattinara never mentioned that his secretary, Alfonso de Valdés, was the author of the work. Born in Cuenca to a minor government official, Valdés had studied under the Milanese humanist Peter Martyr d'Anghiera at the University of Alcalá. From 1520 he served in many offices at court, including Latin Secretary of the King, Royal Chronicler and Chancellor of Naples. He and his brother, Juan de Valdés, both enjoyed reputations as notable Spanish humanists. Alfonso, in particular, was the greatest supporter of Erasmus and his ideas at court.⁶ He was also a fierce defender of the interests of the emperor. He and Gattinara shared the same vision of universal monarchy, but the secretary had a talent for eloquence lacking in the grand chancellor. In fact, he never mentioned Valdés in his autobiography at all, despite their close relationship. As his personal secretary, Valdés lived in the household of the grand chancellor.⁷ Their imperial propaganda was clearly a collaborative effort, as certain key phrases appear in the works of both men. Therefore there is no way to know exactly who wrote the *Pro Divo Carolo*, but one can guess that Gattinara either supplied the ideas for it or approved of them as they were written by Valdés.

The work outlined the goal of universal monarchy common to all of Gattinara's works.⁸ Once he established political unity, the emperor could unite all people in the Christian faith. This required both the reformation of the Catholic

Church, which had fallen into corruption, and the conquest of the Muslim heresy. The ultimate goal was world peace and the establishment of the Millennium on Earth. This imperial destiny, according to the work, was 'ordained by God himself, foreseen by the prophets, predicted by the apostles, and approved by Christ our Saviour by his birth, life and death [in the Roman Empire]'.⁹

Valdés set the goal of world peace against the motives of the League of Cognac, which he portrayed as self-serving. As he stated, 'They appear not to aim for universal peace, which is the reason for this solemn assembly, but rather for particular interest, to block and delay the universal peace of Christians so that nothing stands in the way between our pernicious enemies, the Turks, and the necks of Christians'. He accused all of the republics in Italy of acting in their own interests, rather than in the interests of the greater good.¹⁰

An image of the greater good, the goal of a peaceable Christian kingdom, appeared in the 'Prologue to the devout reader'. He stated that if those who are called defenders of the faith exhibited 'true piety' in addition to their magnificent titles, an agreement about the nature of Christianity would naturally follow:

We pray for those having office or duties that they may fulfil them most attentively and by the single consent of the world, all controversies having been set aside, they may prepare for the universal assembly of Christians ... At this assembly Christ, the Best and Greatest, shall preside, the freest opinions are spoken; the judgments of all having been conferred to one evangelical light, it will at last be achieved so that we may discern more conspicuously the matter of Christ which we thus far were so fully overlooking. To none will it be able to appear an injurious assembly at which Christ himself will preside. For on the contrary who may doubt that Christ will be present, if he shall see all to come together there for the supreme improvement of the Christian commonwealth?¹¹

The appeal to the Lutherans is apparent, not only in the reference to evangelical light but also in the image of the assembly of believers. In proposing that earnest Christians could come to an agreement about the religion if they assembled in good faith, could speak their piece, and admit only Christ as their leader in doctrine, the work expresses a remarkable faith in humanity. The grand chancellor and his secretary understood that an assembly of free and equal believers stood in opposition to the hierarchy and tradition of the Church. Nevertheless, Gattinara was so eager for the public to see this intoxicating image of Christian brotherhood that he paid for the publication of this work himself.¹² Almost immediately, however, government officials denied that the work, *Pro Divo Carolo*, represented the true voice of the emperor, and efforts were made to suppress the work.¹³ On the other hand, the work continued to be published in the German lands, with appended biblical prophecies that supported the role of Charles as a saviour emperor.¹⁴

At the same time, Gattinara also sought to revive much older attacks against the papacy by seeking the publication of a new edition of Dante's *Monarchia* from 1314. It was a daring move by an imperial official to seek its publication. On 12 March 1527 the grand chancellor sent a letter to Erasmus of Rotterdam asking him to edit the work. Although the book undoubtedly appealed to Gattinara because of its vision of universal monarchy, the timing of his letter to Erasmus suggests that it was the attack on papal legitimacy itself that Gattinara sought.¹⁵

For almost two hundred years, Dante's treatise had been considered controversial. In it he made numerous arguments from logic, scripture and history to prove three major contentions: 'whether the office of monarch was necessary to the well-being of the world, whether the Roman people took on empire by right, and whether the authority of the monarch comes from God directly or from someone else'.¹⁶ Arguing from first principles, in the manner of scholasticism, Dante proposed that human fulfilment was only possible in a state of peace. The only guarantor of peace was a universal monarch who could end all political divisions leading to war. Dante also argued that the Roman Empire was established by God to bring peace to the world. This third argument was more contentious because it claimed that the Roman Empire preceded the Church, which gave it precedence. Therefore imperial power could not possibly have been granted by the Church.

Dante's argumentation went even further to undermine the authority of the papacy and the very foundations of the Church itself. He asserted that the pope is not owed the obedience claimed by his supporters, stating, 'We owe [to the Church] not what is due to Christ, but what is due to Peter'.¹⁷ For Dante, papal authority rested not on signs of divine will but simply on tradition, a lesser foundation than scripture, history or logic. Dante quoted Jesus at the temple, stating, 'Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?' He then remarked, 'By this he gave to understand clearly enough that tradition takes second place'.¹⁸ Although this attack against the venerable institution is stunning, Dante was not the first to claim primacy for the empire. In 1210 the scholar Ugucione da Pisa argued that there was an emperor before there was a pope and an empire before a papacy.¹⁹ Dante's bold questioning of the foundations of the pope's authority earned the work a ritual burning in 1329 and a place on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1554.²⁰ It is no wonder that the book was first printed in Basel at the height of the Reformation in 1559.

Gattinara's suggestion to Erasmus about *Monarchia* was sufficiently vague to allow Erasmus to refuse the offer. 'My Erasmus', he stated, 'The book will be yours to either publish or withhold from circulation. I leave it to your judgment'.²¹ Indeed, the offer put Erasmus in an uncomfortable position. On one hand, the famous humanist needed his protection against his enemies in Louvain who wanted to try him for heresy. On the other, his protector had asked him to edit a dangerously heretical text. In the end he tactfully refused the offer.

Also, Erasmus did not want to take sides by becoming a partisan of Charles V. Although he had been in the service of the emperor and had written the *Education of a Christian Prince* for him, he did not share Gattinara's glorification of universal monarchy. This is apparent in several of his adages. In '*Aut fatuum aut regem nasci oportere*' (Kings and fools are born, not made), he stated, 'The proverb seems to have originated among the Romans, who hated the name of kings as barbaric and tyrannous, and contrary to political freedom'.²² The adage most condemning of the vision of empire is '*Scarabeus aquilam quaerit*' (The beetle searches for the eagle), also from the 1515 edition. Of the eagle, the symbol of empire, he remarked, 'It is the eagle alone that had neither friendship nor kinship with any living creature, no comradeship, no daily intercourse, neither treaty nor truce. It is the enemy of all, and all are its enemies'.²³ Clearly, Erasmus understood the inherent danger of tyranny in investing too much authority in one person. It was the very opposite of Dante's assertion that one person with absolute authority would not want to increase his power.²⁴

Moreover, Erasmus did not adhere to the ideology of divine rule. In *The Education of a Christian Prince*, he made a distinction between a Christian practice inspired by Jesus and empire-building. He wrote, 'You have allied yourself with Christ – and yet will you slide back into the ways of Julius and Alexander the Great? You seek the same reward as the others, yet you will have no concern with His mandates'. This phrase seemingly gave the reader a choice between conquest and Christianity. The distinction Erasmus made between power and righteousness did not appear in Dante or Gattinara, who both maintained that power, as an expression of God's will, was holy by nature.²⁵

Despite the pacifism and unorthodox religious and political perspective expressed by Erasmus, the grand chancellor wanted to ally the imperial cause with Erasmus, the greatest champion of Christian humanism in his age. In addition to his star power, he provided eloquence and ideas that could serve the interests of empire. Humanism, as a revival of *belles-lettres*, had already been linked to a number of expansionist regimes across the continent. In Spain, long before the arrival of Erasmus, Antonio de Nebrija had championed the vernacular. He presented the first book of Spanish grammar to Queen Isabella as an 'instrument of empire'.²⁶ Cardinal Cisneros had founded the University of Alcalá in 1508 to train the clergy in the new, humanist approach to translation developed in Italy. He wanted to unite the studies of rhetoric and philology to theology. The polyglot bible, which featured side-by-side Aramaic, Hebrew, Greek and Latin translations of the scriptures, was the crowning achievement of this effort.²⁷

At the University of Alcalá, Italian humanism had mingled with elements within Spanish mysticism to form a new religious experience. Already in Spain there had been a movement of lay spirituality that sought a deeper connection to the divine outside of the ritual and hierarchy of the Church. This *iluminismo* had

been influenced by the Franciscans and the *devotio moderna* of the late Middle Ages. These mystical approaches to the faith merged with Platonist ideas in the early sixteenth century to provide the central focus of the *alumbrado* movement. Neoplatonism, the Christian adoption of Platonist ideas to the faith, encouraged meditation and contemplation as a means to understand the divine. Also, the Platonic belief that love, truth and beauty existed as ideals in the mind of God but were perfectly represented by Jesus Christ on Earth encouraged the individual to contemplate the meanings of these abstractions as an act of worship. These abstractions could never be seen, but remained hidden on earth, as an esoteric knowledge comprehended only by the pure at heart. Platonism's emphasis on harmony also reflected an egalitarian sense of brotherhood that underlay Christian humanism.

The *alumbrados* had been largely lay Christians who had focused on a personal experience of God's love in place of ritual. It especially appealed to *conversos* whose Jewish heritage caused them to reject superstitions and 'empty' rituals. Women, who had been excluded from the clergy, had a major influence in the *alumbrado* movement. The traditional clergy found many reasons to distrust this movement. The focus on an interior faith in contrast to outward displays put it at odds with the traditional rites of the Church. Naturally, it also de-emphasized the role of the clergy as intercessors between the religious faith of an individual and the deity. Finally, its egalitarianism threatened the hierarchical order of the institution.

Strongly influenced by the *alumbrado* movement were the twin brothers Alfonso and Juan de Valdés, both courtiers of *converso* heritage. Although they have been described as 'Erasmians', these friends of Erasmus had developed their ideas independent of the famous humanist from the Netherlands. Alfonso may have been exposed to Neoplatonism as a follower of Peter Martyr d'Anghiera. His *Dialogue on Mercury and Charon* had drawn the attention of the Inquisition for *alumbrado* errors, despite being a propaganda piece concerning the treachery of the French king after Pavia. Juan's *Dialogue on Christian Doctrine*, with its emphasis on contemplation, lay spiritual education and reformation of the clergy, illustrated the freedom allowed to scholars at Alcalá.²⁸ Even after the death of Cisneros, the University of Alcalá continued as a haven for humanism in Spain. Despite enemies in the Church, scholars were free to debate religious ideas and received protection from the Inquisition's accusations of heresy.

The grand chancellor supported and protected the development of Christian humanism at Alcalá. After 1525 he encouraged the press at the university to publish many of Erasmus's works. Erasmus's *Enchiridion*, or *Handbook for a Christian Soldier*, was published first in Latin, then in vernacular Spanish. A wide movement of Erasmianism emerged in Spain. By 1526–7 a vision of 'Spanish hegemony, Christian unity, and general reform' had united with Erasmian philosophy. Works with these themes came off the press at a quickening pace,

and Alcalá had become a virtual propaganda mill against the Catholic Church. According to Headley, it was one of the first uses of the printing press to influence public opinion in the Europe.²⁹

Gattinara had political reasons to support Christian humanism. On the most basic level, it threatened to diminish the power of the clergy, just like the Lutheran heresy, which he tolerated to a certain extent. But there are also more profound reasons for a prophet of empire to support a philosophical approach to religion based on Platonic philosophy. As had been demonstrated fifty years earlier in Italy, Platonism favoured monarchy. It promoted the rule of philosopher kings as the most rational form of government. Secondly, its focus on meditation and contemplation suited a disenfranchised nobility and middle class. Most importantly, Platonism offered the promise of harmony as an achievable goal of the polity. It saw the contest of private interests as a lower endeavour than building consensus and agreement. It stressed the role of love in building bonds among the subjects of a benevolent and messianic ruler. Its promise that the world could be reformed by peace and love was utopian. The concept of a beautiful *renovatio* suited an empire engaged in conquest, promising a new regime that would be all things to all people.³⁰

The Sack of Rome

The propaganda war against the Catholic clergy intensified in the spring of 1527. On 5 May 1527 an imperial army under the duke of Bourbon attacked the city of Rome. When the duke was killed on the first day, the soldiers, without any discipline, stormed the city and sacked it. The pope and cardinals were held captive in the Castel Sant'Angelo, and rape and slaughter engulfed the city. Many of the German soldiers, presumably Lutherans, had destroyed holy images and relics during the sack. Gattinara expressed profound sadness at the sack, but his true opinion about its significance in terms of imperial policy appeared more complicated as expressed in his autobiography. He recounted how he gave the emperor options about his public response to the atrocity:

He could approve the actions of his men and contend that they took up arms not against a pastor, but a predator, a disturber and usurper of Christianity. It was a necessary act of defence to protect himself and his clients against such a scandalous and incorrigible pope, who had upset the whole state of the Christian religion by avoiding the universal council that had so often been implored of him ... Or ... he might announce these deeds in writing and explain how bitterly he bore such a terrible event without, however, taking blame for it. He should declare his desire to put an end to these wars and conflagrations in favour of universal peace, and announce the creation of a general council for this purpose.³¹

Publicly, the court could claim that the sack was divine punishment for corruption. Charles acted as the agent of divine wrath against the usurper of Christianity. The second option contradicted this vision and demanded that Charles claim no responsibility at all for the destruction. One rested on a supernatural foundation, the other on mere contingency. Gattinara ended his discussion of the sack with concrete advice. He counselled the emperor to go to Italy himself and prepare a powerful fleet of galleys to 'pacify the affairs of the Christians'.³²

Although the grand chancellor did not mention it in his autobiography, Valdés had decided to support the first option on behalf of the emperor. He wrote a dialogue inspired by Christian humanism, defending the Sack of Rome as the vengeance of God against a corrupt Catholic Church, entitled the *Diálogo de las cosas acaecidas en Roma*.³³ He claimed the work had been approved by the grand chancellor before circulating it.³⁴ The purpose of the work was to absolve the emperor from blame for the sack. The sophistication with which he used contemporary humanism as well as the tolerance for Lutheran influence made the work exceptional.

The story took the form of a dialogue between an archdeacon arriving from the Sack of Rome and a courtier from the imperial court. When the archdeacon described the atrocities of the sack, Lactancio, the courtier, explained why Charles V should not be blamed for the sack, and maintained that 'God permitted the whole thing for the good of Christianity'.³⁵ In the beginning, the two interlocutors looked for a place to speak plainly and openly about the Sack of Rome:

Archdeacon: If we were somewhere else, where it would be safe to talk, I'd have plenty more to say on the subject.

Lactancio: Against whom?

Archdeacon: Against the one who had done more evil in God's church than even the Turks or pagans would dare.

Lactancio: Look, friend, archdeacon, you may be blaming someone who is not at fault. We can talk freely, you and I. Tell me how you feel about it and perhaps I can set you right so you won't blame the wrong person.³⁶

The social setting of a friendly discussion among equals served to bring the reader into the conversation. Rather than simply putting out propaganda, the dialogue gave the impression that the reader is smart enough to discern the truth from the arguments provided. This would not be merely imperial or religious dogma, but a reasoned argument for those able to think critically.

The first part of the dialogue explained the setting of the sack within the diplomatic vicissitudes of the Italian Wars. Clement VII had not acted as a peacemaker, but entered into a military alliance with other powers. This is how the dialogue presented it:

Lactancio: If a person supports war instead of peace, how can he be a follower of Jesus Christ?

Archdeacon: It would be impossible. But what are you getting at?

Lactancio: While the Emperor was doing his duty by defending his subjects, the Pope was neglecting his duty by waging war against him. It was the Pope who destroyed the peace and started a new war in Christendom. Under the circumstances one cannot blame the Emperor for the ensuing evils, since he was only doing his duty by defending his subjects.³⁷

The archdeacon countered by arguing that the pope acted prudently because he was afraid of losing his church lands. He worried that since Charles had taken the duchy of Milan away from Francesco Sforza, the same could be done to him. In response, Lactancio replied, 'Was the Pope acting as Christ's Vicar or as Giulio de Medici?'³⁸

The attack on the pope as a selfish human being rather than an exalted and anointed figure of authority undermined the aura of the Church. But Valdés did not simply accuse the pope of political motivation; he also painted him as a force for evil rather than good. Although he was careful to say that he did not blame the pope himself, only the bad advice from his ministers, he still connected him to heinous crimes.

How prosperous and happy was the Christian world in times of peace. The beautiful cities, the fine buildings, the wonderful gardens, the joyful pleasures of the people. The peasants gathering their loaves, grazing their herds, building their houses. The people in the cities, prospering in the full enjoyment of their possessions and sharing their wealth with the poor. Then this cursed war began. The cities lie destroyed, the buildings burned to the ground, the fields laid waste, and the people of all classes stricken with dire poverty ... The Pope's minions visited new atrocities on the innocent and helpless. In this the army of the Pope even went beyond the emperors Nero and Dionysius of Syracuse, and all other cruel tyrants who have ever reigned. Look what they did in the land of the Colonnas after the Pope broke his truce with Hugo de Moncada. Two Christians seized a noble virgin maid and stripped her and held her up by the ankles while another Christian split her down the middle with his halberd. Right before the eyes of the husbands, they seized pregnant women, cut open their wombs with swords, pulled out the still-warm infants and roasted them while the mothers looked on with horror ... What had those women done that they should die in so much pain seeing their wombs ripped open and hearing their infants shrieking on the spit?³⁹

The purpose of the passage, besides demonizing the pope, was to show the ravages of war in general – which could end if everyone simply put down their weapons and accepted the rule of Charles V. It was a continuation of the idea of empire as pacification.

The second half of the work, dedicated to proving that the sack was God's punishment for the sins of the Church, focused more on theology. He had the main character Lactancio explain:

The numerous vices of that Roman court were corrupting God's children, who not only were not learning Christian doctrine from their supposed teachers but were being taught a vastly different way of life. God saw that nothing availed to make them reform – neither prophets, evangelists nor the many saintly Church doctors ... And so God sought new ways to bring them to their duties. He now sent that excellent man Erasmus of Rotterdam. And Erasmus, writing with eloquence, prudence, and modesty, exposed the vices and deceptions not only of the Roman court but of all ecclesiastics in general ... But no, your vices and evil ways increased every day. So God decided to try to reform you by another method. He permitted Martin Luther to rise among you. This friar not only publicized all your vices in a most disrespectful way but he also turned many persons away from their prelates. Since you had refused to be reformed out of shame, you might at least be reformed out of greed; for now you stood to lose the profits you were taking out of Germany ... If you had done what you should, he might never have strayed into the heresies now coming from his pen.⁴⁰

The criticism of the clergy continued to include a statement indicating that the Catholic Church exacerbated the problem of economic inequality. Lactancio stated:

How is it that the rich are buried in the church and the poor in the graveyard? That the rich enter the church in time of interdiction and the poor have the door slammed in their faces ... Did Jesus Christ want His church to favor the rich over the poor? Then why did he advise us to seek poverty?⁴¹

And:

God permitted the robbing of His churches to show us how worthless He considers all things that can be stolen or corrupted ... so that we might offer Him our hearts and wills rather than gold and silver, and so that we might serve him according to his commands.⁴²

Statements such as these appealed to those wanting to purify the Church from the excesses of material accumulation. It was a sentiment that had been used to criticize the Church since the third century. However, the critiques of Luther and Erasmus were seen as revolutionary because the message of clerical poverty had been politically charged for several decades. In a larger sense, the passage played on the social resentment of the poor against the rich, which had led to many upheavals throughout Europe in those years.

Also included in the work is the idea that outward forms of religious display mean less than interior sentiments of true piety. During the sack, soldiers had not only destroyed images but also destroyed and desecrated the holy objects

of the church. Valdés defended the acts of impiety by explaining the difference between true and false piety in the voice of Lactancio:

Take the priest who gets up after sleeping with his concubine and then goes to say mass. Or gets a benefice through simony. Or harbors an evil grudge against his neighbor. Or accumulates wealth by fair means or foul ... Doesn't this strike you as worse than throwing the sacrament on a stinking rubbish heap?⁴³

This statement indicated that Valdés had a sophisticated grasp of Erasmian philosophy. Not only did he evoke pacifist and even utopian values, he also engaged in the larger debate over 'interior' and 'exterior' aspects of religion, which echoed the *iluminismo* and *alumbrado* approaches to Christianity circulating at Alcalá.⁴⁴ The idea that things that cannot be seen matter more than those that can resonated among those inspired by Platonist ideas.

Valdés had co-opted all of these intellectual trends not just to reform the Christian religion but also to sanctify the emperor. Valdés linked his emperor with those who fought on the side of social justice:

Archdeacon: You sound as if you want to reform the world.

Lactancio: I just want to keep what is good and get rid of what is evil.

Archdeacon: May I live that long.

Lactancio: May the Emperor Charles live that long and you'll see whether I'll do it or not.⁴⁵

The portrait of Charles V as a saviour-emperor appeared in the controversial line spoken by the archdeacon, who in the end had been converted to the perspective of the courtier, 'To the end of time people will say that Jesus Christ founded the Church and that Emperor Charles V restored it.'⁴⁶

Many contemporaries found the dialogue extremely offensive. Baldassare Castiglione, the papal nuncio to Spain at the time, accused Valdés's dialogue of heresy. In a letter to Castiglione, Valdés defended his work by pointing out that he had shown it to Gattinara and to prominent theologians in Spain. All had read and approved it.⁴⁷ The extremely vitriolic letter of response from Castiglione to Valdés took up nearly fifty pages. It included attacks on his politics, theology, motivation and ancestry, and a personal threat to refer him to the Inquisition. This chapter limits itself to a discussion of Castiglione's attack on Valdés's political rhetoric. It indicated that some contemporaries viewed his use of religion in the service of politics as misleading, destructive and morally questionable. Castiglione protested:

In order to excuse those who have ruined Rome, the Church and the Pope, you praise the fires, destruction, tortures, sacrilege, deaths, and all of the inhumanity and impiety that one could ever imagine. But since your intention is so abhorrent to reason and contrary to God and to nature, I don't think you could persuade any good per-

son, even though you think you are very eloquent and you consider yourself able to distinguish and understand the diversity of arguments, since you are young. Perhaps you have read in ancient works some who used the force of their eloquence to praise things that were not very praiseworthy. I think you have taken up this task in imitation of the orator, Marc Anthony, who while defending Norbano praised the seditions and popular revolts to better persuade them and get what he wanted.⁴⁸

By linking Valdés to Marc Anthony, Castiglione accused him of demagoguery, of swaying the people into a dangerous course of action for selfish reasons. The papal nuncio understood propaganda as an integral part of the job of royal secretary. However, the government official had an obligation as a Christian not to spread lies and cause destruction.

[Good Christians are] obliged to give glory to God and to procure the health of the Christian people and the honour of their princes. But he who misleads can hardly lead others out of falsehood, and he who blasphemes God does not give him glory; and he who tries to lead the people into believing false opinions is not procuring their health, and he who persuades the prince to do evil does not honour him.⁴⁹

Strangely, Castiglione did not accuse Gattinara of being involved with the dialogue. He stated that he did not believe Gattinara had seen and approved of the work, because 'everyone knows that whatever he has persuaded the emperor to do, his majesty has put into operation', and that the grand chancellor was 'pained by the destruction of Rome as being the misfortune of all Italy'.⁵⁰ Indeed, Gattinara had been on friendly terms with Castiglione and the other Italian ambassadors. He had successfully convinced them that he was 'Italian by nature, and imbued with Italian customs', as he affirmed in his autobiography.⁵¹ Moreover, he had the interests of Italy at heart. Whether Gattinara had read and approved the work cannot be ascertained. However, as long as Gattinara lived, he protected Alfonso de Valdés from the force of the Inquisition. After Gattinara died in 1530, the Inquisition began a review of Valdés's case. The secretary only avoided prosecution by dying of the plague in Vienna in 1532. After 1529 Erasmus and his ideas no longer found toleration in Spain, and the theology of Erasmus and Luther met with the full force of the Inquisition. When Gattinara and the Valdés brothers left with the emperor on the voyage to Italy, they left the humanists at Alcalá without any protection. Moreover, enemies at court, including Francisco de Los Cobos, took the opportunity to carry out a purge of the supporters of the grand chancellor from the Spanish court. In addition, when the Treaty of Barcelona established an alliance between Spain and the papacy in 1529, it became unsuitable to have the voice of the Spanish king come down so forcefully against the Church in Rome. The 'reformist' stance had no place in early modern Spain.

The anti-papal propaganda campaign illustrates how prevalent and even mainstream attitudes against the papacy were before the Treaty of Barcelona. The works of Martin Luther take on a new aspect in the light of imperial anti-papal propaganda. If not a natural outgrowth of three centuries of papal criticism, the words of Luther must be seen at least as growing from exceptionally fertile ground. Likewise, historians need to distinguish between 'pre-reformist' or 'Erasmian' personal sentiments and the work of political propagandists and diplomatic strategists. The line between them was very thin indeed.

There are two possible interpretations of Gattinara's motives concerning religious reform. If he wholeheartedly embraced an inner piety in sympathy with the reform movements, he may have seen the military conquest of Italy as a precondition for his ultimate goal of spiritual reformation. The opposing perspective reverses the equation. He may have seen the conquest of Italy as his primary aim; in this case he used the language of spiritual reform as a tool to accomplish this. If one takes the second interpretation as valid, one must ask precisely how he intended to do it.

It is very possible that Gattinara understood religious reform as a call for revolution. It promised to replace an old regime with a new one establishing brotherhood and peace. This was an appealing message that could be used to draw people into the imperial camp. The call for religious reform put at risk a political and spiritual hierarchy that had been in place for a thousand years. The attack on the Church attempted to neutralize an important obstacle to conquest. Perhaps more cynically, the toppling of an old regime could also create a power vacuum to be filled with imperial authority. The strategy of stirring up a revolution to facilitate foreign conquest had existed in the playbook of empire since antiquity. Mercurino di Gattinara, an eager student of history, might have come across it in his studies.

5 GATTINARA, GUICCIARDINI AND THE TREATY OF MADRID

Ovid's *Metamorphoses* contains a poem narrating the fight between Ajax and Ulysses over the armour of Achilles after the Trojan War. The rivals argued about which carried more weight in war, arms or intelligence?¹ The debate between Mercurino di Gattinara and his Burgundian adversaries over the Treaty of Madrid presented a sixteenth-century version of the same central question. The grand chancellor asserted, like Ulysses, that finesse rather than force would better serve the cause of domination. Two set speeches composed by Francesco Guicciardini in his *Storia d'Italia* described the debate. The Florentine historian set Gattinara's eloquence, acumen and predatory instincts against his more powerful but less savvy Burgundian opponent. The self-portrait of the grand chancellor in his autobiography did not differ greatly from that described by Guicciardini. Both descriptions of the debate over the treaty illustrate the common training and culture underlying the Italian practice of diplomacy in the Renaissance.

In his autobiography, Mercurino di Gattinara portrayed himself as a skilled advisor, shrewd diplomat, leading policymaker and prophet of imperial destiny. These qualities figured prominently in his depiction of the Battle of Pavia. He recounted how he took upon himself the entire burden and responsibility of the Italian war when Charles V succumbed to a fever in 1525. Having a calm mind and a trust in divine aid, but no money, he urged the imperial commanders to victory with nothing but 'writings, counsel, persuasions ... and the promise of honours and profit'. He predicted that before the first day of March, the French king would either perish in war or be captured, and on 24 February 'Fate and the prudence of the commanders delivered'.² With this vignette, Gattinara intended to show how his political acumen and rhetorical skill had contributed to the greatest Spanish victory of the Italian Wars. His humanist education had proven every bit as decisive in war as arms and money.

In the series of wars that saw French and Spanish armies fighting for Naples and Milan, the victory at Pavia represented a major turning point. Accustomed to defending their interests by playing the monarchies beyond the Alps against each other, the Italian states were bewildered by the definitive French defeat at

Pavia. Before the battle, Charles V had made peace with the English, the Venetians and the papacy, and now he found himself without any enemies on the peninsula. For imperial propagandists, this glorious victory was a stepping stone to universal peace. In the words of Gattinara's secretary, Alfonso de Valdés, the victory at Pavia was proof that 'God, our Lord, wants to put an end to all the evils that have been endured for a long time ... defend Christianity, resist the Turk ... end civil wars, extend the Catholic faith to the whole world to "let there be one flock and one shepherd"'.³ Nevertheless, despite all the talk of millennialism, Pavia was not the final word on the Habsburg–Valois rivalry. After the French had been so thoroughly defeated, and the French king held in captivity, the major players felt they had more to fear from Charles V.⁴

As all the major players reconsidered their alliances, the emperor had to make a decision. Should he ally with France or with the Italian states? Many of Charles's Burgundian counsellors leaned towards friendship with France as the best diplomatic path. The military commander and trusted advisor of Charles V, Charles de Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, advocated a generous agreement with Francis I. He would have to cede Burgundy and several other provinces, pay some indemnities, and leave his children as ransom. However, he would be treated decently and regain freedom with his honour intact. Lannoy believed that an alliance with France was the most secure choice for the emperor. Francis I was tied by parentage to Charles and bound by a noble code of honour.⁵ If that did not suffice as a motive, the economic considerations of merchants in the Low Countries, who had strong ties with the French nobility (as a market for their textiles), might have added some weight to the negotiations.⁶

On the other hand, Gattinara was against any accord with the French king. Believing that Charles should press his claims for Burgundy rather than Italy, Gattinara had written a lengthy legal treatise arguing the emperor's right to the territory.⁷ He had not wanted Francis I brought into Spain and into proximity to the emperor. When Francis I fell ill in captivity, and requested an audience with Charles V, the grand chancellor advised against it. He told the emperor that he should not visit the king unless he intended to free him immediately without any concessions. Otherwise, the act of the king would be seen as mercenary and self-interested rather than compassionate. The curious advice of the chancellor – to either keep him indefinitely or free him with no restrictions – echoed Machiavelli's dictum in [chapter 3](#) of *The Prince*, that 'men should be either caressed or exterminated, because they can avenge light injuries, but not severe ones'.⁸ The emperor went anyway, and the king recovered.

Besides the contest over Burgundy, the investiture of Milan presented another obstacle in negotiations. An illness of the duke of Milan, believed to be mortal, made many Italian powers fear that Charles V would either occupy it personally or grant it to his brother, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. If the Hab-

sburgs united Milan with both Sicilies and the Austrian domains, the rest of the Italian powers would be in danger of losing their own states. This fear gave rise to a scandal involving Gerolamo Morone, chancellor of the duke of Milan. Morone tried to incite the leader of the imperial army, the marquis of Pescara, to switch sides and fight against the emperor.⁹ He suggested that Pescara 'might win great glory as the liberator of the *patria*'. The whole affair was related to the imperial court by Pescara himself, putting the reputation of Francesco Sforza, and all of the Italians by association, at great risk. So damaging was this conspiracy to the Italians that Gattinara claimed not to believe it at first. After accepting the fact of the conspiracy, he placed Pope Clement VII in the centre of shifting alliances and diplomatic manoeuvres. Clement VII had forgotten 'favours he had accepted from Caesar'. Of the pope, he stated in his autobiography:

He tried to lure to his side not only the powers of Italy under the pretence of liberty and peace, but also the French with the hope of liberating their captive king. He appealed to the self-interest of the Cardinal of York [Wolsey, Archbishop of Canterbury], offering to improve the status of his king and enlarging the entire kingdom of England ... the pope and the Italian powers grew to suspect that they would pay the price, supposing that Caesar aimed to take possession of Italy rather than to pacify and liberate it.¹⁰

What Gattinara described as pacification and liberation, many Italians considered slavery. They viewed the grand chancellor's plan of world monarchy as domination. Marino Sanudo in his diary described the Venetian ambassador pleading with Gattinara to intercede with the emperor as an Italian, 'as Joseph did with Pharaoh'.¹¹ However, the role of 'liberator' was not one Gattinara intended to play. Rather, he understood that the Italians' fear presented an obstacle to military conquest.

In order to placate the Italian powers, Gattinara advised the emperor to ally with the Italian states against France. He did not advocate taking and occupying Milan outright, nor did he think it should be given to Charles's brother, Ferdinand. Instead, Gattinara recommended that Charles focus on Burgundy, and let the successor to Milan be chosen by the pope and other Italian powers. Francesco Sforza and the pope should be forgiven for their attempted betrayal. He did not want the empire to overplay its hand in Italy.

The lengthy paragraph in his autobiography explaining his reasoning is worth citing in its entirety:

There were various opinions concerning these matters. The viceroy recommended accepting the offer of the French, by which a bridle would be placed on Italy. In this way, it could be ruled easily with a rod, perpetually subjected to Emperor Charles. However, Mercurino contradicted him, putting no trust whatsoever in the exhortations of the French, who never kept faith with their promises. He said that they needed to be won over to Caesar's wishes not by force but by human kindness. Caesar

knew that if he tried to use force to do it, he would have perpetual war on his hands. Nor could he ever look after the peace or tranquillity of Christendom. He would also encounter the same difficulty that the Romans experienced for so many years, who spent more time and energy to acquire Italy than to obtain the monarchy of the rest of the whole world. Finally, he concluded that Italy, if possible, should be held together by love rather than by force. He would press for peace, if it could be gained, but a peace entirely negotiated and accepted by everyone, the French as well as the Italians.¹²

Sentiments such as these led Italian ambassadors to see Gattinara as an ally to their cause. Castiglione reported, 'Nobody has as good of a mind for Italian affairs as the grand chancellor'.¹³ Andrea Navagero, another Venetian ambassador, wrote that the grand chancellor was 'a very good Italian and greatly fears that this union and peace with France would only result in great harm and ruin to Italy'.¹⁴ However, Gattinara did not counsel against the conquest of Italy, only over the means to this end. Italy, as the garden of empire, would be under Spanish domination, but he preferred that it be done 'not by force but by human kindness'. By 'human kindness' he most likely meant the policy of allowing the leaders of Italy to remain in possession of their lands as client states of the emperor, a situation with potential benefits for the elites of Italy.

The historian John Headley proposed that Gattinara's intentions for Italy mirrored the hegemonic system established in ancient Rome and supported by Bartolus of Sassoferrato, in which local customs, institutions and rulers remained intact in client states that respected the hegemony of the imperial power. This attitude is reflected in the *relazioni* of Contarini, who said that 'the Romans, Cyrus, and others who have produced universal monarchies have not ruled all directly but have had other kings and other republics that have favored them, enjoying their fraternity. This was the way that the chancellor guided his Imperial Majesty'.¹⁵ He believed that the grand chancellor supported 'not a uniformly organized empire but a looser Habsburg hegemony that would give room to local privileges, provincial customs, native institutions'.¹⁶ However, the feudal claims made by local elites often took away customary rights to self-government by representative institutions.

From another perspective, Gattinara's assurances of self-rule did not necessarily reflect an ideological conviction as much as a tactic of diplomacy. Because he could imagine the situation from their perspective, he understood that scaring the Italians when they were already terrified about losing their liberty would only encourage them to solicit the aid of the French and the English.¹⁷ Whatever one decided to do about Italy in the long run, in the beginning it made diplomatic sense to tread lightly. A show of force would be counterproductive. This is what he meant when he stated, 'the Romans spent more time and energy to acquire Italy than to obtain the monarchy of the rest of the whole world'. He

advocated considering the interests of those he intended to dominate. Military force was an important element in establishing political power, but dissimulation, the exploiting of party conflicts, the granting of favours, and providing opportunities for individuals to gain from the new regime also helped to facilitate what Gattinara hoped would be a universal monarchy. Maintaining what one has conquered by force was the difficulty. After the Battle of Pavia, Gattinara confided to his friend, Johannes Dantiscus, 'I fear that we can say about ours the same that was said about Hannibal, "You know how to conquer, but you do not know how to take advantage of your victory"'.¹⁸ From his perspective, the clumsy faction of Burgundians, who relied only on the heavy use of military force, was in the process of undoing all of his delicate diplomatic handiwork.

In the end, Charles decided to take the advice of Lannoy over Gattinara. The Treaty of Madrid released Francis I from captivity with a promise to cede Burgundy to the empire. Gattinara deemed the treaty so imprudent that he refused to affix the seals of the empire to the document. In *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, John Headley provided a brilliant depiction of this act of defiance.¹⁹ When Gattinara claimed that his office as chancellor did not permit him to lead his prince into danger, Charles was constrained to have the seals affixed to the document himself. Witnesses reported that when the emperor mumbled that he would never have another chancellor, Gattinara suggested that he replace him right then, not wait until his death. He knew, however, that Charles could not replace him. When the French king renounced the treaty immediately after obtaining his freedom, the grand chancellor, who of course had predicted it, must have felt vindicated.

Mercurino di Gattinara in Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia*

In two speeches set at the court of Charles V during the captivity of Francis I of France, Guicciardini opposed Mercurino di Gattinara and the Burgundian commander and advisor, Charles de Lannoy, viceroy of Naples. The speeches accurately represent the different policy positions of the two interlocutors, as recounted in contemporary diplomatic reports and Gattinara's own autobiography. However, Guicciardini's use of antithesis in the speeches created a heightened distinction between Gattinara's political acumen and Lannoy's identity as a high-born warrior. In a set of opposing speeches that set virtue against nobility, intelligence against force, prudence against temerity, and Italian humanism against Burgundian chivalry, the Florentine historian Guicciardini appeared to take the side of Gattinara, a man who had been his political adversary during most of his career. Guicciardini's portrayal of Gattinara as simultaneously Italian, prudent, rational and predatory illustrated how policymakers used an Italian political education to establish dominion over their homeland.

The political careers of Gattinara and Guicciardini shared strikingly familiar characteristics. Both earned degrees in law and had tried cases early in their careers. They had also served as diplomats at the court of Spain under Ferdinand of Aragon, although at different times.²⁰ In addition, Guicciardini, like Gattinara, had served as a head administrator, as governor of the Romagna, and essentially ruled all of the papal lands for Clement VII. Guicciardini acted as the main advisor of Clement VII in precisely the same years when Gattinara served as main advisor to Charles V, 1526–9. They were years of bitter opposition, as discussed in the previous chapter. Significantly, Guicciardini had advised the pope to ally with the king of France rather than Charles V after Pavia. The fateful decision led to the Sack of Rome in 1527, for which he felt at least partially responsible.²¹ Although the two men probably never met each other personally, they inhabited the same intellectual universe. Ambition served as the ruling passion for each of them.

The passion and vehemence in the portrayal of the grand chancellor has made more than one historian wonder if the dialogue reveals some larger psychological issue.²² In his narrative, the Florentine historian introduced the character of Gattinara as ‘a man who, although born of humble origins in Piedmont, by much reputation and experience, had for many years sustained all the important business of the court’.²³ An interesting discussion has arisen concerning the evaluation of Gattinara as evidenced by differences between the first and final drafts of Guicciardini’s *Storia d’Italia*. Delio Cantimori suggested that Guicciardini had at first esteemed the grand chancellor, but had revised his opinion of him by the last draft.²⁴ Among other changes, Guicciardini had written the following introductions to the speeches:

On the contrary, not only did the grand chancellor argue, but he also exclaimed. [He was] a person of the greatest credit and experience who for many years sustained all of the important business of that court.

But on the contrary, Mercurino di Gattinara, the grand chancellor more exclaimed than argued. [He was] a man, although born in a humble station in Piedmont, with much credit and experience, who already for many years had sustained all of the important business of the court.²⁵

In the second one, Guicciardini changed ‘grandissimo credito’ to ‘molto credito’ and added the more negative phrase ‘nato di vile condizione’. Moreover, the emphasis on ‘esclamava’ is greater in the second quote. It was an unusual choice, for men of great credit and experience are more inclined to give reasoned advice, not emotional outbursts. According to Cantimori, the changes resulted from an increasingly critical attitude towards Gattinara. In particular, the juxtaposition of ‘esclamava’ and ‘disputava’ appeared, rhetorically speaking, as the sort of classical antithesis that Guicciardini employed often in imitation of his historical

model, Thucydides. Thus, by linking Gattinara with irrationality and emotion, Guicciardini was able to make him an object of criticism, perhaps even derision.

On the other hand, Giovanni Barbero pointed out the prudence and rationality of Gattinara's position when compared with that of Lannoy. The latter drew upon the ethos of chivalry and caste, and had even insulted the Italians as untrustworthy merchants and priests. At the end of the speech, Guicciardini narrated how Gattinara 'had moved the opinions of a great part of the council with this speech, accurate and vehement, and with his reputation for prudence'.²⁶ He had, as affairs turned out, been correct in his advice. Moreover, the work had been written after Guicciardini had witnessed the crowning of the emperor by the pope in Bologna, the definitive achievement of all that Gattinara had worked for in his political life. So why would he doubt the effectiveness of Gattinara as a statesman? Barbero proposed that Guicciardini may have actually related to Gattinara as a prudent advisor whose opinions were correct but unappreciated. The sense of powerlessness led to the sense of emotion conveyed in the word 'esclamava'.²⁷ Moreover, presenting the grand chancellor as someone from humble origins highlighted the victory of his *virtù* over *fortuna*.²⁸ Thus Guicciardini might have displayed a profound respect for his fellow statesman, despite his role as the author of the calamity of Italy.

The main premise of Gattinara's speech was to convince Caesar not to ally with France, but with the Italian powers instead. The proposed treaty required the French king to renounce his claims to Burgundy, but Gattinara opposed it because he did not think that the French king would honour a condition that would damage his own interests. More importantly, the grand chancellor manifested the sense that the empire was showing its hand too soon:

I desire, with equal ardour as those of the others, that at the same time Burgundy will be recuperated and the foundations for dominating Italy will be established, but I know that he who wants to hold so much runs the risk of not seizing anything, and that there is no reason that the king of France, once liberated, will observe so many important stipulations. Does he not know, that if he gives back Burgundy, that there will be an open door to France? That it will be in your power to run all the way to Paris whenever you want? And that with you having the ability to cross through France from so many parts that it will be impossible to resist you? Does he not know, and everyone else, that it gives consent for you to enter armed into Rome, that it will give you a bridle over Italy, that you will reduce to your will the spiritual and temporal state of the Church, and the reason of redoubling your power, that never more would you lack money or arms of offending it, that it will be necessary to accept all the laws that you would like to impose on it? So who is there who believes that he has to observe an accord by which he becomes your slave and you become his lord?²⁹

Gattinara essentially asked his fellow counsellors to see the situation from the standpoint of their adversaries, both the French king and the Italians, taking into account their particular interests and understanding their emotional

responses. Not to do so would be naive. He gives his adversaries credit for correctly understanding their situation, as he would if put in their position. In fact, what Guicciardini had the figure of Gattinara do is enter the minds of his adversaries. It was the kind of imaginative exercise encouraged by the careful reading of ancient history and literature associated with a humanist education.³⁰ With these statements, Guicciardini also implies that this educated perspective, the possession of the lone Italian in the room, is something lacking in his fellow courtiers from beyond the Alps.

The speech also conveys the prudence of the grand chancellor, who did not believe that fidelity and promises held much esteem in politics. He maintained that all actors would act in their own interests.

Fidelity and promises (which in the interests of the state is not considered of great weight by many people, and by the French as nothing at all) will not induce them to follow an accord which raises their enemy to the sky and puts their own kingdom in manifest danger.³¹

Shortly afterward, the historian had Gattinara use a medical metaphor to describe the political situation, a means of explanation he shared with many other Italian diplomats. Also noteworthy is the vivid description of future events:

Thus the medicine that we are preparing to use in order to escape danger will be that which increases our danger beyond comparison ... People will ask me, what is your opinion, then? Do you advise that we draw no profit from so great a victory? Do we have to remain continuously in this perplexity? I confirm what I have said many times: that it is too harmful to take in more food than the stomach can digest, and that it is necessary to reconcile with Italy (which is only demanding security from us), and to try to get Burgundy from France and whatever else we can, or make an accord with him by which Italy remains at our discretion, but with such mild terms and so in accordance with his interests that he would have a reason to observe it. In the choice between these two paths it is necessary, Caesar, that your prudence and good will prefer what is stable and more just to that which at first sight appears perhaps more profitable and more grand.³²

Gattinara spoke of future events because his counsel was based on foresight. Using the ocular metaphor adopted from Thucydides, Guicciardini had the grand chancellor oppose what is stable (or solid) with something that cannot be seen clearly. What only seemed grand and profitable could not be the prudent choice.

Deception also appears in the speech as an underlying theme. Gattinara wanted the terms of the treaty to be mild or sweet, *dolce*, and he wanted to draw closer, *reintegrandosi*, to the Italians. This was part of a larger political strategy that would lead to the domination of Italy, and perhaps imperial hegemony in the wider world. In postponing short-term gain for a greater victory to come, he played the long game.

The contrasting speech by the viceroy Lannoy lacked the sophistication of his adversary at court. Guicciardini introduced Lannoy as a viceroy whose

‘authority, at least in regard to his fidelity and good will, was great with Caesar.’³³ The successful military commander began his speech by countering Gattinara’s point about appearing greedy. He stated that the greater danger is missing an opportunity, especially as a result of cowardice.

Those men are not to be praised, most glorious Caesar, who, because of their desire to have too much, reach for more than they can hold. But also to blame are those who, because of undue suspicion and mistrust, deprive themselves of the opportunity to acquire great conquests with much difficulty and danger. Although both errors are serious, it is more to be condemned, in such a great prince, that which proceeds from timidity and a meanness of spirit than that which is born out of generosity and grandeur. And it is more praiseworthy to seek to acquire too much even with danger, than to flee danger and annihilate the extremely rare opportunities available to a man.³⁴

Lannoy placed his position, described as generous and grand, in opposition to that of the grand chancellor, which was timid and lowly (*abiezione di animo*). Intended to spur the prince’s sense of personal dignity and honour, the words played upon his fear of the shame of cowardice. He implied that an alliance with the Italian states would threaten the noble status of the emperor:

Is it better, Caesar, and more fitting to your imperial dignity, to your grandeur, to subject yourself again to fortune, to put everything in danger again, that, forgetting your status, your authority as the highest of all the princes, and the name of Caesar, as conqueror so many times of a most powerful king, to accept from priests and merchants such conditions that would not be any more grave or disgraceful if you had been conquered? ... One ought to put more trust in a king of France with a pledge than with the Italians without any pledge, more in the faith and word of such a great king than in the immoderate greed of priests and the suspicious vileness of merchants; and we can have an alliance more easily, as many times in the past our ancestors have had with the French than with the Italians who are our natural and eternal enemies.³⁵

The base of his argument was simple. He maintained that an alliance with Francis I accorded more with the honour code of nobility, which ensured his compliance. The agreement allowed both partners the ability to save face. Rather than constructing an argument based on reason or psychology, Lannoy played upon the emperor’s fear of social insecurity. The blatant prejudice against the Italians as a group reflected an almost tribal identity. Because of this complete disdain, the viceroy could not see the motives of his adversaries. Such harsh words also implied that he had not been educated in Italy, nor did he share the cosmopolitan view of the humanists. Moreover, he evidently had little experience in arguing both sides of a question. Despite his lack of acumen, perception or education, he represented the victor, a powerful military force.

Ironically, Lannoy’s contempt for the Italians did not serve to decrease his thirst to dominate Italy. He made the point that Milan and Naples, as the gateway to Italy, represented a greater opportunity for glory than Burgundy. In a strange excursion from the general narrative, Guicciardini had Lannoy list in detail the advantages of Italy:

Who doesn't know what Italy is? The queen province of all the others, because of its advantageous location, the temperance of the climate, the multitude of talented men skilled in all honourable enterprises, the fertility of everything supportive of human life, the grandeur and beauty of so many noble cities, the riches due to its position as the seat of religion and the ancient glory of empire, because of an infinite number of other aspects. If you were to dominate it, all of the other princes would tremble in fear of you.³⁶

Rhetorically, this description created a distinction between Italy as a cultural and geographical entity and the lands beyond the Alps. The passage served to heighten the emotional sense of pathos in Guicciardini's narrative of Italian conquest. The speeches placed Gattinara firmly in the camp of the Italians in a conflict that set the Italian Renaissance in opposition to the military culture of the northern European nobility.

In addition to the theme of cultural difference, the dialogue also provided a discussion about two distinct approaches to war, one based on force, the other on intelligence. In Ovid's poem mentioned at the start of this chapter, the powerful, noble and brave Ajax scorned Ulysses as cowardly, low-born and deceptive. In his opposing speech, Ulysses used his powers of eloquence to defend his trickery. He, too, had served as a diplomat and pleaded cases, using his eloquence to move others in support of the cause. Of course his scheme, the ingenious Trojan Horse, had won the war for the Greeks. Without his prudent direction, he claimed, Ajax would not have known what to do with his strength and bravery. He was the head, Ajax the arm. In the end, the Greeks awarded the armour of Achilles to Ulysses. His ability to reason had made him the most effective predator. In this contest, too, Gattinara proved his eloquence and acumen. Although he lost the battle over the treaty to Lannoy, ultimately it was his mind that had directed the course of the emperor and his armies. Intelligence, not military force, had conquered the Italian peninsula.

In the process of writing his speech, the historian had entered the mind of Gattinara, who had entered the mind of the Italians whom he was in the process of conquering. In the world of politics, Guicciardini played the role of victim, and Gattinara that of victor. But composing the speeches allowed Guicciardini to switch roles and become the conqueror. Thus history served as a means of gaining control over what one had lost in reality. It was also a perfect illustration of how the Italian humanist education, used to great advantage by both Gattinara and Guicciardini, was in the process of destroying itself at the end of the Renaissance.

CONCLUSION

Gattinara was a Renaissance statesman by coincidence and temperament. Driven by ambition and educated in the humanities, he experienced and excelled in every human endeavour related to the negotiation and administration of power. In an era that exalted language as the divine force granted by heaven to mortals for the purpose of establishing order on earth, he made the most of his talent. He showed his mastery when he portrayed himself as a prophet, predicting and then fulfilling the will of God and preparing for his kingdom. Simultaneously, he fit perfectly within the hermetic tradition of language inherited from antiquity. In this esoteric philosophy, Mercury, the messenger of the gods, had brought humans not only communication, knowledge and magic, but also the arts of trickery and deceit. Many contemporaries believed he shared more than just a name with this elusive figure.

Whether through talent or training, Gattinara's greatest asset as an advisor was his ability to see situations from the perspective of his opponents, subjects and patrons. Whether they were Aztec peasants in New Spain, Lutheran foot soldiers in Germany, duchesses in Brabant, kings in England or popes in Italy, they all had interests and motivations, and Gattinara made it his business to understand them. He evaluated circumstances according to the 'human measure', a way of looking at the world inherited from the Western legal tradition.¹ It allowed him to configure justice from the standpoint of the person, not abstract authorities. Both civil and humanist traditions sought to synthesize multiple perspectives in order to achieve a greater semblance of truth. Doing this required an open exchange of ideas which required the liberty to speak freely. Without these, a true picture of reality could not emerge. This was important to people who needed information to administer states as well as wage war.

This humanist perspective provided real benefits to the subjects of the Spanish empire in the early sixteenth century. The grand chancellor administered the realms in the form of a Renaissance monarchy as described by J. Russell Major. It was a government based on the rule of law, which ruled with the consent of the people. Gattinara respected representative institutions and wanted his ruler to avoid the stain of tyranny at all costs. After him, the centralization of state power

and an increasing amount of military force allowed European rulers to shift their concerns away from the well-being of their subjects. New empires would eventually justify themselves not with the ideologies of justice and peace, but with notions of racial superiority. Policies of dehumanization, undreamed of by Gattinara's generation, would later take a heavy toll on their conquered subjects.

Nevertheless, Gattinara's imperial ideology laid the foundation for such abuse of power. He used the critical thinking he gained from his training in Renaissance humanism to undermine the practice of critical thought itself. When one makes an argument from a supernatural base, there can be no opposition that is not blasphemy. There are only two sides: God's will and those who oppose it. This is a space in which politics cannot exist. Interests and factions cannot compete because there is only one legitimate interest, the interest of the deity. If the emperor represented God on earth, then it was only his interest that mattered. In the imperial ideology that dominated the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ruler represented the centre of the universe, the sun in a Neoplatonic universe. Under the sun, the force of love bound all of the subjects together in unity. This vision presented a beautiful image of a state existing in universal harmony. Individual interests and perspectives worked against these bonds of love. A perfect image of this Neoplatonist ideal exists in Granada near the Alhambra, where Charles V commissioned the construction of an imperial palace in 1527. The palace contains a perfect circle within a perfect square. The radial nature of the courtyard, with all lines converging to one point in the centre, gives the one person in its centre the feeling that he dominates the space. There is only one point from which the whole design makes sense; the architecture of the palace evokes ideas of order, control, hierarchy, triumph, dominion and universality.² There is no evidence that Gattinara played a role in designing the palace, nor did he develop the ideology of imperial Neoplatonism. He was one of many who promoted it, but he promoted it with full awareness of what he was doing.

Gattinara was revolutionary in that he sought to change the political system that had dominated the direction of public affairs in northern Italy and Spain for at least two hundred years. This is not to say that the system would not have changed without him. The challenges to public space in the form of economically, if not politically, independent city-states had already mounted in much of late fifteenth-century Europe. In Spain, the practice of selling city charters to noble warlords had begun as a result of the *Reconquista* and had accelerated under Ferdinand. In Italy, private families began to dominate politics in many cities, the most salient example being the Medicis in Florence. Rich private interests had always threatened public spaces, and fearing both public revolts and their nobilities as their political rivals, the crown, at least in Spain, had generally taken the side of the public. They had enforced the laws protecting the rights of the cities and towns. By the sixteenth century, however, they increasingly took

the side of the nobles over the public. The influx of gold and silver and the ability to raise large state armies undoubtedly played a part. The centuries between 1500 and the Age of Revolutions saw a return of more private sources of wealth and power, and not surprisingly, those at the top of society chose to return to cultural forms more suited to a feudal era. Jousts, romances and pageantry merged with Neoplatonic ideas of cosmic harmony to give the early modern era a certain lustre that still entices the modern imagination. But was the magnificence and splendour the natural result of a return to private power, or was it the intentional construction of those in power to maintain the cultural norms and ideology of personal power? With Gattinara, who operated early in the sixteenth century, one might reasonably suspect that he knew that he engaged in the kind of empire-building that required both the conquest of territories and the co-option of a populace. In the re-establishment of feudalization, he seemed to know what he was doing, just like the inhabitants of the town of Gattinara knew exactly what they were doing in desecrating his grave during the French Revolution.

The sacralization of Emperor Charles V went beyond norms established in medieval kingship. Charles appeared in treatises, pamphlets, pageants and paintings as a saviour-emperor who fulfilled biblical prophecies concerning the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth. Just as the empire was immortal, so, too, became the emperor, the *divus augustus carolus*. What did the elites who propagated this vision have to gain from it? If the government is sacred, all of its officials must somehow be imbued with the divine essence themselves. Moreover, as 'the powers that be', the vassals of the new dynasty, tied by blood to the trained magistracy, could claim a legitimacy previously denied. This was no counter-revolution to the one that promised justice and peace, it *was the revolution*, conjured up by the *same men*. It was a deliberate power grab orchestrated by policymakers like Gattinara, who understood the historical context of their fight for private over public authority.

Guicciardini described the end of politics in Florence when he discussed the establishment of the Florentine government, 28 October 1530:

At this time the Emperor set forth the form of the government of Florence ... he stated that the city should be governed by those magistrates, and in that manner, in which it used to be governed at the time of the Medici rule, and that Alessandro, the Pope's nephew and the Emperor's son-in-law should be head of the government, and in the event of his death, his children and closest descendants in the same family should succeed one after the other ... in the entire decree he inserted words which showed that he was basing himself not only on the power conceded to him by the parties, but also on his imperial authority and dignity.³

The passage shows a remarkable disjuncture between ideas about the basis of power. Guicciardini saw power as a result of objective, human and ultimately random events and forces. Parties competed for power in a public space. In a

forum that allowed the airing of multiple perspectives, a rational consensus about reality could form. The unification of power in one man destroyed this space. Authority and dignity, qualities that had no basis in human reason, became the foundations of the new regime.

The author is not trying to draw battle lines between liberty and tyranny, or good and evil. Historians have not come to a consensus concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the 'Calamity of Italy', or whether it was a disaster at all. Many Italians had been oppressed by the merchant oligarchies that dominated the city-states of northern Italy. They had suffered years of civil wars. There is something to be said for peace, and its way of allowing children to grow into maturity, and the protection of women against the constant threat of rape and murder engendered by perpetual warfare.

Nevertheless, the kind of thinking encouraged by Gattinara certainly proved fertile ground on which the worst abuses of power could grow. With the Spanish domination came the proliferation of the Inquisition in Italy, which used torture to suppress thought crimes. In addition, refeudalization ensured that many common people would never have the opportunity to develop their talents. Clearly, something peculiar to the human psyche suffers with the elimination of public power.

Mercurino di Gattinara claimed to be an agent of justice and peace, a revolutionary bringing a new age to a weary, war-torn people. He may have been. Or he may have been a force for aggressive conquest, whose language and policy facilitated the overthrow of established political authorities in order to consolidate his own power. Were his appeals to humanist values sincere or deceptive? There is no way to know. Despite all of our research, study and analysis, we are no better now than in the past at judging whether or not to trust Greeks bearing gifts.

A NOTE ON THE TEXT

A manuscript of Mercurino di Gattinara's autobiography written in his own distinctive handwriting exists in the Archivio di Stato Vercelli, dated 24 June 1529. It has been well preserved, but the edges have withstood some damage over the years. A copy of the manuscript was made in the eighteenth century, when the original manuscript had been in better condition. This copy is also in the same packet of manuscripts at the ASV.¹ Working from both manuscripts, Carlo Bornate published a Latin edition of the autobiography at the turn of the nineteenth century. The work is reliable despite a few errors. The following translation has been made in consultation with the original manuscript, the eighteenth-century copy and Bornate's printed edition. In addition, the author has made much use of an English translation of the autobiography made by John Headley, which has never been published.

Gattinara wrote his autobiography in the style of neoclassical Latin in vogue in the early sixteenth century. This English translation has significantly altered the structure of the prose to make it lively and readable for a modern audience. In order to convey the meaning of the text, the translator has added verbs, eliminated couplets and redundancies on some occasions, and added punctuation. The names of certain individuals have been rendered in their most common, modern form. She has also converted many sentences from the passive to the active voice. The Latin prose has been referenced when necessary to provide the reader with more clarity. The references usually refer to the edition cited by Bornate, unless a difference exists between that edition and the manuscript. The text does not contain annotations referring to contemporary diplomatic dispatches, letters and reports, but directs the reader to the extensive references contained in Bornate's and Boccotti's editions.

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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY

According to tradition, the branch of the Arborio family currently residing in Vercelli, a country still adorned with many castles, originally made its way from Arbois, a town in Burgundy. Evidently the family's authority was so great that its castles were subject only to the Holy Roman Empire until the reign of Frederick Barbarossa. When Pope Innocent III excommunicated him for troubling the Roman Church, he considered it appropriate punishment to release the castles subject to him. At that time, the castles of the Arborio did not recognize any superior authority when the state of Vercelli was governed by the people. The Arborio family flourished in this state.¹

In the year of the Lord 1243, the nobles surveyed, constructed and built the city of Gattinara, uniting the villages of Rado, Loceno, Locenello and Mezzano under the dominion of the Arborio family. To this day the noble descendants of this family retain the name of Arborio di Gattinara. When the Holy Roman Empire neglected to protect Italy, these towns and their castles (Arborio, Greggio, Ghislarengo, Lenta, Ricetto, Giardino, Cassinale and San Columbano) did not have enough strength to defend themselves. In 1404, in order to escape the yoke of tyrants, the towns begged for help and submitted to Count Amadeus VIII of Savoy as imperial vicar for his protection. The illustrious Amadeus gained recognition as the first duke of Savoy, and transferred this duchy to his son. The Council of Basil that deposed Pope Eugenius IV proclaimed Amadeus VIII as Pope Felix, happy by name, but not in his situation. He chose to retire to Ripaille on the shore of Lake Geneva, where he lived as a hermit. Only those within his borders recognized Felix as pope. Eugenius held the Roman seat under the auspices of Phillip the Good of Burgundy. At any rate, this count Amadeus, whom the Arborio trusted to keep them safe, not only failed to protect them but also deprived them of their jurisdictions, and forced them to give up feudal privileges and the hearth taxes of the cottagers.²

From this lineage, which had four principle branches in the city of Vercelli, was born Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara in the year 1465, on 10 June, at dawn. His father, of the same last name, Paulino, and his paternal grandfather, Lorenzo, were noblemen of exceptional virtue. Nor was his mother, Felicita, common, but

from a branch of the noble Ranzo family from the same city of Vercelli. Her father, Mercurino Ranzo, a man of great learning and renown, had the honour of serving the office of president in both Savoy and Piedmont. At the same time, he directed the chancellery of Savoy with great equity. He left life in a praiseworthy fashion in the year Mercurino was born, and from this death, the new Mercurino accepted his name.³

When Mercurino became an adult, he succeeded in restoring and even skilfully added to the land lost by his ancestors. Thus he consolidated all the aforesaid lands obtained by his predecessors into one: the county of Gattinara. The emperors Maximilian and Charles, as well as Duke Charles of Savoy, bestowed this county upon him and his descendants perpetually by order of succession and according to the law of primogeniture.

At the age of fourteen, Mercurino's father and paternal grandfather died. This left his mother, at barely twenty-eight years of age, with the burden of raising five sons and two daughters. In debt and having little means of supporting so many children, she could hardly bear the responsibility of running the household and educating the children. Debts piled up, and the patrimony had proved insufficient for raising so many children at a level appropriate to their status. Even the neighbours tried to take away what little remained.

Mercurino, the firstborn of all the children, entered into adolescence. Solomon had named three amazing things, and four which he did not understand. The three things were the way of the bird in the air, the way of the ship in the sea, and the way of a serpent on a stone. He afterward confessed his total ignorance of the fourth: of the way of youth in adolescence. Various directions and tendencies became apparent in the youth of Mercurino. The weakness of that life stage did not offer a guide for choosing the right path. That age has neither a memory of the past, nor foresight into the future. It is easily deceived by vain and frivolous thoughts.⁴

His mother, Felicita, burdened by the weight of taking care of the children, had brought in a young woman, Andreeta, to help her. An orphan, the noble maiden came from a distinguished family of lawyers from Vercelli. He often heard his mother say that she would thank God if given a daughter-in-law like her, as she provided so much support and aid. Mercurino felt the same way and thought that asking her for her hand in marriage would please his mother. However, since Andreeta was over twenty years old, and he was hardly more than a minor, he did it without his mother or relatives knowing. He proposed to her verbally and wrote up a secret marriage contract himself. It stated that the marriage would be consummated after four years, and it would remain secret until that time.

The affair was uncovered and the contract discovered in the hands of Andreeta. His mother, paternal relatives and other kin considered him a ruined man. They upbraided, condemned and assaulted him with abuse. If he were left

at home, they said, he would pass his time in leisure, and neglect his studies. They declared the marriage invalid because he had not yet reached puberty, and urged Andreeta to start legal proceedings in front of an ecclesiastical court. Andreeta refused; she would rather join a convent than go before a court. Meanwhile, Mercurino, forbidden to associate with his wife, was sent to the city of Vercelli, and entrusted to the care of his paternal uncle, Pietro di Gattinara. Here he idled away in training for about three years. Later, he was sent to live with the magnificent Bartholomeo Ranzo, his maternal uncle, a doctor of law, who was like a father to him. Educated by this uncle, he afterward followed him to Casini as a prefect in Monferrato, where he served for about two years. The uncle urged him to devote himself to the study of letters and begin the study of jurisprudence. Mercurino obeyed the advice of his uncle, and as long as he remained with him, began to read and memorize the text of the *Institutes*. He drank it up, and within a short amount of time he could recite the entire *Code of Justinian* by heart. In the year of the birth of our Lord 1490, when Mercurino entered adulthood and reached twenty-five years, he realized that he had not based his life on any firm foundation. He heeded the warning of his uncle, and as was fitting, the grown man embraced what he had neglected as a youth: jurisprudence as a career. According to the legislator, it was a career that permitted 'one to live without poverty and to die without anxiety'.⁵ He persisted and tried to prepare himself for legal studies.

His mother, brothers and other relatives tried to dissuade him, saying he had come to it too late. He had wasted his time during the best life stage for studying. In addition, members of the Arborio family who had tried to study law failed and squandered the time and money given for their studies. Mercurino's portion of the inheritance, which could have paid for the studies, had been exhausted. Therefore he couldn't study law without hurting his brothers and sisters. These arguments meant nothing to Mercurino, who decided absolutely to pursue and acquire jurisprudence. This he would do without causing any harm to his brothers and sisters.

He could now marry Andreeta, over thirty years old, without damaging the interests of his brothers and sisters. She had lived without her betrothed for so many years, through no fault of his own. Mercurino decided to follow through and consummate the pact made before with Andreeta. She would have to suffer for a few more years so that he could complete his studies. The couple could only see each other during vacation. Meanwhile, she would endure his absence while he recouped her inheritance and resources to apply them to his law school expenses. He thought Andreeta should live with his mother, Felicita, and his brothers and sisters. The good wife agreed, because she didn't want to be blamed by her in-laws for causing his ruin by leading him astray and distracting him from his studies.

The marriage situation was resolved with the celebration of a solemn wedding, after which Andreeta was led back to the house of her husband and

brothers. Mercurino researched the resources of his wife and recuperated the liquid assets, which permitted him to attend the University of Turin in 1490. He lived with his paternal uncle, Giovanni di Gattinara, a judge in that city. Now he had time for his legal studies, and he mastered the *Institutes* with all of the glosses and commentaries, usually after hearing only one class lecture. What usually took two or three years to complete took Mercurino only six months. Within the first two years of devoting himself to the ordinary lectures on the Digests and the Codex, he dared to undertake the defence of judicial cases. In his second year of studies, he brought seven cases to court to fight for the dowry owed to Andreetta. He won them all without any help from anyone, and consequently he suffered four assassination attempts. Twice his enemies conspired to make him drink poison, and in the other two, he was attacked by gangs of armed men. In both he miraculously dodged the blows and freed himself from the hands of wicked men.

Now that Andreetta and Mercurino lived together without the interruption of studies, they had a daughter, Alexis, in the year 1492. She was their only child. In 1505 she was married to Alessandro de Lignana, lord of Settimo near Turin. The excellent marriage was blessed with six children, both male and female.

We return to Mercurino. He assiduously and diligently pursued his legal studies, with impressive results. In his third year, the prince granted him a licence to practise law. He practised as a public defender, sometimes in front of a large crowd. Enjoying the support and favour of nearly all the counsellors and judges, he grew enormously successful in his legal profession. He was so popular that he argued on one side or the other of every single case brought before the council of the duke of Savoy. The lawyers on the opposing side were so impressed with Mercurino's diligence and talent that they simply abandoned their own cases against him, and even asked the brilliant young lawyer for legal advice on their other cases. Thus he gained experience in both defending and prosecuting. He, however, only took on the cause of the defence. Determined to support the more just cause, he was never seen with his hands on unjust claims, even when by defending the guilty party he could have showed off his amazing talent. Because of this, he always came out the winner. In addition, he never pressed his clients for money, but only took what they offered freely and voluntarily. Indeed, sometimes he refused pay, especially in cases where he knew his client to be oppressed by poverty, or if by doing so he could increase his reputation as a man of integrity.⁶

Hearing these things, the illustrious Duke Philibert of Savoy watched Mercurino in person treat a very difficult case. Mercurino pleaded alone against six of the most renowned doctors in the area of jurisprudence. Three of them had been his professors: Jacobinus de San Georgio, Claude de Seyssel and Bernardo

Troto. Not only were they willing to hail their adversary as their best student, but they also proclaimed that the student had surpassed his masters.⁷

The duke himself summoned Mercurino, offering him a post as a *silenzario* or a counsellor in the ducal senate. Mercurino thanked him politely, but turned down his offer. The good prince was amazed that Mercurino would refuse something that others would seek with favours and money. He asked why he refused. Mercurino responded that if he had accepted the offer, he would either have to become a thief or live in poverty as an object of shame and reproach, because the salary was not sufficient to maintain the attendant status. It would leave him susceptible to corruption in violation of the oath he would have to take before taking office. Accepting gifts would make him a thief and perjurer. On the other hand, if he maintained his incorruptibility, he would suffer extreme poverty and become a laughingstock among the people. Therefore he considered it more fitting to serve in the office of advocate, freely in service to others, doing injury to no one. This way, he could accept gifts without reprehension and live an honest life in liberty, rather than constraining himself to a life of obsequiousness or sinking into crime, poverty or infamy. The good intentions of Mercurino pleased the duke.

In 1501 the duke had married the most serene Margaret, Archduchess of Austria, daughter of Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor, and sister of Phillip, King of Castile, in a most joyful ceremony in Geneva. Numerous subjects of the duke had flocked to the duchess in her first audience, pleading with her to intercede with the duke on their behalf. Since she didn't want to demand or obtain anything unjustly from her husband, she sought someone learned, upright and fair to serve her. This person would investigate all of the petitions directed towards her, distinguish between the just and unjust, and know how to answer each demand with equity. Duke Philibert himself suggested Mercurino. Margaret listened to her husband's advice and took Mercurino into her counsel, so that he earned two congruent salaries. Mercurino did not refuse the office; rather, he was very happy to accept a position that allowed him to serve as counsellor while practising law. At the same time, the duke named him finance minister, with the understanding that he would begin when the office became vacant.

Duke Philibert died in the year of our salvation, 1505, and was succeeded by his brother, Charles. Margaret, now a widow, wanted to keep Mercurino as an advisor in her affairs. She needed his legal expertise to protect her dowry as well as what she acquired by marriage. Mercurino made it clear that taking on the role as advocate for her individual interests would damage his own interests. If he undertook it without the permission of Duke Charles, his prince, he could lose his homeland, patrimony, relatives, friends and clients. Margaret told him she would ask the duke for his permission so that she could consult Mercurino without doing any harm to him. It seemed more appropriate for him to ask the duke himself, and judge his attitude from his responses and gestures. He went

immediately to Charles, and told him how he had been the counsellor of his late brother, Duke Philibert, who had asked him to serve as counsellor to the most serene Margaret. She wanted him to stay in her service, but he told her that he would not be able to without the approval of his natural prince and lord, to whom he owed loyalty. He also added that if Charles insisted on him staying in his service, he would remain his most obedient subject. Charles responded that he was pleased to have him serve Margaret, adding that he could serve him when not occupied with her affairs. Mercurino told him that he could not well serve two masters. If he entered into the service of Margaret, he would be obliged to serve her well and faithfully. By accepting, he would subordinate all of his other roles to this one. The duke himself agreed, and conceded his permission for Mercurino to serve Margaret as a most faithful servant.⁸

After the funeral of Duke Philibert, a controversy arose between Charles and Margaret concerning her dowry and all that she had acquired through her late husband. The duke maintained that Philibert could not alienate his domains to the prejudice of his successors. Mercurino argued for Margaret's rights to inherit the lands against all the ducal counsellors. He drew up a legal brief that was praised and approved by all the legal experts who saw it. With the help of ambassadors from her father, Maximilian Caesar, and her brother, Philip of Castile, she obtained the jurisdictions of Bâgé, Romont and Villars as well as the lands of Bresse and Faucigny, and all of the rights pertaining to them as long as she lived. Soon after, she named Mercurino minister of finance in all of these lands, and then president of Bresse, with the accompanying salaries.⁹

Mercurino returned home to arrange his affairs, and to prepare his wife and daughter for the move to Margaret's court. While in Vercelli, Mercurino went to the church on Good Friday to kneel at the altar. He prayed to Christ and contemplated the suffering of Christ on the cross with all of his mind and heart. Suddenly, he was attacked by fourteen men who unsheathed their swords at the same time and brought them down upon his head. The assailants were partisans, induced, or rather seduced by a diabolic spirit, into thinking falsely, that by killing Mercurino they would win the favour of the duke. Only the protection of God and the courage and virtue of several bystanders spared him in the melee. He suffered only two light wounds which neither slowed him down nor stopped him from realizing his plans or making his journey. Nor did Mercurino care to prosecute the criminals, which he could have easily done. In fact, he had the ringleader of the would-be assassins in his hands, offering to implicate the others. Mercurino kindly told him that since the crime had been committed on a holy day and in a holy place, he felt the need to pardon him. He did not want to know who the others were. In honour of the Lord's suffering, he refused to feel hatred or seek revenge against the criminal and his accomplices. The assailant

was struck by Mercurino's extreme humanity, and pledged himself to his service for the rest of his life.¹⁰

In 1506, while Margaret was still in her year of mourning, Philip of Castile died. He left six surviving children, two male and four female. The oldest of them was Charles, not yet seven years old. Their mother, Queen Juana, suffered from an incurable illness. Occupied with affairs of state in Germany, Emperor Maximilian, their grandfather, left the wards (who were babies, really) in Brabant. Their maternal grandfather, Ferdinand, left his kingdom of Naples to rule his kingdoms in Spain. At that time Margaret, their aunt, was passing her widowhood in Bresse, in the duchy of Savoy. When she heard about the death of her brother the king, she hurried to Rothenburg. Here deputies and ambassadors from the land of Flanders urged Maximilian to undertake the tutelage of his children. However, pressed by administrative obligations in the empire, he could not care for them himself, and so he appointed his daughter Margaret to this task with the help of wise counsellors. Throughout the entire journey, Mercurino served as her loyal servant. Moving to Louvain, she took control of the state and convoked the Estates General. This assembly swore loyalty to Maximilian and approved the guardianship of Margaret and her counsellors. She sent Mercurino to Germany for over eight months to report on state affairs and to ask the emperor to come to the Low Countries.¹¹

In 1508 the office of the president of Burgundy became vacant. Maximilian Caesar, personally familiar with the faith and integrity Mercurino displayed on so many diverse occasions, appointed him to the post. Mercurino had not sought this office. Rather, the emperor granted it to him, spontaneously, voluntarily and enthusiastically, with great munificence and liberality. Thus the counsellor had the honour of holding two presidencies at the same time. Mercurino did not take office immediately. The emperor, arriving in Brabant, wanted to press the claims of Margaret to the county of Burgundy. Through the efforts of Mercurino, she was conceded the rights of the county for life. In gratitude, she wished to confirm him in the office he had been granted earlier.

Meanwhile, Maximilian and Louis XII engaged in negotiations to establish peace in the city of Cambrai. Maximilian sent representatives with full power to support his side. Among these were Margaret, the bishop of Gurk (later promoted to the opulent archbishopric of Salzburg and then to the cardinalate) and Mercurino, the president. On the side of the French king was Cardinal Rouen, legate of France, the bishop of Paris, and Albert, count of Carpi. Mercurino officiated at the League of Cambrai, concluded in 1508, around the time of the feast of the Blessed Virgin. Besides achieving the goal of peace, the negotiations stipulated a war with Venice. It conditionally ceded Milan to the French king. In these negotiations the French experienced Mercurino's diplomatic skill and dexterity. He drafted the agreement in such a way that they found themselves much

more restricted and vulnerable than they had imagined. All blame for breaking the agreement would be ascribed to them. For this reason, the French made it clear that in the future they would never allow Mercurino to draft another accord with them. Nevertheless, Maximilian sent Mercurino, though suffering with quartan fever, as an ambassador to King Louis XII to enforce the treaty.

Meeting at Blois in February of 1509, Mercurino represented Maximilian and gave a suitable oration swearing to uphold the league. They agreed to join forces to fight the Venetians and set the date of the first of April in the same year, just as the treaty had stipulated.¹²

Meanwhile, Mercurino made his way to Burgundy to take possession of his prefecture. As president of the parliament, he gave an appropriate oration to colleagues and attendees. From there he took up his role as ambassador once again. King Louis of France convoked an assembly in the city of Lyon to seek a path for his passage into Italy. After a setback from the appointed day, the king himself moved with his army through the Dauphiné. At the same time, Mercurino was travelling through Savoy towards Turin in the Piedmont as imperial ambassador, where he was received graciously by the duke himself, a prince of the Holy Roman Empire. He conducted the charge entrusted to him by Caesar well. Mercurino met the French king himself the first of May in the city of Milan. There he reproached the king for not beginning the war on the day established by the league. The king defended himself, saying that the chosen date did not give him enough time, and promised to speed up the expedition.¹³

Thus the king with his powerful army made his way to Cassano with great diligence. Mercurino accompanied them as imperial ambassador. He crossed the river Adda, transporting all of the catapults and war machines across the bridge. The enemy advanced, but was pushed back. The king gathered his troops and led them towards Caravaggio. Here they established the line of battle, a scene of bitter fighting with great slaughter and carnage. The Venetians greatly outnumbered them, but they gave in when one of their commanders, the count of Petigliano, began to fall back. The other commander, Bartholomeus Alivanus, was taken prisoner. It was a glorious victory for the king of France. Caravaggio was taken by force and captured. All of the other towns up to Brescia were taken and occupied within a short time. Brescia, its fortress captured, surrendered without a fight. All other places belonging to the king as specified by the League of Cambrai surrendered willingly except for Peschiera, which was taken by force. While Mercurino followed the French camp as imperial ambassador, he also fulfilled some other commissions at Mantua and Ferrara, where he was welcomed as a representative of Caesar with highest honours.¹⁴

When Mercurino went back to the French forces gathering in Peschiera, he tried to keep the king from crossing the river Mincio with his army. That region had been allotted to the emperor in the Treaty of Cambrai, even if the emperor

did not want to seize it at that time. According to the treaty, the emperor had to wait forty days after the French invasion before entering the Veneto. Caesar had already amassed an army, paid for with the 100,000 scudi the French king had given him for the investiture of Milan. The pope, who named Caesar 'defender of the faith', urged him to wage war against the Venetians and others who had been excommunicated from the bosom of the Church. Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Treviso and other cities, which had been assigned to the emperor by the treaty, had voluntarily surrendered to him.

In the meantime, the French king and Caesar negotiated a meeting place. Louis XII proposed many locations, but none served the interests of the emperor. A certain top-secret friend had informed Mercurino that these suggested places were, in fact, traps laid to deceive the emperor. He decided to meet Caesar en route in order to accompany him to the conference. On the banks of the river Trent, he told the emperor what he had heard. Accordingly, Maximilian refused the offers of the French king as unjust, unsuitable to his honour, authority, much less his security. He sent the bishop of Gurk and Andrea di Burgo as ambassadors to the French king in order to postpone the meeting. This would give him a few days to prepare his army at the same time. They proposed holding the meeting in Verona, a suitable location for both sides because the river Adige divided the city into two distinct parts. The side facing Germany could welcome Caesar, and the other part, facing the French camp, could receive the French king. The Gaul was indignant because the affair had not turned out according to his wishes. Refusing to wait for the bishop of Gurk and Andrea di Borgo, he left Peschiera and made his way to Milan. The ambassadors followed him and met him in Cremona. They explained their plan, but the Gaul refused to meet at Verona. They urged him at least to go back and finish the expedition against the Venetians as required by the treaty. They pointed out that the king couldn't dissolve his army and end his war against the Venetians until the other members of the league obtained what was due to them in the treaty. Although the French king refused to continue the war, he agreed to send back a contingent of 500 heavily armed cavalry to join Caesar's troops after he reached Milan. They came much later, after the army had taken Padua. Mercurino stayed in the imperial camp at that time.

After a few months he served again as ambassador to the French king. The latter offered himself as mediator in order to establish concord between Maximilian, paternal grandfather of Charles (the prince of Spain), and his maternal grandfather, Ferdinand. They contested the right to rule and administer the kingdom of Castile. Maximilian claimed that he should be preferred as paternal grandfather and tutor of Charles because Joanna, his daughter-in-law and mother of Charles, was incapacitated. On the other hand, Ferdinand, the Catholic king, maintained that as long as Joanna lived, Charles had no legal right to the kingdom. Her perpetual illness gave the right to rule the kingdom to her father, Ferdinand.

The French king presided over the meeting held in Blois. Mercurino and Andrea di Burgo represented Caesar as ambassadors and imperial agents. Jeronimo de Cabanilla and Juan d'Albione represented Ferdinand. They reached an agreement in 1509. As long as Queen Joanna lived, Ferdinand, the Catholic king, her father, would rule Castile. He would have to pay 20,000 gold pieces per year to Charles, prince of Spain. However, when Queen Joanna died, the kingdom would belong to Charles. The treaty required the Catholic king to have all of the nobles, prelates and cities of the kingdom produce duly signed letters swearing an oath of allegiance to Charles as king. Louis, the French king, pledged himself as preserver of this treaty. With letters duly signed, he promised his military support to the party upholding the agreement against the party that violated its terms.

The concord having been completed, Mercurino went back to Flanders and gave Caesar and Margaret an account of his work. From there he went back again to Burgundy to take up his office of president of the parlement around the beginning of the year 1510. Here he was happily engaged in settling disputes and administering justice to the best of his ability. He stayed in Dôle, where the Parlement of Burgundy resided, until around May of that year, when he was presented with a new commission. Maximilian Caesar himself ordered Mercurino and Doctor Iohannes Scath, brother-in-law of the bishop of Gurk, on a mission to Spain to make sure Ferdinand fulfilled the terms of the treaty and executed it in its entirety. Mercurino took up his charge, but before setting out on his journey, he decided to make his home in the land of his ancestors. He had a mind to tread the land from which they came. The people still remembered his ancestors, and celebrated his return. For these reasons, Mercurino gave a mandate to certain gentlemen friends to look for a vacant castle suitable to his presidential dignity near the town of Dôle. If they found one available, they were to buy it and conclude the terms of sale in his name.¹⁵

Mercurino then set off from Burgundy to fill his office of ambassador to Spain. With Doctor Scath, they travelled on their journey as rapidly as possible. Around the month of June in the same year, they met the Catholic king at Monzón, at a meeting of the *cortes* of Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia. Here they related their message as charged to the Catholic king in a suitable oration. They stayed another three months until the end of the *cortes*. In September they followed the Catholic king to Madrid, where the king convoked the *cortes* of Castile. After the assembly swore to uphold the treaty, Scath returned to Maximilian. Mercurino stayed with the Catholic king by order of Caesar, in order to assure his friendship and gather good intelligence. He stayed over a year, traveling throughout the principal cities of Castile. When he stayed with the king in Seville, a city of great commerce and fame, he was granted licence to return to Maximilian Caesar. In this way he was able to go through many other distinguished and cosmopolitan cities: Grenada, Valencia and Terragona, on which Barcelona depends.¹⁶

With Maximilian Caesar in Germany, spending time at Innsbruck, Mercurino considered the long distance of his journey, and the impediment of his caravan, including his family, baggage, mules and horses. He decided to leave them in Burgundy and go straight to the emperor. Playing the role of postal courier, he soon reached Caesar and gave him a brief account of his mission. The emperor ordered him to take the state documents concerning the negotiations into Flanders in order to obtain Margaret's seal. Again he went by the postal service to Burgundy, where he rejoined the family he left on the way out of Spain. He brought his family with him to Flanders. Just as he was ordered, he gave the state documents to Margaret, the daughter of Caesar, and rendered an account of his mission. Soon after, he rushed back to Burgundy around the beginning of the month of November 1511, and worked diligently in his office of prefecture. He found that his agents, to whom he had entrusted this charge as mentioned previously, had bought a castle in his name. It was called Chevigny, only two miles from Dôle. The purchase was considered fully legal; the contracts had been completed, the money was paid, and the deed was transferred to Mercurino with an even stronger bond of ownership according to the *ius prelationis* and the *ius commissi*, which allows the relatives to purchase the property. The relatives who could have claimed possession by right of proximity declined their rights to the castle.¹⁷

Mercurino thought he had drawn up the purchase contract so reasonably and legally that it would be free from any kind of lawsuit in the future. He spent a great deal to build, restore and fortify the nearly dilapidated castle and its neighbouring land, even beyond its principal cost. He also restored estates in the countryside and in the city to a better state, greatly prolonging their usefulness and increasing their profitability. This aroused feelings of jealousy and envy among the people; they say this is characteristic of the people of this region. Around the end of the year 1512, after all of this work had been completed and paid for, those who originally had declared that they did not want to buy back the property rose up and changed their minds. They said they wanted to go back and offer a price. Although he considered this action illegal, Mercurino nevertheless offered to sell the castle back as long as the price included the cost of renovations. They rejected the offer. This gave rise to a long legal dispute contested in the parliament. The judgment of the court annulled the actions of his enemies. The adversaries claimed that the affair wasn't settled and vowed to carry on the fight; even if he died, they would prosecute his heirs, who knew nothing about it. Mercurino saw this as a travesty of justice, and proposed setting a date when they could publicly justify their reasons for continuing the case. If they did not and continued to draw it out in endless delays, he would order them to remain silent once and for all. Having been given a deadline, they now rejected the demands of parliament, mainly out of spite for Mercurino, its president, and instead sought recourse to the prince, Margaret. This could not have been done

without his permission, but he assented in order to remove any suspicion of unscrupulous behaviour.¹⁸

The great council of the prince met in Mechlin to try the case. Mercurino expected a knowledgeable and conscientious opinion, appropriate to true judges from the council. Instead, it turned out differently from what he hoped. The new trial did not conform to legal procedure, nor did it show any recognition of due process of law, which it totally neglected. They did not refer to previous acts of parliament, but instead they brought out a new arraignment that was both inept and inadmissible. The plaintiff did not offer any proof, nor did they implement evidence relevant to anything offered by him, without any procedure to permit the exhibition of proof or hear the sentence. Having totally set aside all procedural order, they pronounced a judgment null and void, obscured by so many defects and errors. It was contested on ten invalidations resulting from the acts themselves, and ten mistakes concerning the drafting of the decision, which were themselves flawed by seven errors of law contained in the same decision. In order to protect himself against such notorious injustice, he sought remedies from the law. He thought that the judges as delegates should be completely discharged from their office and even that the suspects should be rendered suspect from mounting cases and legally recused. Since every investigation devolved upon the princess herself as the one who appointed the judges, ordinary law allowed him to appeal to her with supplications and complaints. According to ordinary law one could supplicate the prince in cases of notorious injustice. He pleaded with the duchess and explained why the case should be nullified due to error and notorious injustices. It was decided to trust the case to the privy counsellors.

Mercurino felt like a pilot navigating in the Sicilian straits. He wanted to avoid Scylla, but was tossed by the tempests and storms to Charybdis. The privy counsellors of the prince were the colleagues of the council judges, who were eager to uphold the honour of the previous judges. Although neither side requested it, they decided to send the case back to the earlier justices, so they could take note of the errors committed. In order to soften the decision, they allowed Mercurino to explain the reason for his suspicions against them, and let him take suspected jurors off the court. He could replace them with others of an equal or greater value, at his own expense. Meanwhile, the previous verdict, despite the errors and grounds for nullification, was ordered to be executed. Despite its harsh and illegal nature, Mercurino wanted to obey the decision. He put forth the motives for his suspicion of the previous justices. He swore under oath and declared himself ready to furnish, if requested, the evidence relevant to the case. At first a term of three months was fixed for the production of proof, and then it was refused. The executor appointed to settle the case had been one of those counsellors dismissed earlier. Despite objections, he executed the so-called judgment, which was admittedly muddled. The investigation of the settlement of the so-called judgment also

appeared uncertain. More and more he showed himself suspicious. He didn't settle what should have been settled. Nothing was done about the payment that should have been made according to the sentence, nor was he reimbursed for the established deposit. The executor tried hard to deprive Mercurino of his estate and his money in violation of the judgment. Interspersed between these troubles were appeals, supplications and complaints to the duchess. While he pursued these legal claims, the prior justices even tried to find out what he owed from these. Mercurino was never able to obtain judges free from suspicion.¹⁹

As he pursued his rights in the judicial system, he complained bitterly of so many troubles and injustices. Meanwhile, his adversaries, conspiring to murder him, hatched various plots against his life. They tried in vain. On one occasion, they sent soldiers to intercept Mercurino on his way to the Estates General meeting in the county of Burgundy. Sensing this danger, and knowing that the meeting had been postponed, he pretended to take the long way home. While the gates of Dôle were closed, he left the town at night with armed men, who captured the highwaymen and led them to the prison in Dôle the following morning. They set new traps, but Mercurino, trusting in divine aid, managed to avoid them. He had made an oath to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre of Christ. However, he needed to go to Flanders first in order to get permission for this pilgrimage from the most serene Margaret. Mercurino journeyed through the domains of his adversaries, through places set with snares. Just as Peter had escaped the chains of his captors, Mercurino escaped the ambushes of his enemies. With God leading, he had been delivered.²⁰

Coming into Flanders in 1516, he still could not obtain permission for his pilgrimage. Therefore he vowed to refrain from eating meat and fish, anything from a terrestrial or aquatic animal, until he got permission. He continued in this vow to abstain from flesh or fish for half a year without any permission being granted. Finally, the pope granted commutation of the first vow, and dispensation for the second. The commutation allowed Mercurino to live his life serving God in any reformed monastery for a semester. In addition, the amount of money he would have spent for a pilgrimage to Jerusalem would be put towards some other pious use. Mercurino fulfilled this vow by a six-month retreat in a Carthusian monastery outside of Brussels, called 'Our Lord of Grace'. Here he obtained the grace of great patience.²¹

Seeing so much injustice, he put out a new accusation against the earlier justices and their partiality in his case. He thought he could at least obtain new judges. Not only was he not heard, but his access to the prince was also cut off. His supplications were neither heard nor seen. All of his entreaties had to go through the privy council, staffed by the same judges who had ruled against him. Having rejected out of hand all of his appeals, entreaties and complaints, the council put out another judgment in 1517 without any input from Mercurino. The judgment

was actually just a pretext to deprive him of his castle and other purchases, which were not even part of the original ruling. They deprived him of the repair expenses and furniture, which greatly exceeded the original cost of the castle. At this time Mercurino was in the monastery, fulfilling his vow and serving God. His agent handled the lawsuit and the complaints, urging some kind of compromise with his adversaries. However, Mercurino could not submit without ignominy, for he considered honour to be preferred above all else. He in no way consented to a settlement, and remained firm in the hope of someday having justice.

The situation worsened to such an extent that Mercurino, like another Job, received three pieces of information on one day depriving him of goods, honour and dignity. The first notified him of the definitive sentence, which was the same as the first with pre-emptive terms. The second was an imposition of an exorbitant fee to cover expenses for the process, with a due date. The third informed him that he had been deprived of his office as president of the Parlement of Burgundy because of the envy of his adversaries.

At this point, all of Mercurino's friends, servants, relatives and neighbours rose up to reproach him. They blamed him for being stubborn, making it worse by refusing to compromise. Nevertheless, Mercurino bore these losses and this blame patiently, saying just like Job: 'The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, as it pleases the Lord, let it be done'.²² Nor would he want to leave the cloister before he fulfilled his vow. In the midst of these troubled times, he restored his spirit somewhat by composing a little book for the divine Charles, now the Catholic king. The oration contained a supplication concerning his situation, containing a dream of a future world monarchy and the triumph of Christianity to come in the person of divine Charles. He predicted the future and with various proofs acclaimed Caesar as the greatest monarch of all. He had this little book presented to Charles as a clear presage of his future success before he left French Belgium to sail for Spain.²³

In 1517, after he completed his vow, Mercurino went to Margaret to complain about his situation. He especially protested that he did not deserve to lose the office of president of Burgundy. It seemed as though she had taken away from Mercurino something that she had not given. Since Maximilian had graciously conceded the office, she had no just cause to take it away from him. He concluded that Margaret had three choices: give him back the office taken away without cause; or subject his case to another judicial examination, one in which Mercurino could tell his side. She could not justly deprive him of his office unless she believed he deserved to lose both life and office at the same time. If she did not want to choose either of these, she could release him from her service and compensate him for the loss of his office with whatever amount her conscience dictated.

Margaret responded that she could not quickly restore his office, for that would make her appear frivolous and arbitrary. However, she could give it back

to him after the passing of time. Meanwhile, she would give him a stipend that was larger than what he would have earned in his office. She did not think the case should go back to the courts. Even his enemies and rivals admitted that Mercurino had been deprived of his office without just cause. Moreover, he actually suffered for his faithful service, because he made no exceptions for people in his administration of justice. Therefore she asked Mercurino what he wished for a stipend if he would only stay in her service and agree not to petition further. He replied that he could not serve her with honour, even if he made more money, if she did not grant him either his office or a legal examination of his case. Heeding his conscience, he persisted in asking her for permission to leave with compensation. Margaret bore this bitterly, but realized that she could not retain Mercurino against his will. She gave him the licence to leave he had sought, and compensated him with 6,000 gold pieces, and confirmed her commitment to provide him 1,000 gold pieces a year for life on the basis of his merits. Thus Mercurino obtained from the divine Margaret permission to leave, but he had to promise not to go over to the French or work against the interests of Burgundy and Austria despite the injury he suffered in this affair. For the duchess knew that Louis XII of France had used various means of tempting him. He even offered him the office of chancellor of France, if he would pass over to the side of the French and uphold the king's interests. She worried that he might pursue out of indignation what he had previously refused out of virtue. But so great was Mercurino's temperance and constancy that no anger could divert him from the right path, and therefore he assented freely to her wishes. He could only make one charge against the divine Margaret. She had shown herself a woman by believing advisors and accusers, whom he hoped God would soon punish.

His friends reproached him in his retirement, calling him a ruined man, whom nobody would remember in the future. As though speaking with a prophetic spirit, Mercurino responded boldly that he placed his hope in the Lord, because as a just judge, God himself would do justice to those who had done so many and so great injustices against him. Just before he reached his home, messengers who had followed him the whole way came to him with great news. They called him to come back from his journey, with great honour and profit. The results of this are well known.

For when Mercurino left Flanders, he made his way through Germany to tell Maximilian Caesar about his situation, especially the lost presidency, which he himself had conferred. He met the emperor in Augsburg, who graciously listened to an account of his affairs (which upset him not a little). He offered his assistance, asking if he would remain in his service. Mercurino did not reject Caesar's kind offer, thanking him for these great benefits. However, he asked him if he could visit his family so that he could put his affairs in order and prevent

any more damage. Caesar agreed, and thus Mercurino was granted permission to continue his journey.

En route he spent money extravagantly, as though he still had dignity and authority. His friends urged him to moderate his expenses, since he had been stripped of his goods, offices, stipend and other emoluments. He responded that a just man would never be abandoned, nor would his children go begging. He trusted in help from the Lord, who would never desert him.²⁴ Thus he continued his journey in the hope of the Lord, reaching Constance, then crossing the Swiss lands, staying in the towns of Lausanne and Geneva overlooking Lake Lemman. In the town of Annecy he met the illustrious Duke Charles of Savoy, his natural prince and lord. He told him everything that happened and why he had returned to his homeland. The duke received him with great favour, and appeared well informed about the misfortunes and injustices he suffered. In his opinion, nothing in these events could stain the honour and reputation of Mercurino. He considered himself lucky to take a man such as Mercurino, originally his subject, back into his service. This was especially true since at that time the offices of prefecture and chancellor of Savoy lay vacant. He intended to appoint Mercurino to these offices and entrust all of the affairs of his state to his integrity and prudence. He thanked the duke and did not want to refuse his offer, and looked forward to living in his own land with his relatives, in-laws and friends. By serving his natural prince he could benefit his loved ones as well as himself.

But fate determined otherwise, because those things Mercurino predicted after leaving Flanders with a certain prophetic spirit were about to come true. A runner came the next day looking for Mercurino in Germany at the court of Maximilian, and then followed the tracks of his journey to this place. He had letters from the divine Margaret, written in her own hand, addressed to Mercurino as the president of the Parlement of Burgundy. She had reinstated him in this office and promised him not to appoint anyone else to the prefecture without his express consent. If she did, he would be promoted to a higher position. She also stated that Jean le Sauvage had died. He was the grand chancellor of all the lands and kingdoms of the divine Charles, the Catholic king, her nephew. The envy of Sauvage had caused Mercurino to suffer many injustices. He also learned that three others who participated in these legal claims against him had exchanged life for death. At the same time she advised him that her nephew, the king himself, had decided to promote Mercurino to the office of grand chancellor. Therefore she ordered him to put his affairs in order and prepare to carry out the orders of her nephew Charles. Even before Mercurino could reach his home, two other messengers came to it, one after another from Spain, who also informed and ordered Mercurino to set forth for Spain as quickly as possible to go to Charles and take up the duties of his office.

Mercurino showed these letters to the illustrious duke of Savoy, seeking his advice on how to respond to them. The duke replied that he was confused about what advice to give. On one hand, a particular affection urged him to keep Mercurino, already dedicated to him as stated earlier, in his service. He could count on his integrity, prudence and skill. On the other hand, however, he understood that Mercurino had been called to higher things. Perhaps he would hold a grudge if diverted from assuming an office with such high status. He also thought that in serving in a higher capacity, Mercurino might be able to favour the interests of the illustrious duke, especially if Charles, as rumour had it, were elected Holy Roman Emperor. Thus he inclined towards having Mercurino accept the office offered by the Catholic king, at least for a while. If he ever decided that he did not want to stay in this office, having already experienced and bristled at backstabbing and intrigues of rivals, the good prince would offer him those offices he had offered before, and he would be added to his loyal servitors.

Mercurino consented to the advice of the duke and prepared himself for the journey to Spain. He sent messengers to Charles, the Catholic king, to announce his departure. When crossing France for Spain, a bitter fever detained him for fifteen days in Lyon. At his own instigation, going beyond the opinion of his doctors, he endured a bloodletting during a conjunction of the sun and the moon. Freed immediately from fever, the next day he went by boat down the Rhone and in one day reached Avignon. There a few friends picked him up, and he was treated so well that he recovered in three days. From here he continued his journey through France to Narbonne. Fortunately, making haste, he reached Spain, and was received everywhere with great acclamation. After his long journey, ready to take up his charge, he finally met the blessed Charles, Catholic King, at Saragossa. The king welcomed him with good will on 8 October 1518. He swore an oath of loyalty to the prince according to custom, and received all of his seals, and accepted the title and duties of grand chancellor of all of his kingdoms and dominions. As Mercurino assumed his office, a meeting of the *cortes* of the kingdom of Aragon convened in Saragossa. They had laboured in vain for more than nine months before Mercurino's arrival. However, Mercurino applied such an effort to solving this problem that within a very short time the assembly adjourned with the consensus of all the members. He resolved issues of justice, set the administration on the correct path, and removed the grievances of these lands. The kingdom of Aragon offered to pay 300,000 ducats as a subsidy to celebrate the arrival of the blessed Charles in Spain.²⁵

Meanwhile, Maximilian Caesar negotiated with the imperial electors to have his grandson, Blessed Charles, elected as King of the Romans. He advised Charles to make sure his ministers supported this objective. Some ministers preferred to reject rather than accept the imperial election. They complained that the election would bring more harm than good to Charles's kingdoms and lands

in the future. Only Mercurino demonstrated the errors in their thinking to the council. He argued one point: that the title of empire legitimizes the acquisition of the entire globe, as was ordained by God himself, foreseen by the prophets, predicted by the apostles, and approved in word and deed by Christ our Saviour by his birth, life and death. It is true that the empire had sometimes been given to weak princes and had been damaged by these. Nevertheless, it would be cause for hope if the title of emperor were joined to a powerful king, propped up with so many and so great kingdoms and dominions. Under the shadow of the imperial title, not only could he serve his own hereditary lands and kingdoms, but he could also gain greater ones, enlarging the empire until it encompassed the monarchy of the whole world. However, if he rejected it, the empire might go to the French, who would certainly not let the opportunity slip by them. No, they would pant for it with all of their strength. If they held the empire after the death of Maximilian, Charles would not be able to maintain his hereditary lands in Austria and Burgundy, nor even the kingdom of Spain itself. Charles heard this willingly, and the opinions of all his council having been changed, he settled the matter. He responded to Maximilian and sent the support necessary to secure the election in favour of Charles. Pope Leo X, who directed and endorsed the election, sent the imperial crown to Maximilian at the border of Italy and Germany, as he promised.

Having called a meeting of the *cortes* of Catalonia, blessed Charles went from Saragossa to Barcelona. At Lérida he received the sad news that Maximilian Caesar had died unexpectedly. They decided to keep the information secret until he reached Barcelona so that he would have more time for careful consideration. The funeral rites and expiatory services were recently performed according to custom. Meanwhile, before leaving Lérida, they made the necessary arrangements for the election. They drafted appropriate letters to the electors, appointed loyal ambassadors with a mandate, and sent out special envoys with all due speed. They put everything in order before they revealed the death to others. Finally they came to Barcelona in the month of January 1519, where they announced the death publicly and celebrated the funeral rites.

While the *cortes* met to deal with this affair, rumour spread that the French king himself sought the empire. He would do everything he could to have himself elected King of the Romans and then emperor, and announced publicly that he had the seals of four electors who promised him their votes for the imperial election. Charles sent a letter to the French king stating that he wished him to stop these manoeuvres, which contradicted the Treaty of Noyons. As was well known, Maximilian, while he lived, had considered the election to the empire entirely destined for the person of Charles, the Catholic king. The French king understood this. Nor could he try to do anything to harm the honour and dignity of Charles himself without going against the treaty. The French king replied

that the imperial crown had nothing to do with the treaty, and that he would strive with all his might to obtain the empire. If he failed to win it, he would gladly let it pass to Charles, whom he hoped would one day be his son-in-law, and whom he called 'son' even now. A fear that the French king would acquire the empire seized the states, kingdoms and domains of Charles. They recognized the wise counsel of Mercurino and decided to stop at nothing to keep the French from the empire. Nevertheless, there was no reason not to have a conference between the two kings seeking the empire. Ambassadors and representatives might negotiate and reach an agreement on how to arrange the kingdoms and lands should one of them be promoted to empire. Designating Montpellier as the town, they met in May of that year. Artus Gouffier de Boissy, Grand Master of France, and Etienne de Poncher, bishop of Paris, represented France. The Lord of Chièvres, Grand Chamberlain, and the Grand Chancellor, Mercurino himself, represented Charles, the Catholic king. As fate would have it, during the first meeting, the skilled Grand Master of France, burdened with the full weight of all the negotiations, suffered a terrible kidney stone and a serious fever. Within four days he had exchanged life for death. Nothing could be discussed or done without him, because the bishop of Paris did not dare to undertake negotiations alone without consulting the king. Therefore the meeting adjourned without accomplishing anything, and Chièvres and Mercurino returned to Charles.

He knew the French sought the empire and held the election of their king to be certain, assured by the force of money and arms. They also recognized the stratagems of Pope Leo X, who sent Cardinal St Sixtus as ambassador *de latere* to try to exclude both candidates from the election and promote one of the German princes, more diminished than distinguished. In order to take a bite out of the empire and shrink it, they declared Charles ineligible for the empire because he held Naples as his feudal domain. Nevertheless, Mercurino's counsel destroyed this underhanded dealing, so that neither money, arms, threats nor persuasions could detach the electors. Without anyone dissenting, they gave their unanimous consent by the grace of the Holy Spirit that Charles of Spain would be King of the Romans and emperor elect on 28 June 1519.

The good news was brought immediately to Emperor Charles at Barcelona. As he gave thanks to God, his subjects everywhere saluted him as Caesar with the greatest jubilation. A legation of electors presented the solemn decree by hand. Frederick, Count of Palatine, of the Dukes of Bavaria, gave a suitable oration to Charles, to which Mercurino responded with a corresponding oration of extraordinary quality. When Pope Leo X learned that Charles had won the election, he decided that he would stop at nothing to gain his friendship. He offered Mercurino the office of cardinal to make him a supporter of his interests. He turned down the offer. He never wanted to tie himself too closely to the Church, for he knew that the clergy would soon be punished for its corruption.²⁶

He preferred to work towards the reform of the Church itself. He would also strive for friendship between the pope and Caesar, as the two great luminaries of the world, so that both would establish and illuminate the Christian religion in all the lands on earth. As the Holy Scripture says, 'There shall be one flock and one pastor.'²⁷ And thus Mercurino himself resolved the difference between the pope and emperor. Leo allowed Charles to accept the empire, though he held the kingdom of Naples. He granted Charles the investiture of Naples as a kingdom within his empire.

The French king, unsettled by the increased power and prestige of Caesar, tried new strategies to divide the pope and emperor. He offered the pope troops to garrison the two Sicilies, arranged a meeting with the English king, and solicited the imperial electors to move the coronation of the King of the Romans to Aachen, or even to have none. In every way, he tried to isolate Charles from his friends and allies, encouraging them to wage war against him from all sides. Caesar knew it, and even his ministers knew it, but the council remained divided. Wishing to establish a new pact between Caesar and the French king, Chièvres sought a new meeting with the mother of the French king. For this reason he wanted to delay the conclusion of the meeting of the *cortes* in Barcelona. It seemed as though he considered his own private interests in France, from which he was separated, above all else. In contrast, Mercurino thought only of the interests of Charles. He knew about the machinations and deceptions of the French. He wanted to conclude the *cortes* in Barcelona and prepare a fleet to intercept the English king in Flanders before he met with the French king. He would make him promise not to negotiate any treaties with the French to Caesar's detriment, and if possible, prevent their meeting. From there he would go to Aachen as soon as possible to take the crown according to custom. He would try to call an imperial diet before the French partisans could spread their venom.

Mercurino's opinion prevailed. They made the necessary preparations for a fleet and solicited an end to the *cortes* in Barcelona. Before concluding in January of 1520, they offered Caesar a *servicio* of 300,000 gold coins. The *cortes* dissolved, and Caesar began his journey, crossing the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre. Saying goodbye to these, he made his way to Castile. Before long he was in Galicia, first in the city of Compostella, then in the port of Corunna, where the fleet was stationed. He summoned the *cortes* of Castile, justified the decrees previously given to the governors of the realm, and informed them that he would soon prepare to sail. Diverse opinions divided the *cortes*, as Chièvres wanted to require a new *servicio* from them. Mercurino opposed it. He pointed out that the *servicio* from two years ago had not yet been collected, thus it did not make sense to require a new one. He predicted that doing so would provoke a popular rebellion, which happened just as he said it would. On the advice of Chièvres, the representatives of the realm consented to an additional tax of 500,000 ducats.

However, this resulted in nothing but a revolution, which threatened to exterminate all the kingdoms. They could not collect the *servicio*, and popular unrest consumed the remaining royal revenues.²⁸

Having ignored the advice of Mercurino, the *cortes* dissolved. The ships supplied and prepared, Caesar set sail in May of 1520. With his ships equipped, and a favourable tailwind, he had no trouble reaching England in seven days of sailing. If he had been delayed two days, he would have missed the king of England preparing to cross over for a meeting with the French king. On the day of Pentecost, with the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they met at Dover. Then Caesar, the king of England, Cardinal Wolsey and the entire entourage moved to Canterbury, where Queen Catherine received them splendidly. For two days they negotiated and struck a treaty. They swore an oath secretly, to be signed by their own hands. The only ones present, Wolsey, Chièvres and Mercurino, underwrote the treaty. All observers were banned.

The next day the king of England left for his meeting with the French king. He could not avoid it; he had given his word. The term approached, and the French king prepared. The English and imperial fleets committed their sails to the wind together. The Englishman sought a brief transit to Calais. Caesar reached Flushing in Zeeland on the same day. From there he made his way to Flanders and Brabant. In the town of Brussels, he attended the Estates General of all his domains. Everyone welcomed him with great acclaim. In a speech explaining the reasons for his arrival, Mercurino asked for aid in securing the imperial coronation. With the consensus of all, the estates awarded him over 500,000 ducats.

Meanwhile, both the English and French kings called Caesar to a meeting, in order to have the trinity in unity. Unfortunately, Cardinal Wolsey tried to dominate the proceedings, considering himself the main arbitrator among them, able to determine the future as he wished. Caesar's counsel advised him that this unusual meeting did not suit his interests, especially in an unsafe location. Nevertheless, he agreed to meet the king of England in Calais after the end of the French meeting, which he did. Wolsey schemed to prevent a new marriage alliance between Caesar and the French dynasty. A marriage agreement between Henry of England with the French would expire in two years. If freed from this connection, Henry could promise his oldest daughter in marriage to Caesar. So unequal were the conditions of the betrothed in this affair that Mercurino needed quite a bit of diplomatic skill to counter the diabolical arts of the Cardinal of York. Caesar left the conference with no more constraints than were appropriate. He returned to Brussels and then to Louvain. He prepared for the coronation, and called the electors to Aachen on the established day of the coronation.

Caesar continued his journey, but when he reached Maastricht, Mercurino succumbed to an attack of gout for the first time. No one in his family had been vexed with it, so he did not expect it when it came upon him. The con-

tinuous insomnia caused him a great deal of pain. Indeed, the intensity of the gout forced him to miss the official coronation. Nor could he fulfil his functions as grand chancellor until the Diet of Worms. He had gone from Aachen to Cologne, and then sailed down the Rhine to Mainz, where he finally recovered. From there he reached Worms, where he worked not a little at the diet.

The meeting was proclaimed and dissolved the same blissful year, 1521. They defeated the stratagems of the French, who tried to prevent Caesar from restoring imperial authority and assuming his rightful command over Italy. The diet offered to pay the expenses of 4,000 knights in chainmail and 20,000 German foot soldiers for six months. After the invasion of Italy, Caesar intended these troops to provide defence for the kingdom of Hungary against the Turks.²⁹

Meanwhile, before the Diet of Worms had ended, the French encouraged and helped Robert de la Marck invade the lands of Flanders. Meanwhile, Charles of Gueldres and Ulrich of Würtemberg stirred up new uprisings. The French also occupied Navarre under the pretext of supporting the claims of Henri d'Albret. They also tried to incite and support the popular revolts in Spain. Destitute of friends and aid, Caesar found himself without any allies. Chièvres died, allowing Mercurino to seek an alliance with Pope Leo X, which could never have been done while he lived. With forces united, he believed they could eject the French from Italy, and this is precisely what happened.

Caesar recognized Francesco Sforza as duke of Milan and Antoniotto Adorno as doge of Genoa. Charles prepared an army to fight the forces of the French under Robert de la Marck. Under the leadership of the Count of Nassau, the army destroyed almost all of his camps. Mercurino found the money, the sinews of war, to do all of these things in Italy, especially in the two Sicilies, which greatly exceeded their hopes. Such that after the dissolution of the Diet of Worms, Caesar could field not just an ordinary army, but also one powerful enough to fight Robert as well as the shameless French, who tried to support him with a strong army assembled in Champagne.

The English king, linked to both Caesar and Francis I by the Treaty of London, had pledged to help either one fight off the other in case of attack.³⁰ However, considering the recent circumstances, he hesitated to take up arms against one or the other. Instead, he offered himself as mediator to end the dispute between Caesar and the French king. Francis I greatly opposed this, believing he would win the conflict. He had already taken Navarre, and planned to stir up more uprisings in Spain. He even thought he would emerge victorious in both Belgium and Italy, although it turned out otherwise by far. The Spanish, having put down their popular uprisings, threw the French out of Navarre and re-established the rule of Caesar himself. Having strengthened his army in Belgium, Caesar took the town of Boisson in Champagne, along with many other French strongholds. He besieged Mézières, and if an epidemic of the plague

had not attacked Caesar's army, forcing it to disband the siege, he would have either conquered them by force or coerced their surrender. His failure revived the spirits of the French not a little, even though during the siege they were more inclined to let the English king act as mediator between them.

Then at the meeting convoked in Calais, Cardinal Wolsey, speaking on behalf of Henry VIII, acted as mediator. The grand chancellor Mercurino represented Charles, and the French chancellor represented Francis I. Here and there other counsellors accompanied them. The conference took more than three months, in which time they held various debates on all kinds of controversies. At the urging of the Cardinal of York, Mercurino put these in a little book in the form of a dialogue between four interlocutors: Cardinal Wolsey himself as mediator, the Papal Nuncio, without whom nothing could be negotiated, the chancellor himself for Caesar, and the French chancellor. These were the main combatants. And just as one can see in the little book, Caesar, who relied on the advice of Mercurino, could not accept peace or a truce without damage to his reputation. The French had just taken the town of Fuenterrabia, the best Spanish fortress, and also the town of Hesdin in Picardy. Hoping to have greater victories over the French, Caesar ordered that the meeting be dissolved.³¹

At the same time, they received word of an interesting circumstance. When Caesar and Mercurino returned to the town of Oudenarde in Flanders on the day after the feast of St Andrew, there arrived two bits of good news. The army of Caesar and the pope had taken Milan by force and put the French to flight; and the heavily fortified town of Tournai, in the heart of Flanders, surrendered and submitted to Caesar. Word had it that these events had been presaged by omens. Three crosses of St Andrew the colour of flames had been seen in the sky on the evening of that feast. Caesar and his soldiers had just come out of Vespers celebrating the rites of the Order of the Golden Fleece. For two hours the crosses remained in the air, so that all the people in the region could see them. Not long after this, the state of Milan resubmitted to the authority of Caesar thanks to the general, Prospero Colonna, who handed over authority to Francesco Sforza as duke of Milan. Also, this presaged the overturning of the duchy of Genoa by force. After a sack, Antoniotto Adorno became duke.³²

In the same year, Mercurino obtained from Duke Francesco Sforza, on Caesar's orders, a fief for himself and his posterity, or anyone to whom he wished to give it. These were the counties of Valenza and Sartirana with the promise of an annual supplement to his income of 6,000 ducats, which would come from the Marquisat of Romagnano and Valsesia. Beyond this he bought from the illustrious Constantine Comenato, prince of Achaea, the castles and lands of Ozzano, Terruggia, Rivalta and Tonengo in the Marquisat of Monferrato with money he was granted by Caesar. Then he acquired the castle and village of Refrancore.

Caesar granted him direct dominion of these lands, and they recognized no superior authority except the Holy Roman Empire.³³

Meanwhile, Pope Leo X died, and Adrian VI succeeded him by the consensus of all. Because Adrian had been his tutor and teacher of grammar, Caesar respected and revered him as a father. Caesar wanted to meet with Adrian, who had been his regent in Spain, before he left for Rome. This was so that they could establish which affairs belonged under the domain of which offices, temporal or religious. However, against the counsel of Mercurino, Caesar wanted to go to England to make a new treaty with Henry VIII.

The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate the marriage of the king's daughter and to make a declaration of war against France. They left Flanders in May of 1522. They embarked from Calais and in a few hours arrived in Dover. The English king waited to receive Charles, and with a joyous atmosphere he triumphantly led him to London. After a few days, they moved the meeting to Windsor Castle and struck a treaty that would not damage either party. Mercurino's hard work and diligence led the English king to declare himself an enemy of the French.

Caesar left from the port of Southampton and reached Santander after ten days in the month of July. He could not see or meet with Adrian, who was already in Catalonia preparing to sail for Italy. Although Caesar had the highest hopes for this pope and the future of the Christian commonwealth, the lies of the French held him back. Under the pretence of building a universal peace between the Christian kings, he stoked the flames of war in Italy and lost the island of Rhodes.³⁴

Caesar returned to Spain welcomed with great acclaim by his people. All of his subjects returned to obedience, and the revolts were pacified. Although a few ring-leaders of the revolution had been put to death, Mercurino advocated clemency for the other members of the factions. To these he offered a public and general amnesty. Mercurino presided over the *cortes*, held in the town of Valladolid, which offered Caesar 400,000 ducats in honour of his fortunate return to Spain.

Persuaded by Mercurino, Caesar sent letters and ambassadors urging Adrian to direct his eyes to the welfare of the Christian republic. He warned him not to fall for the tricks of the French and destroy Christendom with more damage. There was little doubt that more harm would come to Christian religion unless Adrian realized the open deceit of the French. Under the pretence of peace, they were building an army to invade Italy. For this reason, the Cardinal de Medici, who would succeed Adrian as pope, urged the creation of a Holy League for the defence of Italy. This alliance was already in force, and Adrian would have been able to see it bear fruit, but his death prevented him. Cardinal de Medici, who took the name Clement VII, succeeded him.

The powerful French army invaded Italy under the admiral of France, the leader of this war. Occupying a few cities in Milanese territory, the French laid siege to the city of Milan itself. With the support of the allies under the duke of

Bourbon, Caesar's lieutenant, who had justly switched to the side of Caesar from France, and the viceroy of Naples, captain general of the Holy League, Italy was wrenched from French hands. The French endured great slaughter, but Italy had been once again liberated.³⁵

Meanwhile, the armies of England and Burgundy united. When the forces of Caesar and the English joined together as dictated by their agreement, they entered France from Picardy and sent them scurrying almost to the city of Paris. Bourbon with his army tried to invade the province of Champagne, but his army fell apart due to the intrigues of the French. They had corrupted some of his infantry captains, which forced his retreat to Italy. The emperor gathered an army to lead an expedition into France personally. Due to a slight delay caused by his ministers, which was not his fault, he reached Pamplona, the capital of the kingdom of Navarre, as winter approached. He entrusted his army to the constable of Castile. This commander led the army across the Pyrenees and into Aquitaine. The plan was to call the army back and then press on at the end of that year, 1523. In Mercurino's opinion, if the army left the occupied towns of Aquitaine, the whole military enterprise would seem hollow and laughable. The army crossed over to besiege and occupy the town of Fuenterrabia, and Caesar went to the nearby town of Vitoria so that he could support the siege and strike greater fear into the enemy. Even though the bitter winter caused serious hardship, the soldiers obeyed the order of Caesar and besieged the town. Bombarding it with catapults and war machines, they knocked down the walls, entered the town, and showed their military valour. The town surrendered rather than suffer worse consequences. Thus in February of 1524 they recovered the heavily fortified town, which brought great glory and happiness to the people of Spain.

After winning the victory, Caesar left Vitoria and returned to Castile. He arranged for Bourbon and the Italian army to invade Provence. The treaty stipulated that Henry VIII and Caesar would both bear the cost of this expedition. Bourbon and his army invaded and occupied nearly the entire province, with the exception of Marseille. He tried to lay siege to this city by land alone, because it was heavily fortified with soldiers, machines and artillery, and the fight appeared difficult. Caesar paid 300,000 ducats to the army, whereas the king of England only pledged 100,000 ducats, and he even defaulted on this portion. Meanwhile, the French army increased, as it was led by the king himself in person, who not only wanted to fight the imperial army, but also strove to cross over into a completely exposed and unguarded Italy.

Bourbon and the marquis of Pescara, who jointly led the imperial army, dismantled the attempted siege of Marseille in an impressively orderly fashion so that they could preserve the army intact and return to Italy without damage. They led the army back to Italy as quickly as they could, but not with as much diligence as needed. For the French king with his entire army made haste with

all due speed, taking Novara first, and then the cities around Milan. Caesar's army retreated to Pavia, Lodi and Cremona. From here the French king, having fortified Milan, prepared to lay siege to Pavia. When this news was announced to Caesar, he was suffering from malaria and was not able to make preparations or offer counsel. Thus the burden fell to Mercurino. His rivals accused him of starting the war, and they asserted that if it did not go well he ought to be stoned to death by all the people.

However, Mercurino, who never attempted to do anything without a calm mind, put his trust in divine assistance. He raised the morale of the sad and discouraged by promising a good result if they prepared properly. He sought remedies, and since he could not spend money, he urged the generals with writings, counsel and persuasions. He encouraged them by adding the promise of honours and profit. He predicted a total defeat of the French king, stating that before the first day of March 1525, the king would die or be captured. Fate and the prudence of the commanders delivered. The imperial army grew in size despite their allies' abandonment. Considering only his own interests, the pope allowed the French army to pass through church lands on their way to invade Naples. The Venetians kept their forces in their own lands, so that they could not join Caesar, as they had promised in the treaty.³⁶

Blessed Caesar's commanders, regarding his cause as just, eagerly met these great challenges. Putting all of their faith in divine aid, they dared attack such an enormous army in its own camp. So engaged in conflict, a glorious victory was approved by God. By good fortune, it happened on 24 February, the birthday of Caesar himself, who had just been liberated from his fever. The French king was conquered and taken into captivity, and with the slaughter of a great number of his men, the siege of Pavia ended. The biggest factor leading to victory, after God, was the aid sent by the Archduke Ferdinand, brother of Caesar. Solicited by the duke of Bourbon, Ferdinand sent cavalry and infantry to reinforce the army of Caesar at precisely the right time.

Before this victory over France, Pope Clement still manifested a proclivity towards peace among the players. Twice he sent the archbishop of Capua to Caesar and to France to propose conditions for peace to both of them. Caesar in no way refused them, if they would provide a secure and honest means of peace. When it was decided to send Mercurino to these negotiations, and some seemed to demand he take on this duty, nevertheless another went in his place. At last, the affair having been discussed, they realized the absolute necessity of keeping Mercurino by Caesar's side. Instead they sent Thomas de Plana, lord of La Rocha, as an ambassador with the fullest mandate to the pope in order to negotiate peace. He entered the city ardent for war and not yet disposed for peace, but he developed a fever and died. Thus the negotiations remained incomplete.³⁷

Meanwhile, Pope Clement VII tried to get Mercurino to accept the office of cardinal. He claimed that Mercurino was a man he trusted without any misgivings whatsoever to be the best mediator and arbitrator between the emperor and the pope. With this office he could accomplish much for the good of the Christian commonwealth. Mercurino responded that he had already refused the honour in the time of Leo X. If he had a mind for ecclesiastical dignities, he would have relied on Caesar to provide them from an ample supply of vacant offices in Spain. If he had sought to participate in this, his cap would seem full of air, since he was neither a priest nor of a mind to become one. Thus the offer to make him a cardinal seemed pointless.

The bishop of Capua intervened in the matter while on his second turn of duty in Madrid, 1524. He urgently begged and persuaded Mercurino not to refuse the cardinal's cap, if not for his own interest then for the common good. Even if he had no ecclesiastical income now, there would soon be vacant benefices. And Caesar would not fail to see his compensation correspond to his merit. Mercurino replied that he would not protest it if done by order of the emperor. If he wished, the bishop of Capua could find out what Caesar had in mind and then tell Mercurino, who would then act decisively on it. Capua spoke to Caesar, told him the pope's desire, and asked if he would agree to this. Caesar said that he would like this very much and would heartily encourage Mercurino to take the office. He followed through and urged him to accept it. Mercurino replied to Caesar as he had to Capua. The emperor promised him that Mercurino would not fail him, that he would be able to sustain this dignity with honour, and serve them both. Mercurino gave into these persuasions, not for himself but rather to satisfy the pope and the emperor. The pope sent a brief to Mercurino promising to promote him to cardinal in the next consistory, which he believed would be in September of 1525, after the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross.

But he did not follow through with it. The pope forgot about the favours he had accepted from Caesar, which had sustained and supported him during the papacy of Adrian. Mercurino himself had worked for the pope, having taken care of some minor business when he was supported and saved in the time of Adrian. Then after the death of Adrian, he only managed to reach the apex of the pontificate and take the seat of St Peter by the favour of Caesar himself. Now the pope embraced another path, fearing the great power of the emperor and his invasion of Italy, and devising new strategies to keep him excluded. He tried to lure to his side not only the powers of Italy under the pretence of liberty and peace, but also the French with the hope of liberating their captive king. He appealed to the self-interest of the Cardinal of York, offering to improve the status of his king and enlarging the entire kingdom of England. Now the king of England himself, without even consulting Caesar, settled his differences with the French.³⁸

Some said the pope tried to persuade Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan. He warned that if he didn't join with him and the other Italian powers, Caesar would deprive him of his state by refusing to grant him the investiture of it. Most importantly, the emperor received letters and words concerning a conspiracy led by Gerolamo Morone, chancellor of the duke of Milan, in which he tried to enlist the illustrious marquis of Pescara, leader of the imperial army. Believing him discontented with the emperor, who had not agreed to satisfy his demands, Morone he told him everything about the plot. He revealed the mind of the duke and told him what he himself had brought about: that the pope would greatly support the marquis if he would cross over to his side with the imperial army, and that the pope would offer him the kingdom of Naples as his fief. According to the rumour, the pope had done this through a personal message. But the marquis warned Caesar of the conspiracy hatched by the pope and the duke through letters and messengers. He swore that he played along with it only to get to the bottom of the affair and inform Caesar fully of all the details concerning the long train of negotiations, for the sake of preserving and defending the imperial army. Caesar did not think this information ought to be disregarded; all the same he ordered the marquis to unite his army with that of the duke and to avoid any new manoeuvres unless attacked or invaded. Meanwhile, they would consider how to preserve the army.

The emperor himself, on the advice of Mercurino, decided to prepare an antidote to these plots, omitting nothing directed at the goal of universal peace and tranquillity by removing incentives for new revolts. He ordered that his proud and victorious army be restrained from committing any more savage acts against the enemy. In order to free the pope from any fear or suspicion, he recognized the treaty hammered out between Caesar's ambassadors and the papal mandates, and moved the ratification of it to the city of Rome, as demanded by the pope. He conceded other similar things and proposed even more favourable agreements in order to remove every fear and suspicion of the pope. Following through with the investiture of the duchy of Milan, he consigned the business to the agents of the duke. In order to negotiate with Venice, he sent his ambassadors with the widest mandate possible to propose fair agreements and renew the pact made earlier, and even to establish even tighter bonds between them. He tried everything to keep the king of England on his side, and he decided to offer a just peace to the French, although this was in vain.

Caesar called a meeting of the *cortes* of Castile in the city of Toledo. They declared Mercurino, who presided as president, a native of the kingdom, even without him asking for it. By consensus, all the states of the kingdom voted him capable of fulfilling any office or benefice. Due to the efforts of Mercurino, the *cortes* in Toledo offered Caesar 800,000 ducats. They granted half of this simply in celebration of the victory and to cover expenses from the last war. The other

half they granted conditionally if Caesar, before leaving Spain, would take Isabella, the *Infanta* of Portugal, as his wife. The emperor consented to these wishes, but he later learned that the king of England had joined with France without consulting Caesar, contrary to the oath given in the treaty. Henry VIII negotiated a marriage for his daughter elsewhere, so he would not resent the emperor if he also sought a spouse from somewhere else. The king of Portugal pushed eagerly for the marriage of Isabella, his sister. Caesar sent his ambassadors with a mandate to negotiate the marriage. They concluded the pact after obtaining a dispensation, required because the spouses were second cousins. After a verbal betrothal, the king of Portugal paid a dowry of 900,000 gold coins.

Caesar tried to do all of these things in order to establish world peace. With Mercurino's advice, he pressed forward with all of his strength. Nevertheless, cruel fate dashed his hopes. At that time, the viceroy of Naples was thinking about transferring the French king into Spain. He wanted to keep this a secret, not only from the pope and Italian powers but also from the commanders of the imperial army themselves. Contriving to have the king move to Naples to keep him safe, the viceroy sent a messenger to Caesar to warn him not to make any decisions concerning the Italian states, and to stand pat until Hugo de Moncada arrived at the imperial court. He would be sent immediately with information about all these matters. The emperor foolishly believed the persuasions of his viceroy and suspended the entire Italian expedition.

When Hugo de Moncada arrived, he presented a peace proposal favourable to the king of France, with whom he conspired. It seemed more directed towards reviving war in Italy than towards the peace of Christendom. Advised by Mercurino, Caesar distanced himself from the proposal, not wanting to suspend negotiations with the pope, the Venetians and the other Italian powers. Moncada was led to the same opinion in the matter, while he presented instructions to the viceroy that could be interpreted according the existing state of affairs. Before these instructions could reach the viceroy, the French king had already embarked on a fleet of imperial and Genoese galleys that the viceroy had prepared. He had made a secret agreement with the king concerning his transfer into Spain. The viceroy allowed French galleys to accompany the fleet for security. Pretending to prepare for the journey to Naples, he detoured to Portofino to get the French ships. He then changed course and headed for Spain.³⁹

A messenger arrived by land with letters announcing the imminent arrival of the viceroy and the French king. They included Lannoy's opinions about the affair, and urged that the king, once again, do nothing in Italy before hearing him. He assured the emperor that he would get more from the French king to his advantage than he could possibly desire. Once again Caesar held fast to this vain hope, despite the opinion of Mercurino, and suspended his entire expedition to Italy.

Hence the pope and the Italian powers grew to suspect that they would pay the price, supposing that Caesar aimed to take possession of Italy rather than to pacify and liberate it.⁴⁰ The illness of Francesco Sforza, supposed to be mortal, only increased their suspicion. They wondered whether Caesar would take the duchy of Milan if he died, keep it for himself, or give it to his brother Ferdinand, archduke of Austria. Both these scenarios seemed to fill them with dread. They resented the establishment of such a great power in Italy. The unification of the duchy of Milan with both Sicilies and the Austrian domains frightened all the others. Therefore, considering the welfare of Italy, as they said, they attempted many stratagems and engineered many plots. They tried to figure out the mind of Charles, and sought an agreement with him that would provide peace for Italy and security for their affairs. If Francesco Sforza died, they did not want either Caesar or Ferdinand to take Milan. Rather, they wanted the emperor to grant it as a fief to someone trusted by the pope and the Italian powers. Nor did this keep them from plotting other schemes and conspiracies, for if Caesar did not agree to their desires, they would not be caught by surprise. They would find other remedies in an effort to keep what belonged to them.

The affair remained unresolved for a long time, in accordance with the wishes of the viceroy. He finally arrived in Spain, and the French king was taken into custody. In the presence of the emperor, he opened his little bag of empty thoughts and offered nothing substantive that had not been already transmitted by Moncada. There were various opinions concerning these matters. The viceroy recommended accepting the offer of the French, by which a bridle would be placed on Italy. In this way, it could be ruled easily with a rod, perpetually subject to Emperor Charles. However, Mercurino contradicted him, putting no trust whatsoever in the exhortations of the French, who never kept faith with their promises. He said that they needed to be won over to Caesar's wishes not by force but by human kindness. Caesar knew that if he tried to use force to do it, he would have perpetual war on his hands. Nor could he ever look after the peace or tranquillity of Christendom. He would also encounter the same difficulty that the Romans had experienced for so many years, who spent more time and energy to acquire Italy than to obtain the monarchy of the rest of the whole world. Finally, he concluded that Italy, if possible, should be held together by love rather than by force. He would press for peace, if it could be gained, but a peace entirely negotiated and accepted by everyone, the French as well as the Italians. Rather than inciting new wars, he would arrange everything to promote tranquillity and universal peace. This should be accepted gladly by the parties who had been prepared to accept peace earlier, as long as the prosecution of one party would not impede the conclusion of another.⁴¹

Reverend Cardinal de Salviatis, apostolic legate *de latere*, arrived first at the imperial court. Having a mandate to do so by the pope, he urged peace. Then

the illustrious Duchess d'Alençon, sister of the French king, came seeking peace, as much for the sake of her captive brother as for her mother who governed the kingdom.⁴² The illustrious Charles, duke of Bourbon, promoted his own interests. At the same time the ambassadors for the English and the Italians came charged with full mandates. When negotiations began, affairs were treated one at a time.

The dispute with the French over the unjust occupation of Burgundy and the many issues related to it lasted a long time. Mercurino, grand chancellor, took on the full burden of these disputations and provided such clear evidence of the justice of the emperor's position that there was no way to refute it. Caesar revealed his position; he would not accept any peace agreement without the restoration of Burgundy. The French obstinately refused. The Duchess d'Alençon, considering the matter hopeless, left the failed negotiations with the permission of the emperor.

Meanwhile, the business with Italy was secured when Caesar agreed with the legate representing the pope and Italian powers to settle the Italian matter. He removed every scruple of suspicion and fear. In the case of the death of Duke Francesco Sforza, he offered not to keep Milan or transfer it to his brother, Ferdinand. For the sake of Italian peace, he would grant an investiture of it to anyone who pleased the pope and the other powers of Italy, and who did not arouse suspicion. The legate consulted on this matter with the pope and asked whom he would like to replace the duke if he died. The pope requested the duke of Bourbon, and Caesar did not reject it.

Oh evil fate, which cannot bear peace! Again Davus throws everything into confusion.⁴³ For when Caesar put his trust on the hope for peace, he decided to reduce his army. He totally dissolved one part of it, another he sent to Naples, and another he held in winter quarters in the Milanese. The soldiers hated peace, and they tried to convince Caesar to keep the army intact by preparing for new disturbances. They painted the devil blacker than he was.⁴⁴

It happened that the marquis of Pescara, the leader of the imperial army, received information concerning the affair of Morone, as mentioned before. Warned by his letters of the imminent execution of the plot, and fearing (he alleged) the destruction of Caesar's army, he ordered Morone taken into custody and imprisoned without consulting the emperor. He accused Duke Francesco of a felony and denounced him as privy to these conspiracies. For the sake of Caesar's security, he asked that all of the armies, castles and cities of the state be placed back into his hands, in the name of the emperor. However, the duke lay near dying in the Milanese castle called the *Porte Iovis*. Without any evidence of an order from Caesar himself, the duke agreed to place all of the cities and castles in the power of the marquis and the imperial army. He excluded only his castle and the castle of Cremona. He believed these two castles would provide protec-

tion for him until a new mandate arrived from Caesar. The duke also offered to surrender to secure guarantees that the castles would be kept faithfully in the name of Caesar for the imperial cause. He would release them with a nod of Caesar's head. In the meantime, nothing adverse or harmful to the imperial army would emerge from these camps.

The marquis refused the offer, although in what spirit is unknown. He took the whole state and all of its revenues back into his hands. He pushed and argued bitterly for the duke to hand over those two citadels in Milan and Cremona that had been kept by him. He was not going to wait for another order from Caesar. If the duke refused, Pescara threatened to besiege and take these citadels with violence. While composing letters containing a variety of protestations, the duke refused to release the citadels to anyone without knowing the intention of the emperor, from whom he considered nothing unjust. He sent a messenger charged with informing Caesar, but he was intercepted on his journey by the French. For this reason, Caesar could not be informed or apprised of the circumstances surrounding the duke's defences. Nor could the duke understand the intentions of the emperor by way of letters or messengers.

With the duke still resisting, the marquis ordered a blockade and siege of the citadels. But before surrounding the fortress of Milan, the marquis of Pescara died. In his last written statement, he commended Morone, the author of these conspiracies, as both prudent and faithful to Caesar. It seemed as though the opportunity to occupy the state of Milan opened up to the emperor, but this was the farthest thing from his mind. The death of Pescara revealed the Morone affair as almost an act of service that worked to the emperor's advantage. The marquis of Vasto and Antonio de Leyva, now in command of the army, continued the siege of the duke and the fortress without an order from the emperor.⁴⁵ They confiscated revenues from everywhere, not only from the court of the duke but also from those remaining loyal to the duke, like rebels against the empire. The commanders did not bother at all with judicial inquiries, either to summon witnesses or to hear cases. Subjects who previously had sworn fidelity to the duke were forced to swear an oath of fidelity to these captains, who behaved as though they represented the person of the emperor. They acted as though they had been given a commission from Caesar, who would never have endorsed this. They replaced the duke's magistrates with their own men, and even seized the ecclesiastical benefices. They allowed the soldiers to live without any discipline, looting, raping and committing numerous acts of violence. All order behind them, these barbarians wrenched away the gold and blood of the Latins, not with subtle skill and cleverness but by force. They ravaged the inhabitants and others around them so severely that the subjects left their state, having no safe refuge and abandoning their goods. Seeking security, the people left the greater part of their state uninhabited and uncultivated.⁴⁶

Mercurino exclaimed that this insolence should not be borne. Blaming the leaders, he spurred Caesar on to reform the army. He pleaded for the administration of justice for the crimes committed and for the establishment of a civil way of life. He made it clear that these provisions should be implemented without delay, as quickly as possible. Because if Caesar proceeded slowly in this situation, God would hear the voices of the oppressed and he would hang the threat of bitter vengeance over those who did not keep account of the crimes against the flock. He would exact retribution against those who did not administer justice.

However, those who encouraged these excesses, since they could not oppose the just counsel of Mercurino with reason, tried instead to provoke these outrages indirectly. Although they agreed with Mercurino's sound opinion that so many crimes ought to be prevented, they declared it impossible without paying the soldiers. Going about it any other way would quickly spark revolts and unrest among the military. Worse, the soldiers would defect to the enemy, so that the loss of the army would lead to the loss of all the kingdoms and domains that Caesar obtained in Italy. Nevertheless, the massive amount of money due to the soldiers rendered his solution practically impossible. He did not realize that the soldiers and even the commanders and captains had extorted ten times their usual pay. Nevertheless the tricksters, with their devices and false persuasions, managed to sway the good mind of the emperor so that every possible remedy was left in suspense. The place was not open to justice, so that greater misfortunes followed by necessity. The pope and the major powers in Italy watched and wavered, drenched with fear and greatly suspecting that they would suffer the same kind of attacks as carried out in Milan, added to what seemed to be a complete absence of justice. Taking their own interests into account, they solicited more intensely France and England, who were willing to help in the defence of Milan. They would not suffer Caesar's wish to be fulfilled, nor allow him so much power that he could deprive and subject the others.

Meanwhile, as the Italians negotiated with France, they also pursued a pact with Caesar. They added this condition, however: even if Duke Francesco had committed the crime of *lese majesté* against him, Caesar would pardon him. Even though justice demanded that he be deprived of his state, Caesar need to keep him in power in order to pacify Italy and establish a universal peace among Christians. Meanwhile, Francis I, seeing that he could not be freed from captivity by intrigue, sought to establish a means of peace with Caesar. He sent ambassadors to the imperial court: the president of the Parlement of Paris with the archbishops of Bourges and Embrun. These men discovered for themselves that the affair did not go as they wished. Sent to Mercurino, the chancellor, who suffered from gout, they perceived well enough that he opposed their tricks. They spoke to Caesar and asked that the viceroy, Charles de Lannoy, be allowed to approach the captive French king. Because the king could speak more directly

with him, they could more easily agree on the means of making peace. Desiring peace, Caesar assented to the wishes of the French and sent the viceroy supported with a full mandate to negotiate peace with captive king. The viceroy eagerly promoted his own private rather than public interests, whereas the grand chancellor seemed to support the interests of Caesar and the public. Lannoy cunningly managed to exclude Mercurino entirely from the negotiations, so that he would not be able to uncover his tracks and stratagems.

As soon as the viceroy met with the French king, he proposed the means of peace. In the first place, as the foundation of the peace, the firstborn sister of Caesar, Queen Eleanor, the widowed queen of Portugal, would marry the French king. Her daughter, Maria, *Infanta* of Portugal, would be betrothed to the dauphin, the firstborn son of the king of France. If Caesar fulfilled these marriages, the French promised to restore Burgundy. They also renounced their claims to Upper Flanders and Artois, as well as all rights pertaining to the cities of Tournai and Arras, the kingdoms and domains of Naples, Milan, Genoa and Asti, and all the other domains possessed by Caesar. They would restore the town and fortress of Hesdin, and they promised the restitution of the states and domains of the duke of Bourbon and his adherents. They offered many other things on the side, such as the most powerful French fleet to carry Caesar to Italy, and aid, money and soldiers for the trip against anyone who would oppose him. An indeterminate amount of all expenditures would go towards declaring and prosecuting the war against the Turks and the Lutherans. They promised that everything would be ratified by the Estates General of France and be approved by the Parlement of Paris. The fulfilment of everything depended on one point: the French king's liberation and restoration of his kingdom. They offered hostages while they made good on their promises.

Arguments ensued over whether these terms suited Caesar or whether these means sufficed to establish peace. Only Mercurino spoke against these proposals. He would praise peace if it could be gained honourably, securely and advantageously. However, he did not think the French could be trusted indiscriminately, since they had never learned to keep faith. He advised absolutely against the marriage of Queen Eleanor. He did not think she should be entrusted to any enemy, longstanding or recent, who had shown himself eager to attack the honour and the lives of Emperor Charles and his brother Ferdinand by various stratagems. With these offers, he could follow through with his evil intention more easily, especially since by reason of such a wife, he could aspire to universal reign and dominion equal to Charles and his brother, and even to the succession of the empire itself. Thus he thought they ought to beware lest the lives of Caesar and his brother be put in critical danger by such a marriage. It would put the sword of the inveterate enemy into the hands of the assassin to be used against the emperor and his brother.

Mercurino did not think it safe to liberate the king from prison in exchange for hostages, especially before he accomplished everything necessary to secure peace. The restitution of Burgundy and the restoration of the duke of Burgundy needed to be ratified by the estates and approved by the Parlement of Paris. Their supervision would serve to place a bridle on the Frenchman. Mercurino advised that there could be no firm peace with the French king without the trust and the re-establishment of the affairs of the duke of Bourbon. Before releasing the king, they needed to ally and link the pope and the Italian powers to the emperor. Otherwise, he threatened, the power over peace and war, which had been in the fist of the emperor while the king was captive, would be placed in the hands of his enemy. The king, once freed, would think of nothing but vengeance and maintain none of the agreements. Rather, he would try to influence the Italians, the English, the enemies of the faith and even the subjects of the emperor himself to force such things as the cession of Burgundy, the dismissal of revenues and the release of hostages.

The majority of votes ruled, and Mercurino's advice was repudiated. Caesar concluded peace with France according to the wishes of the viceroy and his entourage on 14 January 1526. Mercurino protested openly that he had nothing to do with this vote; he refused to sign or affix his seal to such an agreement. He gave his chancellery seals back to Caesar, so that he could use them as he wished. Nor could any blame be placed on Mercurino. If the matter turned out differently than they expected, he did not want to be seen signing, sealing or tacitly approving something he expressly opposed.⁴⁷

Some called Mercurino stubborn because he seemed to rely only on his own prudence, and because he made predictions about future contingencies, the truth of which had not been determined. They thought he devoted himself to vain astrological predictions or trusted in apocryphal prophecies. Mercurino replied that true astronomy and prophecy is what prudence produces, the elements of which should be the memory of past events and the consideration of present affairs. This results naturally in foresight into the future. It should be far from a wise man to ever say: I should not have imagined that.⁴⁸ For if one respects the past, it easily shows that in the last hundred years there have been many, eagerly sought, treaties between the French kings and the dukes of Burgundy, none of which have been kept by the French kings themselves. Rather, they violated every one of them.⁴⁹

If we turn our attention to the present, the captive king and his ambassadors declared openly that if he were forced to give up Burgundy or anything belonging to the crown of France, he would only be promising it to gain his freedom. However, once free, the king would consider his own interests and rupture the peace. Looking back on the contention surrounding the validity of the Treaty of Arras, the ambassadors of the French king opposed it, claiming it was made

under duress. Thus from situations like this Mercurino could reasonably predict future events. Someone who did not keep agreements in the past can be predicted to not keep them thereafter. Indeed, this person removed his consent entirely from an act and excused himself from the obligation to observe it in the future. He claimed that he was under duress when he agreed to the Treaty of Arras, although it is true that a strong army had invaded. This French king had even more reason to argue that he only agreed to this treaty by force, and thus it seemed there was more reason to fear.⁵⁰

For these reasons, Mercurino maintained his prediction that the French king would renounce the treaty in the future unless they prepared another antidote. But he did so in vain, as all the others wanted to reach a conclusion, and this required the consent of the duke of Bourbon. To win his approval, they promised restitution of his lands, now occupied by the king of France. In addition, Caesar agreed to invest the duke of Bourbon with the state of Milan, if Francesco were deprived of it, in exchange for his consent.

The treaty having been concluded, Caesar visited Francis I as a brother and a brother-in-law. They both visited Queen Eleanor, as said above, the king's betrothed. Then Caesar entrusted the French king to the viceroy, who accompanied him to the border. Here he granted the king his liberty in exchange for the two hostages, the first- and secondborn sons, the *dauphin* and the duke of Orleans. The queen entered the custody of the constable of Castile in the city of Vitoria. At the same time the two hostages were taken into custody by the same constable and transferred to Burgos. The queen would be transferred to the viceroy, who would lead her into France. This was contingent upon the newly freed king approving and ratifying the treaty in all of its provisions in the first town of his kingdom, and then giving the letters of ratification to the imperial ambassadors as soon as possible.

After Caesar had left the king, he entrusted these affairs to the viceroy. While they made their journey to Aquitaine, Caesar took Isabella as his wife in the city of Seville, 10 March of this year (1526). They celebrated the marriage with great acclaim, but the celebration became an occasion of mourning, when a messenger announced the death of the queen of Denmark, the sister of Caesar. After a few days the court completed the funeral rites required by custom, and then tournaments, jousting and other solemnities for the wedding continued as they had been planned, with the greatest joy and merriment.

Meanwhile, the news arrived that the king of the French gained his liberty in exchange for the hostages on 17 March in Fuenterrabia. However, he did not ratify the treaty, which he should have done in Bayonne. Therefore the viceroy retained the queen in the city of Victoria. Although the king asked that she be transferred to him, the viceroy refused to do so before the ratification. From this arose the suspicion that the king had no intention of fulfilling or keeping the

agreement. No just cause could be imagined for delaying the ratification, especially since the king had promised once again to fulfil all the stipulations of the agreement. He had done so after he had been freed, when all fear had ended, by word and in his own handwriting to Caesar.⁵¹

Mercurino decided that they ought to turn a blind eye to the situation until the French fully revealed their intentions. The king needed to fulfil the main clause of the agreement, the restitution of Burgundy, before 28 April in order to be ratified by the Estates General before 14 May. Caesar sent the viceroy to arrange the situation. He would leave the queen with the hostages and the constable, and meet the king in order to discern his intentions and ask him to fulfil the agreement that he himself had negotiated with him.⁵²

Everyone rightly extolled and commended the wise counsel of Mercurino, and they praised him for his sincerity and integrity. Now they condemned the judgment of his opponents who, blinded by passions, had looked to their own private interests rather than public utility, and had put the young prince, all of his interests, and the entire state of his affairs in great peril. Opinions varied during deliberations about what to do if the Frenchman broke faith, if he did not restore Burgundy, if he did not ratify the treaty or have it ratified by the Estates General, if he tried to make new treaties, if he offered something equivalent, or if his wife should be given in proxy. Some advised that the wife ought to be given entirely to the Frenchman even if he did not maintain the agreements, asserting that it would be impossible for her to marry into a higher station. She might serve as a mediator, disposing the others more towards peace. Either the delay in observing the treaty would continue, or new means of peace would be proposed. The king and his state inclined more towards these options than to the restitution of Burgundy, in exchange for which they preferred to offer something equivalent, either money or some other kind of revenue.

Mercurino was asked his opinion on these matters. He said he preferred silence to speaking. When he talked, people usually listened, and not everyone would be pleased to hear it. The wound, he said, was lethal; the cure for it, nearly hopeless. He said it would be better to prepare an antidote against those responsible for the wound, those who put so much hope in the treaty with France, who had contempt for the power of Italy, which they asserted, could be ruled with a rod. Their false persuasions tossed everything into confusion and disorder. Thus Mercurino was forced to offer his opinion, and he found himself, as Susannah, hemmed in on all sides.⁵³ He found himself in a perplexing situation. If he offered advice, no matter how correct, he feared it would be spurned as before. If he had stayed quiet, he would have injured his conscience and neglected his duty as advisor. If he had said that he didn't think they should trust Francis I any longer, he would have been judged a warmonger instead of a peacemaker. If he had said to trust him, he would have contradicted himself and followed

the errors of others whom he previously opposed. In this state of perplexity and anxiety, he finally decided to warn the young prince, saying that no one owed more to God than Emperor Charles himself, for whom he had done more and raised higher than any man anywhere in the world, since he removed so many people who might have preceded him and stood in his way on the path to succession. He conferred so many great kingdoms and domains to him by proper succession in his young age. He acceded with neither aid nor counsel, but rather by the grace of divine clemency alone. And so that he would lack nothing, in his benevolence, he gave this young man the Roman Empire itself, a most just title for the entire world, by the unanimous consent of the electors. They rejected all of the efforts and machinations used by those who fought against it, and neither force, nor entreaties, nor money could impede him from the election. The French king and his supporters seemed to solicit the empire with absolute zeal and total exertion, leaving nothing untried in order to entice the electors to him. He boasted that he had four of them, but he deluded himself.

At that time Caesar had no friends or allies and seemed destitute of all aid, but God brought to him Pope Leo X and all of the kings, princes and powers. Only the French king stood alone in turning against the power and greatness of Caesar. He stirred up war against him everywhere, almost as if he were fighting against the will of God itself.⁵⁴ Only with the help of God, without which human virtue cannot reveal itself, did Charles fight and defeat him so many times, with great slaughter to his own, so many times conquered and blackened, and sometimes put to a most disgraceful flight. Deprived and despoiled of so many of the well-fortified cities he occupied in Italy and French Belgium, he was even captured by Caesar himself.

The Most High himself, who can do everything, seemed to have put the power over war and peace in the hand of Caesar. This was not so that Caesar might abuse all of the gifts and favours granted to him by God, but for the augmentation and exaltation of the Christian religion. With no more excuses, he could strive to bring peace and tranquillity to the Christians, and to stem the effusion of more Christian blood. He could turn the army with its weapons and triumphant banners against the enemies of the orthodox faith: the perfidious Turks, pseudo-Christians and heretics. He would strive to do everything that befits a most Christian emperor, a Catholic king, a protector and defender of the Apostolic See and the Holy Roman Church. From here he could establish the seat of St Peter upon more solid rock, gather the errant sheep into the fold of the Lord, and into the lap and flock of the Holy Church.

It is unknown by what fate the hand of the Lord somewhat distanced itself, or at least subtracted itself, from the care and protection of Caesar and his interests. It might have been because of the bad advice of men, from a diabolical instinct, or even by permission of God himself, for the correction and avenging

of the vicious sins that seemed to thrive in the Italian homeland itself.⁵⁵ Piously, one ought to believe that it was to encourage Caesar to devote his mind more to God, and to attract and entice him more strongly towards celestial gifts. As Paul, the teacher of men, stated, 'Whom God loves, he chastises and corrects'.⁵⁶

It seemed to be more the fault of the ministers than of Caesar himself. The power and greatness of so many realms and domains seemed to turn into certain weakness and impotence. A mound of victories seemed to go up in smoke and evaporate without producing any fruit. Such a great capture of the enemy resulted in so much glory going to the captive himself, so that if Caesar had been captured, he could hardly have hoped for better terms of peace from him.

That victorious army, which made practically the whole world tremble in fear, should have fought against treacherous and barbarous peoples exposed to or involved with enemies of the orthodox faith.⁵⁷ Rather, people saw the empire turning against Christian blood, against its own subjects, friends and allies, aiming to ruin its own empire and that of the Christian commonwealth. From this arose so much plunder and depopulation of Christian states and places, so much pillaging, so many robberies, thefts, extortions, turbulence, violations of girls and women, so much adultery, rape, conflagrations, revolutions, and so many other foul and abominable things. It is a wonder that the earth did not swallow up and bury such assassins alive, that God did not hear the cries of the oppressed.

When the emperor did not correct and castigate the abominations and evil deeds of his soldiers and ministers, when he did not administer justice, when he did not pay his debts, when he did not provide for those suffering damages, and when he did not remedy so many evils, he was reputed unjust by the just. He was considered evil by the good, cruel by the pious, harsh by the merciful, arrogant by the humane, and crude of conscience by the Catholic. He was held as an enemy by the defender of the Church and judged a tyrant by the legitimate prince. He was called imprudent, arbitrary and unwilling to hear good counsel by the prudent.

Mercurino, however, did not blame Caesar, but his ministers. Although some blame could be ascribed to Caesar due to his negligence, for which his youth is no excuse, he did not give up hope of a remedy. For God hears sinners and aids the fallen, especially those who have been chosen for public administration. For David had sinned, and after he repented he was worthy of being heard. Peter had sinned in denying Christ, but once he repented with a contrite heart, he obtained the vicarship of Christ on earth, chosen to be pastor of the whole flock of the Lord. Many other examples can be used to prove this, but let that be enough; as Solomon said, 'The heart of the king rests in the hand of God'.⁵⁸

Thus if Caesar directed his mind to the Lord, he could expect a nurturing remedy for his affairs. Truly, one cannot obtain divine assistance through prayer and supplications alone. As Sallust said, it also requires vigilance, prudent con-

sideration and good behaviour.⁵⁹ Caesar needed to work using consideration, diligence and advice in order to cure opposites with opposites, as the philosopher said.⁶⁰ Caesar distanced himself from so many evils, and had opposed and repaired everything his ministers had poorly managed. Rather than approving their bad deeds tacitly or expressly, he condemned his ministers.

Mercurino believed Caesar should oppose his ministers and show his disapproval when they advocated seizing the state of Duke Francesco unjustly and without a hearing. The emperor should open a new path for justice by appointing judges with no stain of suspicion, who could make inquiries to determine true facts and administer real justice. By these means he would be considered just rather than unjust. He should choose trustworthy men who would hear the voices and complaints of the oppressed. They would find out bad deeds and correct and punish excesses, aid the oppressed and repair injuries as well as possible. By doing these things, he would be judged a good prince, not cruel, not harsh, not arrogant, not barbaric. He would show himself caring for the flock, as a supporter and protector of the vicar of Christ, sustainer of that Holy See. As the wind in the sails of the ship of St Peter, he would direct it without letting it totter or causing a shipwreck. For thus he would have been reputed a Catholic, not hostile to religion, but a defender and protector of it, not an enemy, not a tyrant, but a man led by prudent and good advice, not a man led by his own stubborn will.⁶¹

With this advice, Mercurino laid out the means by which Caesar might join and entice the powers of Italy to his side. He could sustain the army, prevent excesses, contain the French king, and keep the queen and the hostages. His plan provided a remedy in case the French king devised some excuse for not fulfilling the pact before consummating the marriage. Pleased with this advice, Caesar assented to Mercurino's wishes by appointing Hugo de Moncada as an ambassador to negotiate Italian affairs with the pope and the others. He sent Don Íñigo de Mendoza to England, and entrusted Mercurino, as usual, to expedite the instructions. Although they dispatched the ambassadors and prepared everything, they failed in two important respects. First, they did not adequately prepare or secure a fleet to take the emperor swiftly to Italy, even though they could have used the French fleet for this purpose. Second, they did not send the duke of Bourbon into Italy with adequate provisions. As predecessor, he was to rein in the army and prepare the way for the lord.⁶²

Meanwhile, the French king revealed his fraud to the viceroy when he arrived at the French court. Not only did Francis I put off and prolong the ratification of the agreements, offering some empty excuses, but he also published and ratified the pact he struck with the king of England, right in front of the viceroy. He offered pleasing words to the viceroy, assuring that he would fulfil anything in the treaty that was in his power to fulfil. Nevertheless, the Estates General could not possibly ratify the restitution of Burgundy to Charles V because his subjects

had refused. As a substitute, he offered money: two million gold coins and along with the implementation of the rest of the agreement. By these means the queen might be handed over and the hostages restored. The viceroy passed this information along to Caesar in such a persuasive manner that he accepted it. If he did not, the French king threatened to meet with the pope and the Italian powers. Together with the English king, they would consider how to force Caesar to accept whatever conditions they wished.

Some advisors counselled Caesar to refuse the offer. The king had not kept faith, did not fulfil the agreement, and tricked the emperor. Caesar should break with the French king and even attack him until he complied with his promises and agreement. Asked for his opinion, Mercurino chose the middle way. Taking into consideration the nature of the French, he counselled against changing the first pact by accepting money. They were no more likely to observe the new treaty, and this new stipulation would take away the legal justification for taking Burgundy, the purpose of the original pact. Removing the legal argument made it even more likely to be unobserved. On the other hand, he did not think this warranted breaking with the French king, or worse, attacking him. Stirring up a storm might encourage the perfidious Turks at a time of instability among Christian princes. The Christian commonwealth needed to prepare for a greater conflagration.

Instead, he advised the emperor to deal more mildly with the French king. Caesar ought to appear to trust the French king to do everything necessary to make his subjects obey his commands and consent to fulfil the agreements. If it were not fulfilled by the time specified in the agreement, Caesar would excuse the delay until everything could be accomplished as though there were no delay at all. But if they continued in their obstruction, it would not be impossible for the French king to return to captivity, as he had previously sworn. Caesar should not doubt the legitimacy of keeping the king for breaking his word. For example, King John of France, an ancestor to both Caesar and the French king, had been in a similar situation. He returned to captivity in England as he had sworn to do, when he could not otherwise fulfil an agreement. It would not suit the honour of either of them to negotiate another treaty without bringing back the conditions of the original situation. With the king returned to captivity, there would be a difference between negotiating with a captive and negotiating with a free man.

While the French king continued his tricks, pretending to be trustworthy while withholding the implementation of the agreement, Mercurino thought about how to deal with the pope and Italian powers. If possible, he wanted to strike a treaty quickly with the king of England, promising him everything if he would not ally with France and conspire to destroy imperial interests. A treaty with the English would force the French king to keep faith or go back to his original captivity. From here he could support a Christian peace and more easily prepare to repel the shameless enemies of Christ.

Caesar liked this advice, and he responded accordingly to the French king and Lannoy, whom he ordered to continue negotiations. Until they knew the decision of the pope, upon whom the decisions of the Italian powers seemed to hinge, they sent a new commission led by Hugo de Moncada to Rome. He was ordered to reach a full agreement with the pope, and to grant him everything he sought, to conclude the matter according to his wishes. The expedition with these new commissions set off on 8 June 1526.

Meanwhile, the French king brought to light the deceit intrinsic to his soul, which he had kept the whole time in his heart concealed with lies. He scorned Caesar's lenient response. He showed his contempt of religion when he violated his faith and oath. He did not care about his eternal salvation, or honour, or fame. Boastfully, it is reported, he spurned the foundation of the authority of the pope, who plays the role of vicar of God on Earth, and who has the power to bind and loosen. Thinking he could violate his sworn oath, he made a pact with the pope, Venetians, Florentines, Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan, and included the English and the Swiss. This defensive and offensive pact (which he had been negotiating for a long time to cause Caesar's destruction) was struck and published on 22 May of the same year.⁶³ Because of this, that most high pastor, Clement VII, holding the place of St Peter, girded himself with the arms that were not spiritual but temporal. He unsheathed the sword of Peter, which Christ had ordered to be hidden in its scabbard, enlarging the great army of the two confederates. It is said he prepared and arranged 1,000 heavily armed knights, 3,000 lightly armed knights and 30,000 infantry, both Swiss and Italian, for the invasion and attack. Besieging the citadel at Milan, they sought to overwhelm and destroy Caesar's army and tried to occupy Siena, a city of the Holy Roman Empire, with Florentine forces.

Hugo de Moncada, the imperial envoy, had reached out to the pope and offered him the means to obtain peace and tranquillity before the war had begun. Although the Christian pastor seemed to consent to these means, nevertheless he obeyed the other allies, claiming to be bound and subjected to them. He could not accept any means of peace without the consent of all. For the situation was so greatly disposed towards war that it was almost impossible to put out the fire. Once the treaty became public, the French king ordered the viceroy, who had urged the king to observe the treaty made with Caesar, to leave. Although the king granted him leave to return to the emperor, he forbade him to go by land to the kingdom of Naples. Then when Clement VII ordered Cardinal Salviati, the papal legate, to withdraw from Caesar, and Hugo de Moncada and the duke of Sessa to leave Rome, it seemed necessary to make arrangements to protect Caesar's interests with as much order and speed as possible. They immediately warned Caesar of the state of affairs. They advised the archduke, the brother of Caesar, to bring timely reinforcements for the army. They warned

the leaders of the army to prepare for their defence and to be vigilant, lest they be overwhelmed by unforeseen events. They warned both viceroys and ministers of Sicily to prepare for war, and also advised the citizens of Siena to provide for their own defence and safety. And finally they met and settled affairs with the Colonna, some of the Orsini, and other Italians who declared allegiance to Caesar. They provided and arranged arms for their defence.

The emperor, excited by these events and stirred by Mercurino's persuasions as though waking from sleep, looked into every remedy and opinion regarding how to preserve and sustain his army and repel an attack by such a great enemy. He wrote to the archduke, his brother, asking him to add his own army to Caesar's and to give money, wherever possible. He recruited new infantrymen in Spain to augment the army, and prepared and commissioned a fleet that could defeat the enemy and give aid to Genoa, Siena and the kingdoms of the two Sicilies. Bankers in the city of Genoa provided money, the sinews of war.⁶⁴

They arranged for the return of the duke of Bourbon.⁶⁵ With great courage he scorned the most powerful French fleet. It contained many galleys: eighteen triremes, several quinqueremes and various other kinds of ships all prepared and arranged to capture him. However, he dared intrepidly to set sail from the shore of Barcelona for Italy with only six triremes and four biremes on the day of the nativity of John the Baptist.⁶⁶ Divine goodness favoured him. With an encouraging tailwind and making good time, he arrived safely in the port of Genoa within three and a half days. There, on 2 June, he received the designated money from the bankers. Leaving Genoa, he reached Milan within the space of four days, and presented himself as the leader of the imperial army on 6 July. The leaders of the enemy army set up camp near Milan, not knowing anything about it on that day. Intending to deliver the citadel and to entice the citizens to rise up against the imperial army, they attacked the state in three waves.

So exceptional was the prudence and foresight of the duke of Bourbon, and so great was the virtue of the imperial leaders and soldiers, that they drove back the enemy, inflicting on them great slaughter and loss. On that same day, they forced the enemy to retreat from the battle and regroup at their camp near Marignano. Believing they needed to capture the citadel, the enemies once again camped near Milan and tried to deliver the citadel from the besiegers. Nevertheless they failed in every one of their attempts, because Francesco Sforza himself had handed power and control over the citadel to the duke of Bourbon, making certain agreements with him as Caesar's lieutenant. This happened on the twenty-fifth day of July, the feast of St James, the patron saint of Spain, who brought so much favour to Caesar's affairs. Indeed, the army of the pope and Florentines, which was laying siege to the city of Siena, causing the depopulation of their surrounding farmlands, was pushed back. Through the virtue of the Sieneese, the enemy was put to

flight, leaving behind all of their war machines and siege engines. Their devotion and obedience gained them the title of 'imperial city'.

Meanwhile, the pope tried to deflect blame for the conflagration from himself and redirect it onto Caesar. He wrote papal briefs to Caesar containing some justifications and certain trumped-up arguments. He ordered these to be published in order to inform the minds of the public on 20 August 1526. Mercurino responded to these with such ardent efforts that the spears thrown by the pope were turned against the head of the pontiff himself, and he took all the blame. Similarly, the French cleverly put out a similar defence, using false arguments to excuse their own treachery, explaining how they should not be held to keep faith with Caesar, or to observe sworn oaths. Against this, also with the effort of Mercurino, a powerful counter-argument was made that undermined the stain of lies. It revealed the perfidy of the king of the French, weakened his false excuses and brought them into a clearer light. All of these works were typed, printed and published in a fairly lengthy volume. They can be read nearly everywhere, so it seems better to pass over the work in silence rather than to reference it further, lest we go too far off our subject.⁶⁷

Before all of this happened, the French king used the viceroy of Naples to continue his stratagems. He did not break off peace negotiations, but offered to continue what he had proposed to Caesar. Before releasing the hostages, he promised to pay money for Burgundy and fulfil the remaining agreements. He charged the viceroy to convey this to the emperor and he carried out his commission. Mercurino counselled not to refuse the offer, nor to accept it indiscriminately. Rather, a response ought to be sent using the viceroy. He said that if the French king himself wanted to negotiate the offer, he should send a mandate through his resident ambassador at the court of the emperor, or provide another one with full power to negotiate. He would find that Caesar prefers the stabilization and conservation of friendship, and is not at all averse to fairness and reason. This response would make the French king less ready to send his own forces, or to arrange for the Swiss to join the army of the pope and the Venetians at an opportune moment, because at that time the surrender of the citadel of Milan and the victory of the Sieneese had been known.

The situation thus, Caesar sent the viceroy to Naples with infantry to augment the army. Mercurino fought this bitterly, saying that it would lead to the ruin of all of Caesar's interests. He recommended that Caesar go himself with the fleet, if it could be done correctly and secretly. The other advisors scoffed at the counsel of Mercurino and persisted in sending the viceroy with the fleet.

Meanwhile, a new treaty concluded between the pope, the kings of France and England, and Venice against Caesar was brought to light. Caesar knew everything they were doing against him, which inflamed his desire to restore and maintain his army. He sent money, prepared the fleet and put 10,000 German

and Spanish infantry under the authority of the viceroy. Leaving the port of Cartagena, the fleet set sail on 24 October 1526. It kept a straight path to Genoa to liberate the city, which was besieged by the triremes and fleet of the League of Cognac. Before the imperial fleet arrived, they received news that Hugo de Moncada had amassed an army with the help of the Colonna under the pretext of defending the city of Siena. However, on 20 September of the same year, he entered Rome unexpectedly and took over the city. While the pope was forced into the Castel Sant'Angelo, the papal palace was pillaged. The following day the pope signed a four-month armistice, with the College of Cardinals approving. The pope agreed to recall his armed troops immediately from the state of Milan. He also agreed to recall the pontifical fleet, which had been prepared to besiege Genoa. The pope absolved those who invaded the city with Moncada and the Colonna for their crime, but they, along with the Sienese and the duke of Ferrara, were to be led back to Naples, where they would remain for the duration of the truce.

The pope announced these events to Caesar and mentioned the horrendous news concerning the victory of the Turks in Hungary and the death of the king, Caesar's brother-in-law. The pope despaired of the loss of the king and the occupation by perfidious enemies. He urged universal peace, for which he offered to go to Spain and meet with the emperor himself. He pledged his whole support. Caesar, with the counsel of Mercurino, showed by word and deeds his greatest sorrow over both Hungary and the things that had been done in Rome, explaining that it was in no way his fault. Declaring his support for universal peace, he approved the truce. He praised the offer of the pope to meet in Spain, since it was considered too difficult for Caesar to enter Italy before affairs had settled. The pope was allowed to choose the meeting place and promised every security and all honour due to him. Caesar promised to leave nothing undone to promote universal peace, pledging his person, empire and kingdom to protect the Christian religion. To this end, Caesar sent Fieramosca, the cavalry commander, with full instructions to arrange this business with the pope. Meanwhile, he left nothing undone in sustaining the imperial army and building his fleet.

Having arranged matters to provide for the public interest against the enemies of the faith, Caesar left Granada. He announced a *cortes* of Castile to begin on 24 January 1527 and continue until 15 February. Before the meeting, Paulo di Arezzo, the papal nuncio, arrived and asserted that he had brought a mandate from the pope and his allies to negotiate universal peace. Mercurino and other imperial counsellors met with the representatives of the pope and allies and determined whether their mandates seemed sufficient to negotiate a universal peace in terms of universals and particulars. They were to conclude it in the name of the emperor. Finally, after a thorough examination, they found the mandates completely insufficient. In addition, those things they proposed in the name of the league presented not an opportunity for peace, but an occasion for a

greater war. Mercurino, acting as the emperor's instrument, wrote the appropriate response for these diplomats. Set forth in a public document, it justified the opinion of Caesar and cast blame on the others. Having been printed, people will be able to see it.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the viceroy's fleet had been tossed about at sea for a long time by storms, and the wind had forced it to dock in various ports. Finally the part of the fleet that contained the viceroy reached the island of Corsica, twenty-two ships. The winds dying down, they were sailing towards Genoa when they were attacked by French and papal galleys. In an eight-hour battle, the noise of the cannons filled the air sharply like thunder. One ship in the imperial fleet was hit. Although of minor importance, it sank into the sea and suffered a hideous shipwreck. Only the darkness of night and a terrible storm could end the battle. The viceroy directed the fleet to the port of San Stephano, in the domain of Siena. Everyone understood the great danger this presented to the fleet, but no one knew how to remedy the situation.

Genoa, blockaded by enemies, had placed all of its hope in aid from the fleet. But now they despaired of such help, the loss having put them in the greatest danger. When the enemies occupied Cremona, many supposed that part of the army had switched to the enemy side, and they found themselves besieged by both land and sea. They believed that the enemies had blocked all provisions from the city. But God is compassionate. He led 14,000 German infantrymen into Italy to increase the size of Caesar's army. The enemies tried in vain to prevent their entry. Many of the enemies were slaughtered, including Giovanni de Medici. With this aid, the city of Genoa regained its strength and courage.

The viceroy remained in the port of San Stefano with the imperial fleet. Clement VII violated the four-month truce he struck with Hugo de Moncada by allowing Andrea Doria, whom he appointed to command his fleet, to besiege Genoa and attack the imperial fleet. Although the pope had granted the Colonna absolution as a condition of the truce, he proceeded to depose Cardinal Colonna and occupy the castles and lands of the Colonna domains. He began to doubt the arrival of the viceroy, fearing the danger and critical situation caused by the powerful uprisings in the city of Florence. He dispatched the archbishop of Capua to negotiate peace with the viceroy. Before he arrived, the viceroy had dispatched commander Peñalosa, of the order of St James of Compostela, to announce the arrival of the viceroy with full powers of peace and war. The viceroy said he desired peace, if he were offered suitable and equitable means of achieving it. Having sent this ambassador, and not expecting Capua, he made his way to Gaeta in the kingdom of Naples with his fleet. Here they encountered the rest of Caesar's fleet, which had been scattered by the winds. Reaching Naples, they found the Colonna preparing an army to resist the pope with the aid of the local inhabitants. Uniting these forces with those of the imperial fleet, the

viceroy amassed a powerful army; sensing this, the pope prepared for his own defence. He sent the archbishop of Capua to the viceroy to propose conditions of peace. When the viceroy refused these, the pope sent the general minister of the Order of Friars Minor with new articles.⁶⁹ During these negotiations, Cesare Fieramosca arrived at the court of the viceroy and explained his commission. He was sent back to the pope with Capua and the general of the Friars Minor to offer means of peace or armistice.

The diplomats drafted articles created by common consent, but when the time came to exact a solemn pledge to uphold it, the diplomat from Venice did not have a mandate to sign it. Expecting a mandate to arrive within eight days, they made a truce lasting eight days between the armies of the pope and Caesar, subject to certain conditions. The pope did not keep them. The unsuspecting viceroy, not fearing such an action, was attacked by the pope and pushed back from the siege of Frosolone. The enemy forced his retreat with the imperial troops to a safer place. Thus the means of peace grew colder, and the pope turned a blind eye towards his proposed visit to Spain.

The *cortes* of Spain met in Valladolid, as previously mentioned. They gave a tepid response to the emperor's request for support to fight against the Turks and the enemies of the faith. Undertaking such an enormous and difficult expedition without universal peace among Christians and the unification of their forces would be insane, they said. Spain could not possibly shoulder such an insupportable and heavy burden alone. They did not want to put up the lone resistance against enemies with such power, pride and insolence. In the end, the *cortes* adjourned having accomplished nothing because it asked for a subsidy from the magnates and clergy. They rarely harmonized with the other inhabitants of the region, and they refused to accept a form of taxation they considered new and unjust. Indeed, the commoners protested that the previous levies, still uncollected, had been injurious and unbearable. They demanded restrictions on the new subsidies: they wanted assurance that no new subsidy would be levied until after the deadline for the collection of the previous one; that collectors appointed by the inhabitants themselves make the exaction; that these collectors make sure the money from the subsidies goes to the aid of the kingdom; and that it would not be converted to any other use than an expedition against the Turks to be joined with aid from other Christians. However, if the Turks attempted a new invasion either in the domains of Charles or of his brother Ferdinand, they would provide a loan of money beyond the subsidy with the above restrictions.

Mercurino praised these conditions as acceptable. He believed these means might encourage the magnates and the clergy to do the same as the commoners. Otherwise, this unsettled affair would reduce Caesar's authority and diminish his reputation, not only among foreigners but also among his own subjects. No one believed Mercurino. The other advisors wanted to determine the wishes of

the magnates, the prelates and the other clergy before they turned to the commoners, imagining them more likely to go along with Caesar's wishes. If the magnates refused the subsidy, the knights would not suffer it to be collected by the inhabitants. The magnates and prelates responded in vague terms, stating that they would do and try everything, serving Caesar with their lives and states, just as their ancestors had done. Although one could not condemn the response itself, it did not satisfy the request. Caesar could not accept the offer. He dissolved the *cortes* under general terms and permitted the delegates to leave. Thus he gave words for words. It should be added that while Caesar needed the subsidy offered right then, he took pains to follow the appropriate constitutional procedure according to time and place.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, a vow constrained Mercurino to spend nine days at the holy monastery of the blessed Virgin of Montserrat. In addition, he urgently needed to settle some family business and restore his house in Italy. Under the pretext of serving Caesar by putting together or directing a peace initiative, he obtained a leave of absence from the imperial court.⁷¹ He left the court and began his journey on the penultimate day of March 1527. After fulfilling his vow, he went to Barcelona to embark on his voyage. Making haste to Barcelona, however, he met a courier sent by the viceroy to Caesar who brought a truce of eight months struck with certain conditions between the pope and the viceroy. Mercurino immediately judged it fraudulent and deceptive, and advised strongly against observing it. Rather, he believed it would lead to the damage and ruin of public affairs and imperial interests, which events clearly showed. Mercurino reached Barcelona on 27 April, where he was honourably welcomed by the viceroy, the chancellor, the vice chancellor and other counsellors and subjects of the kingdom. In the same city, the navigation order was given, and some Genoese ships in Palamós were hired and carefully deployed. He left Barcelona 15 May, making the journey to Palamós by land, which took four days. Poor weather conditions forced him to delay his voyage for ten days. Instead of encouraging him, all of his friends tried to dissuade him from his voyage. They pointed out the truce made with the pope through the viceroy, along with the hope of the arrival of the pope in Spain for the purpose of negotiating a universal peace. He should go back to Caesar who, they said, demanded it.⁷² But Mercurino did not expect the pope to come to Spain, nor be able to keep the truce. Afterward, they received the news that the duke of Bourbon had broken the truce and invaded Rome with the imperial army. The pope and the cardinals had been forced into the Castel Sant'Angelo.

Almost at the same time, an announcement came from the imperial court that through the inspiration of divine grace, the empress gave birth to a male child on 21 May, at 4 pm or a little afterward. They gave him the ancestral name of Philip, prince of Spain. This news relieved Caesar, who now seemed free and able to go to Italy without doing damage to the Spanish affairs. There he could

take up the imperial crown according to custom and bring peace to Italy. With the Christian commonwealth armed and united, it could repel the perfidious enemies of the Christian religion and restrain the errors of the heretics. Mercurino was eager to prepare the way for Caesar. Acting as a precursor, he girded himself entirely for the voyage. The ship left Palamós on 29 May, but after three days of sailing in calm seas, Mercurino transferred to another ship, a bireme, or what is also called a brigantine. On the third of June the ship was brought safely to the port of Monaco, almost miraculously, having overcome all of the traps prepared to intercept it. If he had arrived two days earlier, it would have been struck down by the French triremes that infested that coast. If he had come two days later, it would not have been able to avoid either a storm at sea or the danger of the Moorish biremes that wandered up and down that shore. From all of these dangers, God, the best and most powerful, in his compassion and mercy, thought to save Mercurino.

Lord Augustino Grimaldi, bishop of Grasse, received Mercurino into the fortress at Monaco with so much approval and honour that nothing more needs to be said. He rested there for twenty days, waiting for his men who stayed on the ship, burdened with all of his furniture. They had been diverted to the island of Corsica, where Mercurino sent biremes that could carry them into port. From there, if fate allowed, they could continue the journey safely by land. He would then cross into Piedmont with his full entourage, settle his affairs, as previously mentioned, and await orders from Caesar. If this were not possible, he would go to Genoa whence he could be transported safely by triremes.

Meanwhile, however, as he dealt with the issues of security on his trip, and as soon as he reached Monaco, a messenger came from Naples with an announcement from the viceroy. The duke of Bourbon had been killed, and the city of Rome had been captured with great slaughter and pillage. The Castel Sant'Angelo had surrendered, and the pope and thirteen cardinals were held captive. He announced many other atrocities, and gave a true account of events in this order. On Sunday, 5 May, the duke of Bourbon with the imperial army set up camp outside the city walls towards the mount of the Holy Spirit and the pope's vineyard, without having arranged the siege engines and war machines to break down the walls. The following day, the city was besieged with great force. There were three separate powerful attacks: the Spanish and the Italians scaled the walls, but the Germans broke through the gate of the Holy Spirit. They invaded the neighbourhood of St Peter with a terrible fury, sparing neither sex nor age, attacking violently with great massacres of Romans. The duke of Bourbon, who had girded himself for the attack like a foot soldier, led the Spanish and Italians. The duke himself died during the attack. By universal consent, the prince of Orange was chosen to take his place as commander of the whole force. They attacked the city violently and took over the mills on the Tiber. From

these they constructed a new bridge across the river in order to take the city. The pope, cardinals and ambassadors sought refuge in the Castel Sant'Angelo as a last resort. After a few days, the besieged fortress, despairing of aid or safety, surrendered. They agreed to put themselves in the custody of the prince of Orange, commander of the imperial army, and to remain disposed to the will of Caesar. An agreement was reached by which they would pay 400,000 gold coins for the stipends of imperial soldiers. To guarantee the payment, they would grant the imperial army possession of the cities of Rome itself with the fortress, Ostia, Civitavecchia, Modena, Parma and Piacenza.⁷³

When they heard the news of this situation, the Florentines proclaimed their liberty and ejected the Medici faction completely. Mercurino, upon hearing the news, immediately warned Caesar before he left Monaco. He had to remove any pollution from that stain and calm the minds of Christian kings and princes. Stirred up by this situation, they might try to take up arms against Caesar and his domains. Caesar had two choices. He could approve the actions of his men and contend that they took up arms not against a pastor, but a predator, a disturber and usurper of Christianity. It was a necessary act of defence to protect himself and his clients against such a scandalous and incorrigible pope, who had upset the whole state of the Christian religion by avoiding the universal council that had so often been implored of him. Or, if Caesar did not want to embrace this rigid stance himself, nor approve of the actions of his men, he might announce these deeds in writing and explain how bitterly he bore such a terrible event without, however, taking blame for it. He should declare his desire to put an end to these wars and conflagrations in favour of universal peace, and announce the creation of a general council for this purpose. Its judgment would settle all contentions and quarrels, both secular and religious, and put an end to fires of war that arise in this way. The council could investigate the situation and inform Caesar about issues that concern him. Whatever their judgment, he would submit to sacred council and in no way refuse it.

Meanwhile, Mercurino counselled Caesar to go to Italy. Doing this would allow Caesar to win the love of the people by removing their troubles and the fear of the enemy. His honour and esteem would increase. He advised the preparation of a strong fleet of galleys. After he pacified the affairs of the Christians, he could turn against the enemies of the faith with a strong army. In the meantime, he considered the appointment of a lieutenant general in the place of the late duke of Bourbon, who would manage all of the affairs of Italy in the absence of Caesar himself. He advised the selection of a governor and an administration for the duchy of Milan, lest they suffer any more atrocities. In order to take away any presumption of tyranny, the case of Francesco Sforza would be determined according to due process of law, by judges who were above suspicion, with justice leading the way. He elaborated on all of these things in writing, in the form of

a *consilium* for Caesar himself. Transmitted by means of a messenger who also took with him the news, Mercurino wanted Caesar to know that whether he was absent or present, he would never fail in his duty to provide correct advice.

Having sent this news, Mercurino learned that he could not make the journey to his homeland safely by land. He summoned three well-built galleys for Genoa. On 22 June, at twilight, he boarded the ship. Although suffering from gout, he sailed on the high seas all night with a tailwind. They kept away from the side of Corsica in order to evade the enemy fleet. Nevertheless, they could not be avoided. Just at daybreak, around the time of vespers, they sighted sixteen French galleys hastening to intercept the three Genoese galleys, one of which carried Mercurino. The commanders believed that the three Genoese galleys could escape the enemy if they veered towards Portofino. They strove to reach this port, believing themselves nearer to it than their enemies. However, they were farther away, and the more they tried to steer towards this port, the more they seemed to be carried into the jaws of the enemy, whose galleys hastened with all of their might to cut off the journey. Here is what happened. The three Genoese galleys were forced to cross before the enemy ships on the starboard side and were bombarded by cannon fire. For twenty miles the Genoese ships suffered an artillery attack that included a variety of missiles and cannon fire. Over 500 shots hit, but did not damage the galleys. With the aid of God and the Blessed Virgin, they were preserved from so much cannon fire, so that none hit the Genoese galleys. All had flown over, or landed short, or passed to the right or left of them. There was only one exception, an iron cannonball of more than thirty-five pounds. After skipping the water twice, it reached the ship carrying Mercurino, hit a row of seven oars, broke as many water vessels, and finally stopped in the galley itself. Fragments of the oars struck and injured only three oarsmen, but none had life-threatening wounds. Despite this blow, so great were the grace of God and the Immaculate Virgin, and so great the skill of the commanders and rowers, that three Genoese galleys that were under attack from sixteen French triremes led Mercurino safely to Portofino. From here he safely reached Genoa together with the other triremes on the next day, the feast of John the Baptist. Here Mercurino was welcomed by the citizens and the doge with great acclaim.

An attack of gout forced Mercurino lie in bed for nearly a month in Genoa. He could not go home or take care of his affairs as he had hoped. Rather, he remained in the city as the heavily armed soldiers of the French and Swiss armies crossed again into Italy to stir up new unrest. Before occupying the city of Genoa, they intended to lay siege to it by land and sea. By depriving it of grain, which greatly burdened the common people, they planned to force it to surrender. However, Caesar, from the other side, had neither followed the advice transmitted by Mercurino from Monaco, as recounted earlier, nor made provi-

sions for war that were equal to the task at hand. With Mercurino absent, all the important business of the court seemed to be suspended. Caesar himself warned Mercurino to return to the court as soon as possible, making it clear that he would be most grateful for it.

At that time, however, twenty-four enemy triremes occupied the entire maritime port and maintained the siege. None of the imperial and Genoese ships that had gone to Corsica for grain had returned, and these transport ships had no way to come in or out of the city. These ships returning from Corsica had to land in Portofino, where enemies besieged and trapped them by land and sea. Therefore Mercurino could not leave safely. The most powerful ships, warned that Mercurino would try to leave, had prepared traps for him every night. The enemies put the port of Genoa under heavy surveillance so that anyone trying to leave would be intercepted by ships.⁷⁴

Moreover, he would have been leaving with some scandal, because his presence greatly comforted the people of Genoa. They hoped that because of him some remedy would follow. If he left, the scandal would be so great that all would have despaired for their safety. With the citizens and leaders having left the city, they feared all would be lost entirely, and the city would fall into the hands of the enemy. For now the citizens had such great terror, whether from a lack of grain or the absence of reinforcements, that with almost no hope of salvation, they began removing their goods and their families from the city and relocating to safer areas. The citizens themselves had also wanted to leave, despite the urging of Mercurino, the orders of the doge, or the advice, authority or influence of the most powerful men to stay. No one seemed to be able to keep others in to save the city. At certain times they consulted Mercurino, each with their concerns about the situation of the city, almost as if he were the oracle of Apollo as portrayed by the poets. They left him refreshed and consoled.

Thus Mercurino remained in a situation of perplexity. He sustained the siege with equanimity, as long as he believed that his presence helped the cause of Caesar and the republic of Genoa. Truly he saw that enemies had blocked supplies and aid, and their hostile armies occupied all the land passes. With the occupation under duke Lautrec, the power of the enemy grew daily by land and sea. The state of Genoa suffered, lacking not only grain but also soldiers, artillery and munitions. Nearly destitute of all aid, they had no hope of reinforcements. The return of the imperial army into Piedmont or Liguria was considered uncertain, without which they could not resist the powerful enemy.

Mercurino saw that he could offer no more aid. In order to escape the hands of the enemy, elude their traps, satisfy the desire and order of Caesar himself, and offer his counsel to him and to the republic, he decided to return to the imperial court. Relying on the aid of God and the Immaculate Virgin Mother, he exposed himself to the danger of a sea voyage.

In order to elude his enemies, who had set more traps for him, Mercurino tried to conceal his exit. He pretended to be wracked with gout and lay in bed for three days. Meanwhile, he made secret arrangements for only one brigantine to carry him and an entourage of only two servants and three blood relatives. On the third night he rose and boarded the brigantine with his company. He left the city without anyone else in his household knowing. Leaving the port of Genoa on the eve of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, they escaped the enemies, who suspected nothing. On the high seas the tailwind gave way to a contrary wind, which forced them to dock on the coast of Corsica on the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin. The delay lasted until the Feast of St Bartholomew, when they heard the news about the surrender of the city of Genoa and the loss of the ships and fleet, which had been besieged in Portofino. Lest something worse happen to him, he boarded the brigantine that evening at dusk.⁷⁵ With good weather and a favourable tailwind, they reached the coast of Catalonia post-haste, and Barcelona on the twenty-eighth of that month. After a few days of waiting to collect his delayed baggage, he finally gave thanks to God and the Glorious Virgin Mother for his safe arrival. He made a vow to visit the most devout cloister of the Holy Virgin in Montserrat, and complete nine days there. He went to the monastery of Montserrat on the eve of the nativity of the Blessed Virgin, and finally fulfilled his vow. However, before he left for the imperial court, his friends urged him to hurry. The king of England was arbitrating peace negotiations between Caesar and the king of France, and his friends wanted him to go before they concluded peace. But Mercurino claimed that the dealings of the French and the English were far from settling peace. He knew they made their attempt under the pretence of peace when they really wanted war, and he understood all too well the craft with which they negotiated. Therefore he preferred delaying his return to court to taking part in their deals and intrigues. When he returned to court on 4 October, Caesar welcomed him graciously in the city of Palencia.

Caesar ordered that Mercurino communicate everything immediately about how the French, English and other allies had proposed to put together a peace agreement. He learned that Caesar gave his final resolution to the ambassadors of the alliance on 26 September with this condition: the allies would have forty days to conclude the treaty according to his resolution, or else the Treaty of Madrid would remain in force, and every offer made by Caesar that compromised the force of the Treaty of Madrid would be nullified. Having seen all of these things, Mercurino understood clearly that Caesar had agreed to and conceded more than was fitting in order to obtain peace. He consented to conditions that were highly prejudicial to himself, his dignity and his situation, whether in his leaving out the restitution of Burgundy, or in freeing the hostage

children before the rest of the treaty had been fulfilled, or also in the omission of many other things promised in the earlier treaty.

Nevertheless, Mercurino did not think that France or the other allies would ever accept these conditions, or that they would give a response before the deadline. Rather, they would delay peace as usual, with stratagems, intrigues and pretences, until the outcome of the war in Italy could be discerned more clearly. Most of all, when fortune seemed to smile on the French king and his allies, they were esteemed much more highly. They occupied the whole state of Genoa and most of the state of Milan, and the viceroy of Naples had died. Without a leader, light, law or obedience, the imperial army was more bent on destroying Caesar's cause than aiding it. The Hungarian War had held up Ferdinand, his brother. Caesar's officers in Italy did not get along with each other, nor were any of them given enough authority to command obedience from the others. The auxiliaries especially refused to give aid and instead supported the power of the enemy. For this reason, Mercurino counselled Caesar not to neglect the war effort in the midst of all of these games and professions of peace. He should sustain anything necessary for reforming the army and defending his states. He should watch the enemies carefully, because they were like the Jews speaking to Christ, who greeted him with 'Hail, Rabbi' while they left him with blows.⁷⁶ Thus the ones having peace on their lips waged war in deed. Daily they strove to cause the downfall of the empire, and to crush Charles entirely. Because of this, Mercurino persuaded him to procure money, the sinews of war, and to appoint a leader with authority, as said before, who could rule the army. No one would be able to refuse to obey his commands without just cause, and all the others would be under his command. In place of the deceased viceroy in the kingdom of Naples, Caesar should appoint a man to govern the kingdom. He would not be a small man but a great one, if possible, with authority, prudence and virtue, and fortified with esteem. This man could also assuage and settle disputes between the papacy and the other powers of Italy. He should take care to send him as soon as possible, so that with peace among these powers, it would be easier to force the French to a peace settlement.

The counsel of Mercurino pleased him, and money was provided by the bankers. Charles V maintained and reformed the imperial army in Italy and recruited new infantrymen in Germany to augment the army. He gave instructions and full mandates. When the duke of Ferrara turned down the offer to be commander of the army, the commission was granted to the prince of Orange.⁷⁷ In the kingdom of Naples, until another could be provided, Caesar gave the helm of the ship of state to the man who had been the deputy of the viceroy before his death, Hugo de Moncada.

Of all the many men proposed and nominated for the task of settling differences with the pope and the Italian powers, none could be induced to accept due

to the risks of the journey and the complexity and importance of the negotiations. Mercurino, secure in the desire to see imperial affairs managed effectively, was the only exception. Seeing the excuses of the other nominees, and recognizing the agreement of all of the other counsellors on this issue, he asked for this commission. He offered to submit freely to this burden, having already experienced every danger and crisis. Indeed, Caesar sufficiently recognized Mercurino's greater capacity to handle this kind of business. He was Italian by nature, and imbued with Italian customs, and had experience in everything related to imperial state policy. His dignity of office and authority surpassed the others, and when treating these affairs, his fellow negotiators would most likely trust him more, and deal with him more willingly. Because Caesar had already experienced how much damage and harm to the business of the court had followed from the absence of Mercurino, who had borne the brunt of it, he preferred to keep Mercurino to himself. He entrusted the situation in Italy to his ministers who were negotiating at that time. They had successfully handled the liberation of the pope, and this seemed to offer an easy path to a diplomatic solution.

Meanwhile, a response to the proposal of conditional peace made in Palencia came from the kings of France and England. It supported a greater hope for concluding peace, as close as they had ever come, and now all the parties seemed to be in agreement about the conditions for peace. Only one difficulty arose. Caesar, relying on Mercurino's advice, wanted the conditions implemented before the release of the hostages, lest he be deceived again. Eager for the liberation of the hostages, Francis I wanted the implementation of conditions, whatever they were, to be delayed until after their release. He offered some frivolous securities, including especially the English king's word of honour. They seemed to want to start a new war rather than to establish peace. Caesar did not think he could rest his safety on these securities. The party of the French could delay no further; Francis I would either have to accept the conditions offered, or reveal what he had in his heart.

The situation reached a breaking point on the feast of St Vincent on 22 January 1528. At that point the French finally vomited out the poison they carried in their heart. The veil was lifted when both France and England declared war against Caesar. The king of France had no right to declare war, having violated his oath, which he swore by religion, to be bound in captivity. The king of England, who pretended to be the mediator of peace, preaching friendship in common, finally showed himself as an enemy and violator of the supporters of the faith.

They founded these declarations of war on frivolous grounds. It did not matter how justified Caesar's case against these were, or that Mercurino had supported the imperial cause with the best and most legitimate arguments. All of these had been set to type and published and can be read easily, so there is no point in repeating them here. The unjust declaration of war rallied the Spanish to the imperial cause, so that they seemed ready to offer their persons and goods. At the meeting

of the *cortes* in the town of Madrid on 10 March 1528, Philip, the firstborn son of Caesar, was sworn in as the prince of Spain. According to custom, the prince was solemnly sworn in at the church and convent of St Jerome in Madrid, on the eighth day of Easter, of the resurrection of the Lord. In addition, the *cortes* agreed to offer 500,000 gold coins to aid in the safety and defence of the realm, to be given promptly within fifteen days of the conclusion of the meeting.

As Caesar had never visited the kingdom of Valencia, or had been received or sworn in there, he could not convoke the *cortes* of the kingdom of Aragon. There was a long delay, not due to the nature of the business to be discussed, but to the separation and distinction of these *cortes*. By letter, Caesar called for the convocation of the *cortes* in the city of Valencia for the sole purpose of swearing the oath. In the same letter he fixed a time to convene a meeting on 1 June 1528, of the *cortes* in the town of Monzon that would include both the Arragonese and Castilians. Then Caesar left the empress and the child in Madrid and made his way to Valencia very quickly. He arrived on the opening day of the *cortes* to great joy and acclaim. After waiting a few days to allow time for the absent to arrive, as was customary, he was received and sworn in. He reciprocated by swearing to uphold their privileges and liberties.⁷⁸ From there he went to Monzon to the general *cortes*. On the day he appeared, he gave a succinct narration of the facts to them, which included the declaration of war, the alliance of enemies, and their preparations for attacks from all sides. He sought from them counsel and aid in order to repel the attacks of the brazen enemy, who had ignored the oath of peace and tried to violate the agreements by force and arms. He made the urgency of this clear to them; the situation was of such importance that he would not suffer any delay. It needed to be expedited as soon as possible. If other matters arose requiring more debate, and Caesar could not attend the meetings personally, they could rely on the authority of Ferdinand of Aragon, son of Frederick the king, viceroy of Valencia. He could preside in Caesar's absence in these matters until the adjournment of the *cortes*.⁷⁹

The *cortes* negotiated this business with some difficulty, as they did not want to deviate from their ancient institutions and customs. Nor did they consider the situation so dire. They looked after their own interests, as usually happened in such assemblies, where one person could oppose all the others, leading to frustrating and pointless conclusion. However, they feared the notoriety of failing their king and lord at such a critical moment.

This situation offered the French king an opportunity to show his foolishness. He was not content with the public declaration of war made in Burgos, which had been made under false pretences, as previously mentioned. The same herald or standard-bearer who made the declaration now presented a booklet or plaque in the presence of the nobility, challenging Caesar to a duel. In words that were sufficiently insulting and incongruent with Caesar's royal dignity, he added

that Caesar need not respond in writing but rather provide a secure field where the king himself 'might take his arms'.

Caesar, completely unfazed by these words, received such a book with a smile on his face. He answered the herald with his own mouth: the king of France was still a captive who had never been liberated; his faith was still beholden to Caesar. He did not consider him able to make such a challenge. Despite the impropriety, Caesar himself consented to reinstate him for the sole purpose of accepting the said duel. He offered his own booklet with his written response and sent it with his own herald to the king, just as Francis I had done, with the appropriate decorum. However, the herald was not admitted to court and allowed to present his response to the king, not without great scandal. It was just as Mercurino had clearly shown in his disputations and arguments concerning these deeds, all of which he wrote about in great detail. Because the account of this affair has been set to type, there is no need to repeat it here.

The challenge of the duel, so rashly offered, provided a great opportunity for the Aragonese, Valencians and Castilians to get their revenge. It gave such an incentive for them to aid Caesar that the business of the *cortes* had been completed in forty days, something that had never been seen or heard of previously. Usually that amount of time was spent on preliminary affairs or prorogation, and the *cortes* would last for years and several months before it adjourned. By the end of this meeting, 600,000 gold coins were offered to Caesar: 100,000 from Valencia, 200,000 from Aragon and 300,000 from Catalonia. Out of this, they set aside a third to cover expenses in each kingdom. Caesar ordered that the rest go to arming the ships, organizing a fleet and supporting the army in Italy.

With this business completed, Caesar returned to Castile to see the empress and child. He spent the month of June in the city of Madrid. Mercurino, suffering not only from gout but also from fever and dysentery, had to wait a few days before being transported there. When he reached the city, he lay in bed, negotiating with Caesar about the voyage to Italy by means of secret messengers. The Almighty opened the way. The news came about the duke of Lautrec, commander of the French army, who with amazing speed had invaded the kingdom of Naples and occupied almost all of it. He forced the imperial army inside the limits of the city of Naples, laid siege to it, and was aiming to force its surrender when death had stopped him. Also, Andrea Doria, admiral of the French fleet, switched to the imperial side with his ships, led his fleet against the enemy, and nearly reduced it to nothing. He freed the city of Genoa with all of its territories and fortresses from the hands of the French with amazing speed, leading it back to the devotion of Caesar himself.⁸⁰

Finally, they learned that the French army that laid siege to Naples tried to leave because of excessive heat, infestation and food shortages. Forewarned, the imperial leaders and soldiers followed the enemy while they were leaving the city,

and destroyed the whole French army. They even captured the leaders and siege engines. Among the captured were Antonio, marquis of Saluzzo, and Count Pedro Navarro, who both died in captivity.

With this wonderful news coming, which exceeded all hope, Mercurino warned Caesar not to let the fruits of these victories slip away as he had earlier, nor to permit such a great occasion to let his interests go to waste. First of all, he counselled Caesar to make no delay in arranging a journey to Barcelona, where he could quickly and more efficiently make provisions for war and peace. Meanwhile, he persuaded him to send an advance guard to work towards peace and quiet in Italy, restrain the army, pull it back from undue oppressions, and prepare the way for the Lord. The emperor himself should collect money from all sides without delay. He should build a fleet with ships and galleys sufficiently equipped with infantry, cavalry, siege engines, artillery, ammunition and everything necessary, including grain and whatever kind of food provisions, with whatever other supplies the voyage to Italy might require.

Caesar liked Mercurino's plan, and wanted to expedite the journey. He ended the first part of the journey in the city of Saragossa, which he considered convenient for the empress and child. From there he could more easily make arrangements for the transit to Barcelona. But some advisors tried to impede the voyage to Italy; they twisted his plan, proposing that the empress and child were too sick and weak to travel. They persuaded him to choose the city of Toledo. They promised that the fleet, if it were to be prepared, could be better and more quickly prepared at Malaga. From there it would have a more direct route to Italy, with everything it needed. If this were done, they promised Caesar would likely return before the month of November. His opinion having been changed by these persuasions, he left Saragossa and set out for Toledo.

Mercurino was still sick, more from mental anguish than from any other cause. In order to regain his previous state of good health, he considered casting aside all of his worries. He postponed entirely his public and private business. Caesar visited the sick man to confer about his Italian journey. He told him how the fleet had been prepared, and that he hoped to have fleet ready before Christmas of 1528, and that he hoped to leave Spain by mid-January. Mercurino smiled and said he did not believe it. It would be enough for him if he could do it before the end of spring, 1529. Caesar was a little disturbed. Before he had considered Mercurino the biggest supporter of the journey to Italy, but now many people had told him that he was strongly against this voyage. Caesar had told them that he did not believe it. Mercurino responded that those people to whom he referred had indeed spoken the truth, if they had considered all the words he spoke in public. To everyone he spoke with about the voyage, and to all those who asked his opinion about it, he said that he did not believe it. This is because he saw no arrangements made for it, nor money, nor fleet, nor supporters, nor

anything else necessary for such a massive undertaking, especially since the extensive delay had given the enemies too many opportunities to recover their strength and force the imperial army to defend itself. With all of Italy destroyed, he could not hope for any benefit from it.

Mercurino did not say all of these things to dissuade Caesar from his voyage to Italy, nor to keep him from the enterprise. Among all of Caesar's counsellors, there was no one who should have sought this more than Mercurino. He was Italian, he held no properties outside of Italy, and whatever he had in Italy had been pillaged, occupied and reduced to ruin. Mercurino could have no hope of enjoying his property unless Caesar, by his Italian voyage, put an end to the wars. In truth, he offered such words for three reasons. First, Caesar himself had decided to keep the transit a secret until it could be carried out successfully. In order to maintain the secret, he had continued to express incredulity about the future voyage, as though it were something unexpected. He even provided added reasons why it could not be done. Second, a rumour had circulated for a long time among the Spaniards that Mercurino had tried with all of his strength to lead Caesar out of Spain and into Italy. Some made death threats, and others tried to stir up the people to kill him if he tried it. In order to avoid this danger, and to remove this negative public opinion of him, he pretended publicly to be against these ideas, to weaken opposing arguments. This contrary report had already allowed him to get back into public favour, so that now everyone proclaimed him publicly as the best counsellor and father of truth. He was someone who would always dare to speak honestly. The third and last reason was that Mercurino so many times before had tried to convince him to make the voyage to Italy as the safe foundation for all public affairs, the principle and support of the highest exaltation of this imperial summit. He solicited the voyage while perfect opportunities opened before them, while Italy, still in bloom, seemed to look forward to and seek his coming, while the power of his enemies diminished and Caesar seemed to be at the peak of his strength, while the army grew stronger and military discipline more easily took hold, while easy money poured in from all sides, and when smaller expenditures could bring greater profit. Even though Caesar inclined towards and agreed with what Mercurino was constantly saying, the arts of the Spaniards succeeded in detaining him, and they allowed all of the best opportunities to slip away. He now saw the same people using their tricks to adduce more urgent reasons not to go, especially the threat to his life posed by a sea voyage, the power of the enemy, the lack of money, the humbling of the infantry and cavalry, the lack of food, especially grain, the clear destruction of the kingdom of Spain if Caesar were to leave, and the uprising of the people and soldiers. These people wanted to release the sons of the French king held as hostages and a peace alliance with the French king that they could enter without Caesar, so that they could protect themselves and their own.

Nothing could be more grievously offered than the appeal to Caesar's loyalty to his wife and child, whom Caesar himself would put in imminent danger by his voyage to Italy. This was especially so since they did not fully trust Andrea Doria. With his galleys, he seemed to hold the whole fleet in his power. Because he had previously been a notorious pirate and bitter enemy of Caesar himself, they did not trust his reconciliation or believe that he should be trusted with Caesar's person. They could also argue that even if Caesar made it to the Italian shore without harm, he would lack money and grain. He would also lack that victorious army which could not be led out of the kingdom of Naples.⁸¹ The army that was left to maintain the state of Milan had greatly diminished in strength. Nor would Caesar be safe with the new recruits and inexperienced soldiers leaving with him from Spain, unable to camp or advance much farther. Many other points could be argued, and in this way they judged the crossing difficult and nearly impossible. Because of these reasons, Mercurino justly doubted whether Caesar, struck by these persuasions, would change his mind again, and go back on the voyage to Italy. Thus he had been thoroughly defeated and induced to publicly manifest his incredulity concerning the transit to Italy. But the things Mercurino said, and how he said them, lit a fire in the mind of Caesar himself for the voyage. They gave him such stings that just as a free running horse, he did not need any other spurs.

The question then emerged, at what time and from what place could the crossing be most conveniently prepared? What could be done to provide for it? Whom should they commission to handle these affairs as quickly as possible? The chief advisors of the court were called together, and Caesar announced that he had fully decided to make the voyage to Italy. Having taken a stand, he no longer sought advice about whether he should go. Now he only asked how to do it: with whom, how many soldiers, what fleet, what supplies, what security, when, where and how. The opinions of the counsellors varied. There were some who tried to keep Caesar from returning to Italy. Even though the affair had been settled, and they had no way to do it, they considered using an indirect means of getting what was directly prohibited. They praised Caesar for his magnanimity, and they said so much and so many great things about his authority and reputation, and the security of his person and state. They described the preparations and arrangements for such a journey so that it seemed not just difficult but nearly impossible. But Caesar persisted in saying that he would go at any cost, that no obstacle or impediment could stop him. Having heard the opinions of all, he would leave from Toledo before the end of February, he would come to Barcelona directly for the journey, and there he would prepare for peace or war, depending on the situation.

Meanwhile, they would prepare a fleet at Malaga, which included 10,000 infantrymen and an ample supply of grain and other food provisions. In Bar-

celona, galleys and other cargo ships for the imperial court would be provided with supplies and cavalry. From Flanders, Burgundy and both parts of Germany, infantry and cavalry forces would converge into one powerful army that would meet Caesar as soon as he reached the shore of Italy. The leaders of the army, already in Italy at that time, would have removed all obstacles in his path. They would be ready to welcome Caesar and prepare his way. Meanwhile, Caesar arranged affairs concerning the administration and government in Spain. He granted full authority to his wife, the empress, with the assistance of the royal council. With the advice of this royal council, he wrote his last will and testament prior to his departure. Finally, he left his wife and children on Palm Sunday and departed for Saragossa. He remained there through the holy days, taking a break from official business, as was appropriate.

Messengers and ambassadors arrived from the most serene Margaret of Austria, the aunt of Caesar himself, offering a means of peace through the mother of the French king. These two women with so much authority pressed for peace. Related to each other on both sides, these women were led by a maternal love that made their work towards this holy aim even more fervent. They wanted peace and security for their children, and to maintain a more equitable balance. Both of these women commanded such reverence that they could arbitrate appropriately, without any mark of shame.⁸²

Although sick, Mercurino persuaded Caesar to appear ready to embrace such a peace, and to grant his aunt Margaret a full mandate. However, Caesar needed to spell out the conditions for peace acceptable to his side, and order that these limits not be exceeded. Meanwhile, however, he should not overlook affairs related to his voyage to Italy or the war, for if distrust and dissent arose among the members of the Holy League, the rest would be more easily drawn towards peace. This opinion pleased everyone. In order to arrange an equitable means of peace negotiated between Margaret and Louis of Savoy, Charles expedited a mandate with detailed stipulations. He sent back Margaret's diplomats with the same instructions.

Meanwhile, Caesar wished to continue his journey towards Barcelona, but an empty rumour arose that the city of Barcelona suffered a pestilence due to either extreme heat or a scarcity of grain. Because of this Caesar continued on to Saragossa, where he stayed until he obtained more accurate information. They charged a few trustworthy men of faith and authority to look into this and make inquiries, and they uncovered no contagious disease. They did consider the price of grain somewhat more expensive, although they found the price of everything else more reasonable. The truth having been discovered, a provision of grain for the use of the court was made before heading to Barcelona. On 20 April they left Saragossa and arrived in Barcelona on the last day of the month. Here, within a few days, he had equipped twenty newly built galleys. News arrived that the fleet

in Malaga had been furnished with infantrymen and grain. He advised Andrea Doria to come to Barcelona as soon as possible with his forty galleys and six others to come, as well as eight Genoese cargo ships he could have from Majorca. He was to come no later than the middle of the month of June. Andrea Doria followed with the imperial mandate and arrived in Barcelona before the deadline.

Nevertheless, some time before, the majordomo of Pope Clement VII himself, the apostolic nuncio, the bishop of Vaison, was sent to Caesar.⁸³ He was sent with the authority *de latere* and with a mandate to negotiate peace with Caesar, in both universals and particulars.⁸⁴ Mercurino and two other counsellors were charged with negotiating with this nuncio. Within a few days they concluded peace, a treaty and union between the pope and Caesar and his brother, the king of Hungary. They pulled up the roots of the quarrel, reconciled minds, and secured everything here and there. Caesar betrothed his natural daughter to Alessandro de Medici, a nephew of the pope.⁸⁵ Their formal treaty was published and Caesar swore to uphold it in a ceremony held at the high altar of the main cathedral in Barcelona, almost as if by fate, on the day of the feast of the apostles Peter and Paul.⁸⁶

Not even ten days later, a fleet loaded with infantry at Malaga arrived as expected, and on the same day came forty mules loaded with cash, from both Portugal and Madrid, to pay the expenses of the expedition. Likewise on this day came a messenger from Italy who reported the destruction of the French army in Lombardy. Antonio de Leyva, leader of the imperial army and governor of Milan, used skill and industry to capture the leader of the enemy army, the Count Saint-Pol, and three other captains.⁸⁷

The fact that everything happened at the same time, as though interwoven, from so many different parts of the world, all directed towards the same end, beyond the possibility of human hope, sent according to divine will, as it was said, brought a great deal of admiration into the hearts of men. It seemed almost as if Caesar's affairs had been directed miraculously by God himself. Everyone appointed to make the journey with Caesar would come together. One by one, they would enter their assigned ships and galleys with their horses, arms and all of their supplies. They would board their respective ships or galleys on the eve or vigil of the feast of St James. On day of St James itself, they would be ready to set sail when the admiral of the fleet ordered it.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Gattinara's autobiography appears in *Historia vite et gestorum per dominum magnum cancellarium (Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara), con note, aggiunte e documenti*, ed. C. Bornate, in *Miscellanea di Storia Italiana*, Vol. 48 (Turin: Fratelli Bocca Librai di S.M., 1915). Future references to this Latin autobiography will be as Gattinara, *Vita*. The most important work on Gattinara in English is J. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Gattinara also figures prominently in J. Headley, *Church, Empire and World: The Quest for Universal Order, 1520–1640* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 1997). The most recent biography of Gattinara is M. Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara. Carlos V y el sueño del Imperio* (Madrid: Sílex, 2005). See also F. Ferretti, *Un maestro di politica. L'umana vicenda di Mercurino dei nobili Arborio di Gattinara* (Gattinara: Associazione Culturale di Gattinara, 1999). There is an Italian translation of Gattinara's autobiography, *Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara Autobiografia*, trans. G. Boccotti (Rome: Bulzoni, 1991), as well as a German translation, *Der Grosskanzler Kaiser Karls V. zieht Bilanz: Die Autobiographie Mercurino Gattinaras aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt*, trans. I. Kodek (Münster: Aschendorff, 2004).
2. G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1964), p. 34.
3. K. Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-Empire*, trans. C. V. Wedgewood (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954), p. 133.
4. The entire correspondence between Gattinara and Margaret of Austria is found in L. Maurits and G. Kooperberg, *Margaretha van Oostenrijk: Landvoogdes der Nederlanden* (Amsterdam: Van Holkema & Warendorf, 1908), pp. 337–463.
5. A. Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513–1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 3.
6. J. Dantisco, *Españoles y polacos en la Corte de Carlos V. Cartas del embajador Juan Dantisco*, ed. A. Fontán and J. Axer (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994), letter from Juan Dantisco to Queen Bona of Poland, 6 May 1527, Valladolid: 'Es admirable que ni siquiera el Emperador se adelanta a tomar ninguna decision en contra de las disposiciones suyas: el señor Canciller afirma que está hechizado por él'.

1 Biography

1. The best discussion of the town of Gattinara in the fifteenth century and Mercurino's family history is found in Ferretti, *Un Maestro di Politica*.
2. On the history of Savoy in this era, see C. Dionisotti, *Illustrazioni Storico-corografiche della Regione Subalpine* (Turin: Roux Frassati, 1898), P. Guichonnet, *Histoire de la Savoie* (Toulouse: Privat, 1988) and J. Lovie, *Les Ducs de Savoie* (Chambéry: Société savoisiennne d'histoire et d'archéologie, 1982).
3. Ferretti, *Un Maestro di Politica*, p. 19.
4. See L. Marini, *Savoardi e Piemontesi nello Stato Sabaudo (1418–1536)* (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per L'Era Moderna e Contemporanea, 1962). The Francophone Alpine duchy of Savoy, with a more feudalistic and military culture, had been in the process of expanding into the Italian-speaking plains south of the Alps. For the city-states of the Piedmont region, this amounted to a foreign occupation in the fifteenth century. These cultural differences required an enormous amount of state centralization, rationalization and militarization to hold the duchy together. See W. Barberis, *Le armi del Principe: La Tradizione Militare Sabauda* (Turin: Einaudi, 1988).
5. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 242: 'tandem dei nutu et quasi miraculose ab impiorum manibus liberatus extitit'. See above, p. 78.
6. Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 32.
7. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 241: 'neminem in paupertate vivere nec in anxietate mori'. See above, p. 77.
8. One of these professors, Claude de Seyssel, also left the University of Turin for international diplomacy and royal counsel. Although fifteen years older than Gattinara, his path would cross Gattinara's at least once. From one of the oldest baronial families in Savoy, and the son of the marshal of Savoy who occupied the city of Turin, Seyssel enjoyed a social level far above the small, provincial, noble status of the Arborio di Gattinaras. Their political trajectories could not have been more opposed, nor could their political perspectives. For information on Seyssel, see R. Boone, *War, Domination, and the Monarchy of France: Claude de Seyssel and the Language of Politics in the Renaissance* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
9. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 244. See above, p. 79.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 247. See above, pp. 80–1.
11. In 1506 Gattinara had already taken the position of supernumerary professor of civil law at the University of Dôle, but he quit shortly afterward. J. Headley, 'The Conflict between Nobles and Magistrates in Franche-Comté, 1508–1518', *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 9:1 (1979), pp. 49–80, on p. 53.
12. For the intricate discussions of the conflict over Burgundy in the context of French history, see J.-F. Solnon, *Quand la Franche-Comté était espagnole* (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 1–18.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 396, 410.
14. Both passages appear in M. Huart, 'Le Cardinal Arborio de Gattinara, Président du Parlement de Dôle et Chancelier de Charles Quint. Discours prononcé par M. Huart, substitute du procureur general, docteur en droit', in *Cour d'Appel de Besançon* (Besançon: J. Jacquin, 1876), pp. 5–70, on pp. 31–2.
15. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 255: 'reliqua ad amicitiam et veram horum intelligentiam spectancia peracturus'. See above, p. 84.

16. *Robin* was a derogatory term for a noble of the robe. These nobles were associated with the practice of law, and wore a long robe. In contrast, the old feudal nobility at that time wore the short robe of the soldier. They were the *noblesse d'épée*, or nobles of the sword.
17. Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 237–8: 'Arborensium prosapia, in vercellensi patria plurimis adhuc castellis decorata, ex Arbosio, sequanorum opido, initium duxisse fertur; tanteque auctoritatis fuisse constat, ut eorum castra sacro romano imperio immediate subicerentur, donec Fredericus oenobarbus, Romanorum Imperator, Barbarossa nuncupatus ab Innocentio 3^o, pontifice maximo, anathematis sententia notatus, eo quod romanam vexaret ecclesiam, horum subiectionem sua culpa amisisse dignoscitur; a quo tempore ipsorum Arborensium castra, sine cuiusvis superioris recognitione, de facto ad instar alodialium possessa fuere, eo potissime tempore quo civitas vercellensis populo regebatur. Ab ipsis quoque Arborensibus, qui tunc in dicta civitate florebant, sub anno natalis dominici 1243 ex unione locorum Radi, Loceni, Locenelli et Mezani, ad eosdem nobiles Arborenses spectantium, constructum ac edificatum extitit oppidum gattinare sub eorundem arborensium dominio, qui adhuc hodie eius agnationis retinent nomen et nobiles Arborensium de gattinaria nuncantur'. See above, p. 75.
18. Headley, 'Nobles and Magistrates in Franche-Comté', pp. 62–5.
19. Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 49.
20. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 266. See above, p. 88.
21. *Ibid.*: 'orationem super hiis supplicatorem continentem, somnium interserens de futura orbis monarchia ac futuro christianorum triumpho in personam ipsius divi Caroli'. The work is the subject of [Chapter 2](#); see above, pp. 25–36.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 269–70. See above, p. 90.
23. For a meticulous discussion of the bureaucratic reforms attempted by Gattinara, see Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, in which he portrays Gattinara as one of the last medieval 'chancellors' to be replaced by a system of specialized ministers.
24. Rivero Rodríguez argues that increasing power was not exactly an unintended consequence of these 'reforms' but his goal all along; *Gattinara*, pp. 96–7.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–9.
26. The unrest began in Sicily in 1517, where elites refused to recognize the viceroy, Hugo de Moncada, with patents from Charles, as legitimate ruler of the kingdom. Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V*, p. 73; Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 74. Peter Martyr of Anghiera characterizes the revolt as a popular insurrection; see Peter Martyr to the Marchionibus, 12 September 1517, Madrid (letter 594), in *Pedro Mártir de Anglería Epistolario*, ed. and trans. J. López de Toro (Madrid: Góngora, 1957), p. 275.
27. Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 272–3: 'Solus Mercurinus horum erroneum consilium ostendit, ea sola ratione quod imperii titulus ad universum orbem consequendum iustissimus censeretur, tamquam ab ipso deo ordinatus, a prophetis predictus, ab apostolis predicatus et ab ipso Christo Redemptore nostro nascente, vivente ac moriente, verbis ac operibus, approbatus constaret ... si regi alias potentissimo, totque ac tantis regnis et dominiis suffulto, ipsius imperii titulus adiungeretur, sub cuius umbra non solum regna ac dominia hereditaria servare, sed etiam maiora consequi ipsumque imperium augere ac etiam orbis monarchiam obtinere liceret. At si id negligeretur, posse huiusmodi imperium ad gallos defferri ... Carolus ipse rex Catholicus nec dominia Austriacae brugundianaeque successionis nec ipsa hispaniarum regna conservare posset'. See above, p. 92.
28. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 281. See above, pp. 94–5.

29. J. B. Owens, 'By My Absolute Royal Authority': *Justice and the Castilian Commonwealth at the Beginning of the First Global Age* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2005), pp. 81–2.
30. The rebellion took on a millenarian tone when a shadowy figure known as the Hidden One, or *Encubierto*, claimed to be a saviour fighting against the second Antichrist (the viceroy of Valencia), who had come to reform the corrupt clergy and lead a crusade to feed the starving poor with the money of the Church and nobility; see S. Nalle, 'Revisiting El Encubierto: Navigating between Visions of Heaven and Hell on Earth', in K. Edwards (ed.), *Werewolves, Witches, and Wandering Spirits: Traditional Belief and Folklore in Early Modern Europe* (Kirkville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2002), pp. 77–92.
31. Letter of Peter Martyr d'Anghiera to the Grand Chancellor and Luigi Marliano, 13 December 1519 (letter 651), in *Pedro Mártir de Angleria Epistolario*, p. 376.
32. G. Benecke, *Maximilian I (1459–1519) an Analytical Biography* (Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 178–9.
33. C. de Seyssel, 'A Justification of Louis XII's Actions against Julius II', reprinted in N. Minnich, *The Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517): Studies on its Membership, Diplomacy and Proposals for Reform* (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1993), pp. 159–61.
34. Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V*, p. 106.
35. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 277: 'Renuit Mercurinus munus oblatum, cum mentis sue nunquam fuisset se magis ecclesie devincire, eo quod pro comperto haberet ecclesiasticorum persecutionem ob illorum corruptos mores brevi fiendam, seque potius operam daturum, ut ecclesia ipsa reformaretur ... ut inter pontificem et Cesarem, tamquam duo magna orbis luminaria, tanta esset conformitas ad christianam religionem instaurandam, ut inde totus terrarum orbis illustraretur, fieretque, iuxta divinam sententiam, unum ovile et unus pastor'. See above, pp. 93–4.
36. From 1519 to 1520 Gattinara made the following circuit: Barcelona, Santiago, La Caruña, Dover, Canterbury, Dover, Flushing, Brussels, Antwerp, Calais, Antwerp, Utrecht. In 1521 he travelled to the following: Cologne, Worms, Calais, London, Southampton, Santander, Valladolid; from Ferretti, *Un Maestro di Politica*, p. 48. The autobiography also adds Louvain, Maastricht and Mainz between Cologne and Worms. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 283. See above, pp. 95–8.
37. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 282: 'Interim durante adhuc gallico et anglico conventu vocatur ab ambobus Cesar, ut ipse cum hiis conveniat, fiatque horum trinitas in unitate, quod practica Cardinalis eboracensis temptabatur presumentis se horum omnium arbitrum futurum et legem, quam volet, unicuique daturum'. See above, p. 95. The negotiations leading to the Treaty of Cambrai are printed in C. Weiss (ed.), *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, Vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1841), pp. 128–241.
38. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 284. See above, p. 96. Gattinara attended the conference late due to an attack of gout.
39. Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V*, p. 133: 'Now that he was gone the young ruler was left alone to work out his destiny as best he could, with a foreigner and a man with whom he was not always in sympathy – that great statesman whose political perceptions embraced the universe, the Chancellor Gattinara.'
40. Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 83.
41. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, pp. 53–4.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 53–4.
43. Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V*, p. 207.

44. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 364: ‘Visitat Cesar egrotantem potius conferendi causa de ipso in italiam transitu, detegit que ircha classem parabantur, Spem certam habere inquiens quod tardius Classis esset ad recessum disposita ante festum nativitatis domini dicti anni 1528, et quod sperabat in medio mense ianuarii esse extra hispaniam: subrisit Mercurinus dicens se id non credere, sibique sat esse si ante finem veris id exequi posset, in anno 1529. Turbatus est aliquantulum Cesar, sentiens se antea semper habuisse Mercurinum ipsius transitus in italiam solicitatorem, sibique a multis fuisse relatum Mercurinum ab huiusmodi transitu penitus alienum, idque denotare verba illa: se non credere’. See above, p. 132.
45. Ibid., p. 365: ‘Secundo quia iamdiu inter hispanos rumor emissus erat, Mercurinam totis viribus conari, ut Cesarem ex hispania educeret, et in italiam transiret, nec deerant qui Mercurino vitae periculum minitarentur, quique vulgus in Mercurini caput concitarent, si id temparetur’. See above, p. 133.
46. Ibid., p. 367: ‘Hisque rationibus Mercurinum iusta ratione dubitasse, ne Cesar horum persuasionibile percitus iterum sententiam mutaret, seque ab ipso transitu in italiam retraheret, Sique merito se ad ipsius transitus incredulitatem publicandam pervictum ac inductum fuisse. At hec, sic a Mercurino prolata, taliter ipsius Cesaris animum ad transitum incenderunt, talesque prestiterunt aculeos, ut ulterioribus calcaribus tamquam sponte currens non indigerent’. See above, p. 134.
47. B. Hallman, ‘The “Disastrous” Pontificate of Clement VII: Disastrous for Giulio de’ Medici?’, in K. Gouwens and S. Reiss (eds), *The Pontificate of Clement VII: History, Politics, Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 29–40.
48. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 373: ‘Que omnia sic eodem contextu a tam variis mundi partibus concurrentia ad eundem tamen effectum preter hominum spem tendentia, divino, ut ayunt, nutu emissa non modicam admirationem hominum cordibus inieunt, quasi res Cesaris non nisi ab ipso deo miraculose dirigi viderentur’. See above, p. 136.
49. Ibid., p. 373: ‘Hiis igitur sic concurrentibus, iniungitur omnibus cum Cesare transiturus ut in navibus ac triremibus unicuique assignatis res eorum cum equis, armis ac universa suppellectili inmitterent, Et omnes ipsi in vespere seu vigilia beati iacobi navem aut triremem, in qua essent navigaturi, conscenderent, ipso die festi eiusdem beati iacobi ad navigationem parati vellaque daturi, dum prefectus classis id iuberet’. See above, p. 136.

2 Preparing the Way of the Lord

1. M. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria somnium interserens de novissima orbis morachia, ac futuro Christianorum triumpho, late enuncians, quibus mediis ad id perveniri posit*, British Library, MS 18008. The manuscript is cited by Gattinara in his autobiography, and the manuscript contains marginalia in Gattinara’s own hand. It had been lost for centuries until John Headley found it in the British Library in the 1990s. The author is very grateful to Headley for the use of his photocopy of this work.
2. Ibid., fol. 4r: ‘Sunt enim quaedam adolescentium auribus danda, praesertim si materia non refragetur ... sumque adnixus ut diversa genera lectorum per plures dicendi species tenerem’.
3. Ibid., fol. 5v: ‘Erit enim et post emendationem liberum tuo iudicio, publicare vel continere: nihilque iocundius occurret, si factum meum cuius gracia periclitatus sum, tuo ingenio tuo testimonio, tuaque auctoritate creverit’.
4. Additional evidence supporting the argument that he intended it for publication is the form of the manuscript now in the British Library, which does not have the appearance

of a presentation copy. Although written in a clear italic script, it contained no ornamentation or illustration.

5. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 7r:

Si licito he saper cose futurae,
 Si secreti divini a alcun fian noti.
 Si a prophete se crede, o a denoti.
 Si per imagination de sogni, o cure,
 Si per revelation, o per scripture,
 Si per voce nocturne, o spiriti ignoti,
 Si per scientia infusa in ydioti,
 Si per planete, segni, o stelle pure,
 Si per carculation de vera scientia,
 Si per viva ragion indicio recto,
 Si per speculation, o experiential,
 Se pode aver noticia o intelecto,
 De praedestinatione, o praescientia
 De choluy chi ab aeterno e stato electo
 Per accomplir leffecto
 De vera monarchia universale.
 Qua dentro troverai il doctrinale,
 Lasciando y vicii et I male
 Le trompe de Parys, flute, et forcete.
 Seguendo le virtute al mondo elette
 Et quel che dio permette.
 Per soy comandamenti, et vera lege.
 Per congregar sotto un pastor suo grege

6. The future grand chancellor composed the work while sequestered in a monastery. In his autobiography, he stated that he entered the Charterhouse of Scheut near Brussels to fulfil a religious vow. More likely, however, he sought escape from difficult personal circumstances that left him out of commission and in despair. He had just been fired from his post as president of the Parlement of Dôle. The *Oratio Supplicatoria* allowed the failed imperial administrator to reaffirm his loyalty to the House of Austria, despite the recent setback. For information on the events leading up to his dismissal from Dôle, see Headley, 'Nobles and Magistrates in Franche-Comté', pp. 49–80.
7. See above, p. 87.
8. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 21r, 'Admirabar haec omnia, angebar his vexationibus, cruciabatur animus meus, ac mirum in modum turbabatur'.
9. Ibid., fol. 21v, 'Conspicatus enim communem ubique, gentium calamitatem, divini cultus negligentiam, religionis despectionem, fidei extinctionem, spei defectum, charitatis refrigerationem, fortitudinis debilitatem, iusticiae terginersationem, temperantiae dimensionem, continentiae abiectioem, morum corruptelam, virtutum desertionem, bonarum artium abominationem, vitiorum exuberantiam, ac malorum omnium aggregationem'. For Joachimite prophecies about the last monarchy, see M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

10. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 22v: 'Attulis somnus velut excamantis vocem auribus meis in haec verba acriter insonantem. Quam quaeris malorum causam, tibi principatuum pluralitas prebet'.
11. Dante, *De monarchia*, fol. I.x.6: 'Et hanc rationem videbat Phyllosophus cum dicebat: Entia nolunt male disponi; malum autem pluralitas principatuum: unus ergo princeps.' Dante quotes Aristotle, who did not refer to reigns but to heads. The phrase also appears in T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, fol. I.ciii.3. See M. J. Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 46. There is also the possibility that Gattinara had taken it from Annius of Viterbo's *Tractatus de futuris christianoru(m) triumphis in saracenos* (Nuremberg: Peter Wagner, c. 1485), fol. 47v. Gattinara relied heavily on this work, extracting much of the biblical prophecy of the *Oratoria* from it.
12. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 93v: 'Methodius in suis revelationibus, dum ait. Ascendet tunc Rex Romanorum sursum in Golgata, in quo confixum est lignum sanctae crucis, in quo loco pro nobis dominus mortem sustinuit, et tollet Rex coronam de capite suo, et pone team super crucem, et expandet manus suas in coelum, et tradet regnum Christianorum Deo Patri, subdens, et tradet continuo spiritum suum Romanorum Rex'.
13. He refers to Isabella of Castile and Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 38r: 'Quum omnipotens Saluator noster Iesus Christus, pro humani generis salute in hoc ipso terrestri globo descendens, unum duntaxat praecursorem Ioannem Baptistam ad parandas vias eius praemisit, tuae tamen Catholicae Maiestae ad hanc novam Christianorum salute, ad reducendas oves Christi, ut fiat unum ovile, et unus pastor, duos ordine successive praecursores dedit, qui tibi mas huiusmodi monarchiae parent: avos scilicet paternum, et maternum'.
14. *Ibid.*, fol. 56v: 'Dicas aperte, ego et pater unum sumus, nec solum id verbo proferas, sed effectu ac operibus palac facias'.
15. This is very common from ancient times in the apocalyptic tradition. See B. McGinn, *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 5. Christopher Columbus presents another example of the tradition of beleaguered prophet. See A. Milhou, *Colon y su mentalidad mesianica en el ambiente franciscanista español*, in *Cuadernos Columbinos*, 11 (Valladolid: University of Valladolid, 1983). In addition, the tradition would continue after him. Noteworthy is the example of Juan de Garnica, who wrote a *Librito* on the Spanish monarchy dedicated to Philip III in which he presents himself as a prophet. See J. Marino and T. Keuhn (eds), *A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain* (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2004), p. 374.
16. Annius of Viterbo, *Tractatus de futuris christianoru(m) triumphis in saracenos*. See especially the quote 'Pluralitas principatuum cum sit mala' in fol. 47v, and the account of Golgotha, fol. 26r: 'Et com hic apparverit filius perditionis: ascendet tunc rex romanos sursum in Galgatha in quo confixum et lignum sancte crucis: in quo loco per nobis deus mortem sustinuit. Et tollet rex coronam de capite suo et pone team super crucem et expandet manus suas in celum et tradet regnum christianos deo patri: et assumet crux in celum simil cum corona Regis: propter quidem suspensus est in ea dominus noster ius christus'.
17. O. Niccoli, 'The End of Prophecy', *Journal of Modern History*, 61:4 (1989), pp. 667–82, on p. 682. See also O. Niccoli, *Prophecy and People in Renaissance Italy*, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
18. Niccoli, *Prophecy and People*, p. 9.

19. Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 62.
20. In the early sixteenth century, prophecies (pro-French as well as pro-imperial) were published in northern Italy, in what might be characterized as a war of prophecies. Because both France and the Holy Roman Empire claimed Charlemagne as their ancestor, the myth of the saviour-emperor was used by both. Frederick II encouraged such imperial prophecies in his political propaganda in the thirteenth century. Charles VIII would do the same on the eve of the French invasion of Italy. F. Yates, *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 5. Another important source for Gattinara's prophetic vision was Johannes Lichtenberger's *Prognosticatio* (n.p., 1488). The astrologer to Frederick III, Lichtenberger prophesized that the great *Aquila* would banish the Turk, chastise a corrupted Church, and bring about a blessed age. The *Prognosticatio* portrayed Maximilian I as the *rex pudicus facie*, and placed the fulfilment of all prophesies within the Habsburg dynasty. Some prophets played both sides. Francesco Benigno Salviati, a Franciscan friar, wrote the *Propheticae solutiones* in 1497, which supported the claims of Charles VIII and his Florentine allies. By 1508 his prophecies supported the claims of the Habsburgs. He dedicated his *Vexillum christianae victoriae* to Maximilian I and his *Contemplationes de B. Virgine Maria* to Margaret of Austria. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy*, pp. 347–50. On Lichtenberger, see D. Kurze, 'Prophecy and History: Lichtenberger's Forecasts of Events to Come (from the Fifteenth to the Twentieth Century); their Reception and Diffusion,' *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 21:1–2 (1958), pp. 63–85.
21. McGinn, *Visions of the End*, pp. 6, 33.
22. McGinn, in *ibid.*, quotes the Tiburtine Sibyl, p. 49–50: '[the King of the Romans] will come to Jerusalem, and having put off the diadem from his head and laid aside the whole imperial garb, he will hand over the empire of the Christians to God the Father and to Jesus Christ his Son'. McGinn translated the passage found in E. Sackur, *Sibyllinische Texte und Forschungen: Pseudomethodius, Adso und tiburtinische Sibylle* (Halle, Saxony-Anhalt: Niemeyer, 1898), p. 186.
23. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy*, pp. 135, 305, 318. As Marjorie Reeves in her classic work explained, 'It was chiefly the political dreamers, the men with a program to further, an axe to grind, who turned to the emperor prophecies' (*ibid.*, p. 318).
24. C. Kallendorf, *Humanist Educational Treatises* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. xiii.
25. B. Platina, *The 'De optimo cive' and the 'De principe'*, ed. N. Rubinstein (Rome: Bulzoni, 1985).
26. Gattinara, Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 101r; 'Adest quoque egregia togatorum, ac iurisprudentium caterna, doctrina quidem, ac rerum experientia probatorum tum ad latinam, ac Italicam, tum ad Germanam, tum ad Hispanam, tum ad Galiciam linguas, quorum consiliis poteris quaecunque ad iusticiae cultum pertinent, ad populorum quietem, ad pacis assequitionem, et conservationem, ac ad reipubl. Regimen foeliciter exercere'.
27. *Ibid.*, fol. 34r–v: 'Non dico Caesari tradendum omnium rerum particulare dominium, nec que omnia regna, et dominia ad eius manus sit particulariter reponenda, nec reges, et principes spoliandi, aut privandi eorum regnis, et dominiis, sed id duntaxat curandum censeo, ut omnes reges, et principes superioritatem imperialem recognoscant, ut de iure tenentur, fateantur monarcham, ac lites eorum quae tot bellis causam dedere, iudicio monarchae dirimant'.
28. Examples of these lengthy memorials are included in the appendix of Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 405–76.

29. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 159. Mattingly's characterization warrants repeating as a summary of both strategies, even if, as he admits, contemporaries would not have put the case in those terms: 'French policy was obliged to be dynamic, divisive, dis-integrating. The French monarchy could profit from the power struggle only by allying itself with those forces, within and without Charles's dominions, hostile to the medieval world. Imperial policy, on the other hand, was essentially static, defensive, conservative. Its natural allies were the universal church and the feudal spirit, just as those of France were schism and secularism and nascent nationalism.'
30. The domains of Aragon included Catalonia from the thirteenth century. E. Duran and J. Resquesens, *Profecia i poder al Renaixement. Texts profetics Catalans favorables a Ferran el Catolic* (Valencia: Eliseu Climent, 1997), pp. 32–9.
31. G. Boccotti, 'Mercurino Arborio, Cancelliere di Carlo V, e un opuscolo inedito sulla monarchia universale', *Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, 153 (1994–5), pp. 155–95. Without knowledge of Headley's discovery in the British Library, Boccotti suggested that this *extractum* was the *Oratio Supplicatoria*, mentioned in his autobiography as a *libellus* (ibid., p. 156). In his evaluation of this piece of prophecy, Boccotti remarked that the explicit references to the most important Mediterranean countries in Europe seem to indicate a concern with politics and history rather than religion. It is also unusual for a nearly illiterate holy man to speak in detail of political events, much less from the pro-Habsburg perspective. For these reasons, Boccotti concluded that Gattinara invented the prophecy himself.
32. Ibid., p. 162. Gattinara would return to the theme of 'renovation' in the Church in defence of the Sack of Rome in 1527, which viewed the emperor as 'chastiser' of a corrupt Church. The theme was very present in the biblical prophecies circulating on the eve of the Reformation. However, it is interesting to compare this anti-papalism with Dante's *Monarchia*. Although Dante looked towards the north for a 'saviour-emperor', his basic premise is contradictory to the major themes in biblical prophesy. Dante did not aim in his work to show the corruption of the Church, nor did he look to the emperor as the chastiser and renovator of it. He simply claimed that the Church had no secular authority. The goal of Dante was not to initiate the coming of a new age, but rather to prove that world monarchy provided humanity with the greatest context in which to develop its full potential. The calculated arguments of Dante in this work have nothing to do with biblical prophecy.
33. Ibid., p. 187: 'Extractum a quodam libro antiquo manu scripto, reperto in cartusia Bruxellensi, cuius titulus est: *De victoria Christi contra Antichristum*; auctor autem ignoratur.' The original manuscript is in the Archivio di Stato Vercelli, Family Arborio di Gattinara, fol. m3.
34. The text is published in J. Perarnau i Espelt, 'El text primitiu del *De mysterio cymbalorum ecclesiae* d'Arnau de Vilanova', *Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics*, 7–8 (1988–9), pp. 7–133; the *Vae mecum* appears on p. 103. For information on Arnau de Vilanova, see Duran and Requesens, *Profecia i poder al Renaixement*, and J. Ziegler, *Medicine and Religion c. 1300: The Case of Arnau de Vilanova* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
35. Boccotti, 'Opusculo inedito', pp. 194–5:

Ve mundo in centum annis, quoniam elongatus est a decore meo. Habitatores Syrie, quo studia prophana dilacerant, in indignatione mea de littore maris eiciet gens prophana. Eritque solitudo in terra, quousque novus David artem altare Syon veniat reparare.

Nidus oncretorum, Italia, a leonibus et lupis, de propria siua natis, moredebitur. Et, laceratis unguibus, usque ad pollices fluet sanguis ac terrenam expertal voraginem discet medellam cognoscere sue sitis.

Germania usque cum dolore coronabitur et, fractis cervicibus, bibet de calore furoris cum sacerdotibus giganteis in cuis pelago multitudo beluarum excitabit procellam subiciens navigantes periculis. Nam, conturbatis principibus, periclitabuntur tranquillatas populares.

Serpiginoso brachia regis apum constringent latera subditorum et, a mari ad mare protensa, complicabuntur. Immoderata repletio! Nam, rex qui sponse menstrua deglutirit, fune proprio strangolatus, de solio corruiet odio vicinorum, arentibus vicibus federis simulati. Nec ambitosa pollutio sanguinis impune transibit merentibus genitis.

Hyspanis, nutrix machometice pravitatis reciproca furia laniabitur. Nam, invicem ipsius regna consurgent. Et, cum pullus iumentalis tria septena compeverit, multiplicabitur ignis vorans, donec vespertilio cinises Hyspanie devoret subiciensque Aphricam et, caput bestie conterens, accipiat monarchiam.

Postquam filius hominis/vespertilionis insurget impetu repentino, ad cribrandum mortales, ut filios Hyerusalem acerbissimo gladio separet a filiis Babilonis. Et draco, sui furoris extremam sententiam in eo concludens, illusus et victus maneat in eternum. Et hec sunt verba revelationis.

36. Duran and Requesens, *Profecia i poder al Renaixement*, pp. 11–12, 168–9.
37. C. Backman, ‘The Reception of Arnau de Vilanova’s Religious Ideas’, in S. Waugh and P. Diehl (eds), *Christendom and its Discontents: Exclusion, Persecution, and Rebellion, 1000–1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 112–31. See also C. Backman, ‘Arnau de Vilanova and the Body at the End of the World’, in C. Bynum and P. Freedman (eds), *Last Things: Death and the Apocalypse in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), pp. 140–55.
38. D. Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after St. Francis* (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), pp. 305–13. Some scholars have also linked Dante to the Spiritual Franciscans; see N. Havely, *Dante and the Franciscans: Poverty and the Papacy in the Commedia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
39. P. Denley, ‘The Mediterranean in the Age of the Renaissance 1200–1500’, in G. Holmes (ed.), *The Oxford History of Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 222–75, on pp. 227–8: ‘At the end of the fifteenth century, when France and then Spain invaded the peninsula and put an end to the Italian independence for over three centuries, they were both merely restating claims which had developed gradually out of that initial interest. In this sense the events of the late thirteenth century were both the antecedent and a sort of dress rehearsal for the transformation that was to befall Italy later’.
40. Boccotti, ‘Opusculo inedito’, p. 176.
41. The messianic vision of Arnau was taken up in the late fifteenth century during the reign of Ferdinand of Aragon, in whose reign the last Muslim outpost in Spain had fallen. Christopher Columbus, who associated himself with the Spiritual Franciscans, also wrote prophecy. In his *Libros de las Profecías*, he portrayed himself as the agent of the new David (Ferdinand) whose discovery of new lands would facilitate the Spanish monarch to fulfil his destiny of world domination and bring about the last days, establishing

the kingdom of God on Earth. Columbus mentioned the *Vae mecum* of Arnau on several occasions. See C. Columbus, *The Libros de las Profecias of Christopher Columbus*, ed. and trans. D. West and A. King (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1991), pp. 34–5.

42. Juan Dantisco to Sigismundo I, 25 February 1523, in *Cartas del embajador Juan Dantisco*, p. 153.
43. Duran and Requesens, *Profecia i poder al Renaixement*, p. 376: ‘Surge, vespertilio, surge, surge; sume faretram et scutum; macometicam sectam judaycamque observantes persequere, et eos, auxiliante Ihesum ad legem suam ut convertantur dispone. Regem Francorum cum victoria tibi amicum facies. Unum regem in Hispania haereticam pravitatem abservantem depones; et in sua principali civitate coronam auream atque famosas adipisceris. Omnes etiam reges tibi vicini amicitiam tecum inhiunt. Ultra citraque Farum rexque utiusque Sicilie eris, et tres de tuo genere reges humiliabis ... Ad imperium certe tu ascendes, et monarca indubitanter eris, tu vel heres tuus; et in eadem domo sancta gloriose morieris tu vel heres tuus, et semper victores, nunquam autem victi remanebitis, qui vespertilio coronatus aurea corona a me dormientie in visione visus est situatus prope mare mediterraneum, tribus mille passibus solum distans’.
44. Nalle, ‘Revisiting El Encubierto’. For more on *Las Germanías*, see R. García Cárcel, *Las Germanías de Valencia* (Barcelona: Península, 1981).
45. Nalle, ‘Revisiting El Encubierto’, p. 83.
46. Niccoli, *Prophecy and People*, pp. 87, 189.
47. Letter from Gattinara to Peter Martyr, 7 March 1522: ‘Utcunque tamen fuit, ofrte potuit de acumine tuo, animus aliquid facile praesagire. Nam etsi Josephus ille somniator aut Prohetarum aliquis e praeteritis, quando id esse non potes, non es: qui negaverit tamen, cum sis vates, posse te aliquando futura dicere?’, in P. Martyr d’Anghiera, *Opus Epistolarum Petri Martyris Anglerii Mediolanensis, Protonotarii Apostolici, Prioris Archiepiscopatus Granatensis, atque à Consiliis Rerum Indicarum Hispanicis, tanta cura excusum, ut praeter Styli venustatem quoque fungi possit vice Luminis Historiae superiorum temporum* (Amsterdam: Fredericum Leonard, 1670), p. 439.
48. According to C. Nauert, unlike the occult tradition of the Italian Renaissance associated with Ficino, Agrippa’s main interest in the study of magic was essentially practical rather than philosophical. He engaged in the occult sciences for the purposes of power rather than knowledge. This could be accomplished, he believed, through the invocation of celestial intelligences. Because these intelligences could be either angels or demons, Agrippa had included a table of names of both angels and demons in his *De occulta philosophia*. See C. Nauert, *Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1965), pp. 230–50.
49. Headley, ‘Nobles and Magistrates in Franche Comté’, pp. 49–50. On Agrippa, see Nauert, *Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought*, p. 28. Interestingly, Agrippa had spent 1507 in Barcelona and Valencia, which also coincides with Gattinara’s diplomatic missions there (*ibid.*, p. 15).
50. H. Bartel (ed.), *Epitaphia epigrammata et elegiae aliquot illustrium virorum in funere Mercurini Cardinalis, marchionis Gattinariae, Caesaris Caroli Quini Augusti supremi cancellarii* (Antwerp: Ioan. Graphaei, 1531).
51. Hermes Trismegistus was believed to be a fusion of the Greek god Hermes and the Egyptian god Thoth. Both were associated with the origin of language and communication between the gods and humans. F. Ebeling, *The Secret History of Hermes Trismegistus*:

Hermeticism from Ancient to Modern Times, trans. J. Assmann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

52. The criticism of this practice would become more common in the second half of the century, when the level of witch prosecutions began to climb dramatically. See J. Bodin, 'Démonomanie des Sorciers', in A. Kors and E. Peters (eds), *Witchcraft in Europe, 400–1700: A Documentary History*, 2nd edn (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), pp. 290–301, on p. 300: 'And not without cause did the law seek rigorously to punish court sorcerers: for it takes only one witch-courtier to taint all the princes and ladies who follow the court and to infect the sovereign prince, because of the curiosity of great lords to see and learn the conjuring tricks of sorcerers, thinking that in this way they will achieve great things'.
53. A good introduction to magic and Neoplatonism in the Renaissance is B. Copenhaver, 'Astrology and Magic', in C. Schmitt and Q. Skinner (eds), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 267–85.
54. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 318: 'Pertinax reputatur Mercurinus, quod soli sue prudentie inniti videretur, quodque presagium faceret de futuris contingentibus, quorum veritas determinata non esset, putatur vanis astronomorum pronosticis intendere aut apocriphis prophetiis fidem habere, Ayt Mercurinus veram astronomiam ac prophetiam eam esse, quam prudentia parit, cuius partes esse debent memoria preteritorum, consideratio presentium ex quibus merito resultare poterat providentia futurorum longe enim a sapiente viro distare videbatur dicere: non putaram'. See above, p. 109. Cicero, *De Officiis* (44 BC; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), p. 82: 'Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquando ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: "Non putaram"'.
55. Gattinara, *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 27r, 'Es tamquam necessario erigenda ipsa novissima Christianorum monarchia, ut tot malis finis imponatur, ut iusticia, quae ad superos evolavit, in terris redeat, in ipsoque terrarum orbe vera pax valeat obtineri'.

3 Gattinara and America

1. Biblioteca Real Torino (hereafter BRT), MS Storia d'Italia, no. 75, pp. 279–86. Although it is labelled 'Miscellanea', it is not the same series. Luigi Avonto has dated the document to 1523; see L. Avonto, *Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara e l'America: Documenti inediti per la storia delle Indie Nuove nell'archivio del Gran Cancelliere di Carlo V* (Vercelli: Biblioteca della Società Storica Vercellese, 1981), p. 90.
2. BRT, MS Storia d'Italia, no. 75, p. 286.
3. Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l'America*, pp. 49–50.
4. See E. Schafer, *El Consejo real y supremo de las Indias: Su historia y organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la casa de Austria*, 2 vols (Seville: M. Carmona, 1935), vol. 1, pp. 36, 37.
5. Archivo General de Indias, *Nombramiento de gran canceller*, Indiferente, 420, L. 10, fols 254v–255v. In order to find out exactly what powers this implied, Gattinara had researched earlier ordinances concerning the establishment of these courts of judicial appeals. There is a document in his family archive which indicates that he took his duties seriously. It is a copy of an ordinance issued by Ferdinand of Spain from 1514, outlining the administrative nature of these courts and the privileges relating to the seals. The

- document has marginal notes in Gattinara's hand. Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l'America*, pp. 59–60.
6. P. Martyr d'Anghiera, *De Orbe Novo: The Eight Decades of Peter Martyr d'Anghiera*, trans. F. Augustus MacNutt (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912).
 7. G. Fernandez, *Bartolome de las Casas*, 2 vols (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla), cited in Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l'America*, p. 57.
 8. A. de Altolaguirre y Duval and A. Bonilla y San Martin, *Indice General de los Papeles del Consejo de Indias*, 6 vols (Madrid: Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos, 1923). On the extent of treasure from the Indies, see also H. and P. Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique 1504–1650*, 12 vols (Paris: SEVPEN, 1955–60). The multi-volume set includes all the statistics of early trade in the Atlantic world. Volume 2 reprints the registers and lists all of the ships, captains and places for the early years.
 9. E. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501–1650* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. iv. Cited in R. Schlesinger, *In the Wake of Columbus: The Impact of the New World on Europe, 1492–1650* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1996, 2007), p. 14.
 10. Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l'America*, pp. 89–90.
 11. M. Giménez Fernández, 'Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas: A Biographical Sketch', in J. Friede and B. Keen (eds), *Bartolomé de las Casas in History: Toward an Understanding of the Man and his Work* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 67–125.
 12. J. Friede, 'Las Casas and Indigenism in the Sixteenth Century', in J. Friede and B. Keen (eds), *Bartolomé de las Casas in History: Toward an Understanding of the Man and his Work* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 127–236, on p. 142. Friede believes that the change in attitude resulted from the influx of Flemish and Italian counsellors raised in an atmosphere of Renaissance humanism in which feudalism was 'repugnant'. However, other accounts of the court portray the northern Europeans (Burgundians) as essentially feudal in culture (Headley, Brandi, Guicciardini). In contrast to these, Gattinara and Peter Martyr were exceptionally well trained in the new humanist learning.
 13. Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l'America*, p. 26. A printed copy of the text, with Gattinara's recommendations attached at the end, exists in the Biblioteca Nacional de España. See also Bartolomé de las Casas, *Carta del señor don Fray Bartolomé de las Casas al illustre ... señor don Mercurino Arborio de Gattinara, Chancellor de S. Mag. El rey don Carlos en q[ue] suplica a S.S. que se le conceda la provincia del Cenu q[ue] se cuente entre la t[ie]rra q[ue] se le señalare pa poner remedio a los agravios de los yndios en la t[ie]rra firme, año MDXX [Texto impreso]* (London: Charles Whittingham, 1854).
 14. Bartolomé de Las Casas, *History of the Indies*, ed. and trans. A. Collard (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), III.138 (p. 9264): "Sir, if you saw people mistreat Our Lord Christ, laying hands on him, insulting and reviling him, would you not try to have him handed over to you, that you might love him, serve and cherish him, and be unto him all that a true Christian should be?" He answered that of course he would. "What if they refused to give Him to you graciously but instead sold Him to you, would you not buy Him?" He said he would undoubtedly. The clergyman then said, "Well, Sir, that is what I have done."
 15. *Ibid.*, III.139–41 (pp. 265–9).
 16. Las Casas, *Carta del señor don Fray Bartolomé de las Casas*, p. iv.

17. L. Hanke, *The Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), pp. 54–71.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
19. D. Castro, *Another Face of Empire: Bartolomé de las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 6–12. Of the plan, Castro states that it was ‘a capitalist primer for the exploitation of the Tierra Firme with little consideration given to the Indians as complementary participants in the venture’ (*ibid.*, p. 84).
20. Friede, ‘Las Casas and Indigenism’, p. 141.
21. Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l’America*, pp. 39–41.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50. Avonto concludes that this verdict arose more from reasons of state than justice, since it actually goes against the principle of obedience to legitimate authority. He calls the conquest Cortés’s own ‘revolucion comunera’.
23. *Cartas del embajador Juan Dantisco*, p. 336.
24. Two documents in his family archive indicate that Gattinara had been informed about the turmoil and unrest in Mexico after the conquest. Both appear in the appendix of Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e L’America*: ‘Alonso de Estrada e Rodrigo de Albornoz, rispettivamente tesoroero e contador del re di Spagna, espongono gli abusi del governo tirannico di Gonzalo de Salazar, Peralmíndez Cherino e Rodrigo de Paz, insediatisi a Tenustitan durante l’assenza del governatore della Nueva España Hernán Cortés, impegnato in una spedizione militare in Honduras’, dated 1 August 1525. Another document, not dated but believed to be from 1526, is entitled, ‘Relazione anonima concernente I tumulti scoppiati a Città del Messico a causa delle rivalità fra I membri del governo provvisorio della Nueva España durante l’assenza del governatore Hernán Cortés, impegnato in una spedizione militare in Honduras’. Both are in the Archivio di Stato Vercelli, Family Arborio di Gattinara, Mazzo 8.
25. Gattinara, *Consigli del gran Cancelliere all’Imperator* (September 1525), in Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 469: ‘La resolution de la jda este secreta: y que se hagan los dichos preparativos con otra color: que me parece se podria muy bien colorar: mostrando que su Md quiere hazer armada ponderosa: para embiar a reduzir a su verdadera obediencia la tierra descubierta par cortes y poner orden en ella por gozar de tantas riquezas commo hay en ella: que por ser descubierta la jda del almirante: y siendo sobravenidas otras nuevas ya publicadas que requieren: de dar prompt remedia a la malicia del dicho cortes: creheran todos que por ello se disponga la dicha armada de mar: y no por la jda de su md en jtalía: y de esta color podra saccarse: otro fructo: que poniendo en temor: los: parientes aliados y amigos de cortes: saldrán ellos: a tales medios que sin embiar armada asseguen la venida del dicho cortes con mayor provecho de su md: y lo reduzgan a ser buen ministro y a contentarse de la razon’.
26. Avonto, *Mercurino di Gattinara e l’America*, p. 93.
27. J. Axer and R. Tomicki, ‘Juan Dantisco: Un amigo de Hernán Cortés’, in J. Dantisco, *Españoles y polacos en la Corte de Carlos V. Cartas del embajador Juan Dantisco*, ed. A. Fontán and J. Axer (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994), pp. 51–60, on pp. 52–3.
28. The Dominican friar Domingo de Betanzos in 1528. Schlesinger, *In the Wake of Columbus*, p. 72.
29. After the siege of Milan, Gattinara advocated the use of justice. In his autobiography he recounted his advice to Charles V, who should ‘choose trustworthy men who would hear the voices and complaints of the oppressed. They would find out about bad deeds and correct and punish excesses, aid the oppressed and repair injuries as well as possible. By

doing these things, he would be judged a good prince, not cruel, not harsh, not arrogant, not barbaric'. See above, p. 114.

4 Enemies of the Faith

1. For a more thorough treatment of the imperial propaganda campaign of 1526–7, see Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, pp. 86–113.
2. 'Discurso del gran Cancelliere sull'indirizzo della politica estera di Carlo V', in Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 496–514. The manuscript copy in Gattinara's own handwriting is in the Biblioteca Real Torino, MS 75, fols 142–6 and 149–51. It begins with the title: 'Lo que se ha de platicar y examiner en los negocios del estado de su md que agora se offrecen por socorrer a la neccessidad presente y evitar maiores inconvenientes es lo siguiente'.
3. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 500: 'Veo solamente tres dificultades; La primera que partiendose el dicho señor jnfante: de alemagna: queda el jmperio en mucha confusion y grandissimo peligro: por los tumultos y desordenes de la maldicta secta de luthero; con los quales tumultos y con la jnvasion que el turco ha hecho jn hungharia hallandose el dicho señor jnfante absente'.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 502–3: 'Pues su md no puede con su persona ny con sus fuerças da aca: proveer como seria menester: al remedio de tantos males: queriendo a lo menos buscar algun medio de sossiego en la dicha nación de alamana con lo qual se pueda esperar algun socorro y servicio della en beneficio publico ha acordado su md de haer este edicto publico con lo qual manda publicar pregonar y declarar: y affixar en todos los lugares acostumbados de todas las ciudades de alemana: que todos los que han sido o son infectados y culpados de los errores de la secta reprovada de luthero: y que hovieren encorrido: en el bando jmperial: y otras penas contenidas en el edicto jmperial de vormacia o de otros edictos: subsecutivos: queriendo de su voluntad dexar los dichos errores de luthero: y reducirse al gremio de nuestra sancta madre yglesia: submetiendose quanto a la verdad de la doctrina evangelica a la determinación del premiero concilio universal de Christianos que se convocare: y que por los yerros passados: sirvan con sus personas y casas en beneficio de la republica Christiana: por el tiempo forma y manera: y donde fuere senalado y declarado por el señor jnfante su hermano y lugarteniente general en el imperio que a todos y cada uno delllos de qualquiere condicion y estado que sean: su md remitte y perdona su justicia y el dicho bando jmperial y todas las otras penas contenidas en el dicho edicto de vormacia y otros edictos susequentes: y haziendo despachar este edicto: en forma devida y con sus clausulas acostumbradas el uno puesto en lingua latina: y otro de la misma substancia en lingua alemana y embiandoles en poder del dicho señor jnfante: por hazerles publicar y executar como mejor le pareciere: se podra dello seguir mucho fructo: se assossegaran en alguna forma los dichos tumultos de allemagna: y los culpados de haver sostenido y favorecido los dichos errors de luthero: los quales hasta agora por temor de las penas jncorridas: han quedados obstinados y reeldes con clemencia y con perdon de las dichas penas: se podran assegurar y mas facilmente retirarse de los dichos errors; especialmente dandoles camino con que rectamente se pueda determinar la verdad de la doctrina evangelica en la qual principalmente se funda la dicha secta: y con esta reduction: y con la submission arriba dicha de mas del sossiego: y remedio de la dicha secta: creesse poderse saccar algun buen socorro de gente de cavallo y de pied: por juntarse con el dicho señor jnfante: a qualquiere cosa que los quiera emplear: sea por socorrer hungaria o por passer adelante a socorrer las cosas de jtalía: con color del beneficio public de la Christiandad: y esto podra ser un torcedor al papa por traerlo mas

- facilmente a la razon: temiendo que tal reduction y ajuntamiento no sea causa de dar mas prissa a la convocacion del concilio que es la cosa que mas teme’.
5. Ibid., pp. 332–3: ‘Interim, ut pontifex huiusmodi incendii culpam, fuccatis quibusdam rationibus, a se ipso excuteret ac in Cesarem riceret, iustificationes quasdam suis scriptis, in forma brevis, cesari, sub die 20 augusti 1526, ad vulgi animos informandos presentari iussit. Quibus Mercurini studio taliter responsum extitit, ut emissa iacula in ipsius pontificis caput retorquerentur, omnisque illi culpa ascribentur, itidem gallorum arte emissa fuit apologia quedam ad excusandam galli perfidiam, falsoque suadendum, hunc non teneri ad servandam fidem Cesari datam, nec ad observationem conventionum iuratarum. Adversus quam, ope etiam Mercurini, taliter per Antipologiam responsum fuit, ut, sublato fucco mendacii, ipsius gallorum regis perfidia, suis falsis excusationibus enervates, luce clarius ostensa fuerit, Que Omnia tippis excussa et impressa, cum satis sint publica, passimque legi possint et satis amplum volume continere videantur, potius hic reticenda quam referenda censentur’.
 6. M. Bataillon, *Erasmus y España: estudios sobre la historia spiritual del siglo xvi*, trans. A. Alatorre (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1950), p. 156. See also A. de Valdés, *Diálogo de las cosas acaecidas en Roma*, ed. R. Navarro Durán (Madrid: Catedra, 2007), pp. 11–23.
 7. Valdés was one of forty-nine people listed as dependents living in the grand chancellor’s household. ‘Repertorio delle persone che sono in casa del gran cancelliere Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara’, in Archivio di Stato Vercelli, Family Arborio di Gattinara, Mazzo 8, Fasc. 42.
 8. The documents relating to this appear in the polemical compilation entitled *Pro divo Carolo eius nominis quinto Romanorum Imperatore Invictissimo* (Mainz: Joannis Schoeffer, 1527). On the Sack of Rome and its devastating impact on the Renaissance, see K. Gouwens, *Remembering the Renaissance: Humanist Narratives of the Sack of Rome* (Leiden: Brill, 1998).
 9. A. de Valdés, *Pro Divo Carolo eius nominis quinto Romanorum Imperatore Invictissimo* (Mainz, 1527), p. 59: ‘Imperium à Deo institutum, à prophetis praedictum, ab Apostolis predicatum, & ab ipso domino nascente, vivente, & moriente approbatum. Nos tamen quo nil aliud, quam pacem, quam quietem Christianae Reipub. Cupiebamus. & quantum fas esset, vestrae Sanctitati satisfacere’. Valdés was the personal secretary to Gattinara, so it is very difficult to distinguish the words and ideas of the secretary from those of the chancellor. However, the same phrase appears in Gattinara’s autobiography (Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 272; see above, p. 92), and a similar phrase in Gattinara’s *Oratio Supplicatoria*, fol. 25r.
 10. Valdés, *Pro Divo Carolo*, p. 214: ‘quae organo vestry reverendi Baldassaris Castilionei Apostolici nuncii pro parte foederationum omnium proposita fuere, quae non ad ipsam universalem pacem, pro qua hic conventus non ad ipsam universalem pacem, pro qua hic conventus celebratus videtur, sed ad particulare interesse tendere videntur: & potius ipsam universalem Christianorum pacem differre & impedire, quo nil perniciosius hostis Turca Christianorum insidet cervicibus’.
 11. *Pro Divo Carolo*, sigs. Av–Avii, cited in Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, p. 100.
 12. A bill for the Spanish edition of the work, the Alcalá edition of Miguel Eguía, was submitted to Gattinara himself. The printer had previously published many works of Erasmus in Spain; Bataillon, *Erasmus y España*, p. 230. See also Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, pp. 106–7.
 13. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, p. 109.

14. Ibid., pp. 109–10.
15. D. Erasmus, *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, ed. P. S. Allen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), pp. 470–1. See Bataillon, *Erasmus y España*, p. 232. See also G. Galasso, 'Lettura dantesca e lettura umanistica nell'idea di impero del Gattinara', in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530–1558)*, 4 vols (Madrid: Sociedad estatal para conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), vol. 1, pp. 93–114, on p. 96.
16. Dante, *Monarchia*, p. 149.
17. Ibid., p. 103.
18. Ibid., p. 105. However, Dante granted the priesthood authority over issues regarding the afterlife, though not over issues concerning the life of this world.
19. A. Cassell, *The Monarchia Controversy: An Historical Study with Accompanying Translations of Dante Alighieri's Monarchia, Guido Vernani's Refutation of the Monarchia Composed by Dante, and Pope John XXII's Bull Si fratrum* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), p. 13.
20. Dante, *Monarchia*, p. xxxvii.
21. *Opus Epistolarum Des.*, ed. Allen, pp. 470–1: 'Cuperem vt, cum in rem Caesaris faciat, libellus in publicum exeat. Quia tamen scriptorium vitio corruptus est, opere precium me facturum existimaui, si eum ad te mitterem teque rogarem vt, dum per ocium licebit, libellum legas, et si res digna tibi visa fuerit, castigatum typographo excudendum tradas. Nullus enim in nostra hac tempestate est cui hanc melius prouintiam demandare possim. Tuum erit libellum vel emitter vel suppressere: id enim tuo committo iudicio'.
22. M. Mann Phillips (ed.), *The 'Adages' of Erasmus: A Study with Translations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 224–5.
23. Ibid., p. 243.
24. Dante, *Monarchia*, p. 27: 'Where there is nothing which can be coveted, it is impossible for greed to exist, for emotions cannot exist where their objects have been destroyed. But there is nothing the monarch could covet, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean'.
25. D. Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince* (1516), ed. and trans. L. Born (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
26. Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*, p. 57. See also A. Fontán, *Príncipes y Humanistas. Nebrija, Erasmo, Maquiavelo, Moro, Vives* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008), pp. 67–71.
27. Bataillon, *Erasmus y España*, pp. 10–22.
28. D. Crews, *Twilight of the Renaissance: The Life of Juan de Valdés* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), pp. 21, 27.
29. See Bataillon, *Erasmus y España*, p. 226, and J. Headley, 'Gattinara, Erasmus and the Imperial Configurations of Humanism', *Archive for Reformation History*, 71 (1980), pp. 64–98, on p. 80.
30. For the political ramifications of Plato in fifteenth-century Italy, see J. Hankins, *Plato in the Renaissance* (Leiden: Brill, 1991).
31. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 348: 'Alterum duorum elligat, aut approbando gesta suorum contendant, se non in pastorem sed in raptorem, turbatorem ac invasorem christianitatis arma sumpsisse pro sua et suorum necessaria deffensione et tamquam in pseudo pontificem scandalosum, incorrigibilem ac universum christiane religionis statum perturbandtem, universaleque concilium sepius imploratum detractantem; Aut, si hunc rigorem Cesar ipse amplecti nolit, nec suorum gesta approbare, nunciet illis, suis litteris, quam egre

tulerit talis casus eventum sine tamen ipsius Caesaris culpa temptatum, se cupere hiis bellis ac incendiis per universalem pacem finem imponi, ad eamque dirigendam generalis concilii indictionem exquiri, cuius iudicio omnes contentiones et querelle'. See above, p. 124.

32. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 348: 'Consulens interim Caesaris in italiam adventum quo et populorum amorem, submovendo gravamina, et hostium timorem, cum sui honoris et extimationis incremento assequi valeat. Triremes ad id cum Classe valida parandas censet, que inde, paccatis christianiorum rebus, in hostes fidei cum valido exercitu convertantur'. See above, p. 124.
33. Valdés, *Diálogo de las cosas acaecidas en Roma*. In English the work has been known as the *Dialogue of Lactancio and an Archdeacon*, ed. and trans. J. E. Longhurst and R. R. MacCurdy (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1952).
34. Valdés, *Dialogue of Lactancio and an Archdeacon*, p. 12.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
44. K. de Broce, 'Authorizing Literary Propaganda: Alfonso de Valdés' *Diálogo de las cosas acaecidas en Roma (1527)*', *Hispanic Review*, 68:2 (2000), pp. 135–41, on pp. 135, 140, 141. See also Bataillon, *Erasmus in España*, pp. 166–76.
45. Valdés, *Dialogue of Lactancio and an Archdeacon*, p. 75.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
47. B. Castiglione, *Il Libro del Cortegiano con una scelta delle Opere minore*, ed. B. Maier (Turin: Unione Tipografica, 1955, 1981), p. 661.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 666.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 668.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 707.
51. See above, p. 129.

5 Gattinara, Guicciardini and the Treaty of Madrid

1. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, trans. R. Humphries (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1955, 1983), pp. 305–18.
2. Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 293–4: '[Caesar] imponitur rei pondus Mercurino, quem emuli auctorem belli accusabant et, si res male succederet, ab omni populo lapidandum asserebant. Mercurinus autem, qui nil umquam nisi bona mente temptaverat, divino semper fretus auxilio, mestos ac tristes consolatur, bonum exitum pollicetur ... et quod pecunia supplere non poterat scriptis, consilio ac persuasionibus belli duces hortatur, animat, addit hiis calcaria honoris et comodi, predicat gallorum regem omnino vincendum, et ante primum diem marcii anni 1525 ipsum regem allum aut in bello moriturum aut in captivitate venturum. Deditque sors ac belli ducum prudentia'. See above, p. 100.
3. A. de Valdés, 'Relación de las nuevas de Italia: sacadas de las cartas que los capitanes y comisarios del emperador y Rey nuestro señor han escripto a su majestad: assí de la

victoria contra el Rey de Fancia como de otras cosas allá acaecidas: vista y corregida por el señor gran chanciller e consejo de su majestad, en marzo de 1525', cited in Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 103.

4. On Pavia, see A. Konstam, *Pavia 1525: The Climax of the Italian Wars* (Oxford: Osprey, 1996).
5. On the role of Burgundians at the court of Charles V, see W. Blockmans, *The Emperor Charles V: 1500–1558* (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 127.
6. Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 112.
7. M. Gattinara, *Mémoire du Chancelier de Gattinara sur les Droits de Charles-Quint au Duché de Bourgogne*, ed. C. Bornate (Brussels: M. Weissenbruch, 1907). The archival collection in the BRT, MS Storia d'Italia, no. 75, includes copies of numerous French treaties going back to the early fifteenth century. All were carefully annotated in Gattinara's hand, indicating the extensive amount of research he did for this treatise.
8. It is not clear whether Gattinara had read *The Prince* or if he formulated the advice himself. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince and Other Works*, ed. and trans. A. H. Gilbert (Durham, NC: Hendricks House, 1941, 1964), p. 99. Guicciardini relates the grand chancellor's strange advice with the comment 'consiglio certamente memorabile e degno di essere accettato da tanto principe'; F. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, ed. E. Mazzali, 3 vols (Milan: Garzanti, 1988), vol. 3, p. 1826.
9. This scandal was known as the 'Conjuration of Morone'. For more information, see G. Morone, *Ricordi inediti di Gerolamo Morone, gran cancelliere dell'ultimo duca di Milano, sul decennio dal 1520 al 1530, in cui Roma fu saccheggiata*, ed. D. C. Tullio Dandolo and E. di Boniardi-Pogliani (Milan: Besozzi, 1859). See also Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V*, p. 230; Rivero Rodríguez, *Gattinara*, p. 112.
10. Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 299–300 and 305: 'Pontifexque ipse clemens septimus immemor beneficiorum a Cesare acceptorum ... aliud iter amplexus, timens cesaris magnitudinem illiusque in italiam adventum, novas ad illius exclusionem practicas moliri videretur, in partesque suas non solum italie potentatus sub colore libertatis ac auietis proprie allicere incitare'; 'Hinc pontifex ceterique italie potentatus in maiorem incidunt suspicionem, ne hec faba in eorum caput cuderetur, putantes Cesarem potius ad italie usurpationem quam ad quietem et liberationem tendere'. See above, pp. 101 and 104.
11. M. Sanudo, *I Diarii*, Vol. 38 (Venice: F. Visentini, 1893), p. 204: 'Nostro orator, el qual andò a trovar il Gran Canzelier, e scrive colloquii auti pregando, essendo italian, voy far bon officio con la Cesarea Maestà, sia pace in Italia et far come fece Joseph apresso Faron'.
12. Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 306–7: 'Habentur super hiis varia consilia, suadente vicerege oblata gallorum acceptanda, cum quibus frenum italie ponebatur, taliter quod cum uno baculo facillime regeretur, ipsique Carolo Cesare perpetuo subiceretur; Mercurino autem contradicente, gallicis suasionibus nequaquam confidendum, qui nunquam fidem servare didicerant, dicenteque italiam non vi sed amore ac humanitate Cesareis votis aliciendam. Quod si id per vim agendum temptaretur, sciret Cesar se perpetuum bellum habiturum, nec umquam christianorum paci aut quieti posse consulere, experturum quoque eam difficultatem, quam romani tot annis experti sunt, qui plus tempori laborisque consumpserant in aquirenda italia quam in obtinenda reliqua universi orbis monarchia. Concluditur tandem italiam, si fas sit, potius amore quam vi continendam, pacem, si obtineri possit, universaliter cum omnibus tam gallis quam italibus tractandam et acceptandam'. See above, p. 104.

13. Basdassare Castiglioni, 5 July 1525: 'Non v'è persona che abbia così buon animo alle cose d'Italia come il Grancancelliere'. C. Martinati, *Notizie storico-biografiche intorno al Conte B. Castiglione* (Florence 1890), cited in Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 307 n. 2.
14. Andrea Navagero to the Signoria di Venezia, 11 December 1525, in Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 478.
15. Cited in Headley, *Church, Empire and World*, p. 109. Gattinara's reliance on a league and upon awakening native elements within Italy points to a looser and more general imperial hegemony. See also Blockmans, *Emperor Charles V*, p. 60.
16. According to Gattinara in a *Consulta* from September 1525, 'Italy is to be preserved for him more by love than by force and with their love he will be able to dominate all the world and without it his majesty will thrust his kingdoms and affairs into peril and never will he be able to recover himself without necessity and work'; cited in Headley, *Church, Empire and World*, pp. 109–10. However, the feudal claims made by local elites often took away customary rights to self-government by representative institutions.
17. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 314. See above, p. 107.
18. Letter from Johannes Dantiscus to Segismundo I, 16 March 1525, in *Cartas del emba-jador Juan Dantisco*, p. 173, p. 288 n. 11. The quote is from Livy, *The History of Rome*, 22:51:4.
19. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, p. 55: 'In the annals of political relationships there are few examples of such open confrontation between prince and minister which can parallel Gattinara's refusal to affix the seals to the treaty of Madrid. Neither Talleyrand's endurance of Napoleon's denunciation of his treasonous activities in 1809 nor Ludendorff's ultimatum to the Kaiser in 1917 conveys the same sense of challenging obduracy and defiance which Charles V's grand chancellor displayed in January 1526'.
20. Gattinara had been there in 1510–11, Guicciardini in 1513.
21. Guicciardini put himself on trial for the sack in an imaginary court case. See his *Auto-difesa di un politico. Consolatoria, Accusatoria, Defensoria*, ed. U. Dotti (Rome: Laterza, 1993).
22. T. C. Price-Zimmerman, in his analysis of Guicciardini's depiction of Clement VII, points out the heuristic nature of Guicciardini's history, in which models are used for historical explanation. The model in use for his characterizations of individuals, he asserts, originates in Guicciardini's own conception of particular situations. He paraphrases Hume: 'to understand the feelings of another person at a given juncture one need only consult what one's own feelings would have been on such an occasion'. He also points out that Guicciardini's background as a diplomat trained him to formulate hypotheses regarding his antagonists' motives as a means of deciphering their actions. Noteworthy in this instance is that both Gattinara and Guicciardini are essentially playing the same game. T. C. Price-Zimmerman, 'Guicciardini, Giovo, and the Character of Clement VII', in K. Gouwens and S. Reiss (eds), *The Pontificate of Clement VII: History, Politics, Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 19–27.
23. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 3, p. 1855.
24. D. Cantimori, 'Guicciardini', in *Storia della Letteratura Italiana*, Vol. 4 (Milan: Garzanti, 1965), p. 87: 'in contrario non solo disputava, ma esclamava el gran cancelliere, persona di grandissimo credito et experientia et che molti anni haveva sostenuto tucte le faccende importante di quella corte'. 'ma in contrario più presto esclamava che disputava Mercurino da Gattinara, gran cancelliere; uomo, benchè nato di vile condizione nel Piemonte, di molto credito ed esperienza, e quale già più anni sosteneva tutte le faccende importante di quella corte'.

25. G. Barbero, 'A proposito del giudizio del Guicciardini sul Gattinara, gran cancelliere di Carlo V', *Bollettino storico per la provincia di Novara*, 61 (1970), pp. 21–8.
26. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 3, p. 1860: 'Aveva il gran cancelliere, con questo parlare accurato e veemente e con la riputazione della prudenza sua, commosso gli animi di una grande parte del consiglio'.
27. Barbero, 'A proposito del giudizio del Guicciardini', p. 27.
28. Ibid., p. 24.
29. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 3, pp. 1855–6: 'Desidererei e io, con ardore pari a quello degli altri, che in uno tempo medesimo si recuperasse la Borgogna e si stabilissimo i fondamenti di dominare Italia, ma conosco che chi così presto vuole tanto abbracciare va a pericolo di non stringere cosa alcuna, e che nessuna ragione comporti che il re di Francia, liberato, vi attenda tanto importante capitoli. Non sa egli, che se e' vi restituisce la Borgogna, che vi apre una porta di Francia? E che in potestà vostra sarà sempre di correre insino a Parigi? E, che avendo voi facoltà di travagliare la Francia da tante parti, che sarà impossibile che e' vi resista? Non sa egli, e ognuno, che il consentirvi che voi andiate armato a Roma, che voi mettiatelo il freno a Italia, che voi riduciate in arbitrio vostro lo stato spirituale e temporale della Chiesa, è cagione di raddoppiare la vostra potenza, che mai più vi possono mancare nè danari nè armi da offenderlo, e che egli sia necessitato ad accettare tutte le leggi che a voi parrà d'imporgli? Adunque, ci è chi crede che vi abbia a osservare uno accordo per il quale egli diventi vostro schiavo e voi diventiate suo signore?' The last line seems to evoke the statement of the Melians against the Athenians in the famous dialogue of Thucydides: 'How could it prove as advantageous for us to become your slaves, as it is for you to have dominion?', in Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Vol. 3, trans. C. F. Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921, 1992), p. 161.
30. Gattinara, although trained as a jurist, exhibited an almost encyclopaedic familiarity with ancient texts in several speeches and treatises. Most notable was the *Oratio Supplicatoria* dedicated to Charles V in 1516. Guicciardini was also trained as a jurist, but he acquired an exceptionally broad humanist education growing up in Renaissance Florence. For his upbringing, see R. Ridolfi, *Vita di Francesco Guicciardini* (Milan: Rusconi, 1982).
31. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 3, pp. 1856–7: 'non fede o promesse che nelle importanze dello stato sono appresso di molti di poco peso, appresso a' francesi di niuno'.
32. Ibid., p. 1858: 'Così la medicina che noi prepariamo usare per fuggire il pericolo sarà quella che senza comparazione lo accrescerà, e in cambio di interrompere questa unione saremo il mezzo noi che parere è adunque il tuo? Consigli tu che di tanta vittoria non si tragga alcuno profitto? Abbiamo noi a stare continuamente in queste perplessità? Io confermo quell che ho detto molte volte: che è troppo nocivo il perdere in una volta tanto cibo che lo stomaco non sia potente a comportarlo, e che è necessario o, reintegrandosi con Italia (che non dimanda altro da noi che di essere assicurata), cercare di avere dal re di Francia la Borgogna e quell più che noi possiamo, o fare uno accord con lui per il quale ci resti Italia a discrezione, ma sì dolce, in quanto agli interessi suoi, che gli abbia causa di osservarlo; e nella elezione tra queste due vie bisogna, Cesare, che la prudenza e la bontà vostra preponga quello che è stabile e più utile e maggiore'.
33. Ibid., p. 1854: 'l'autorità sua, almanco per fede e per benivolanza, era grande appresso a Cesare'.
34. Ibid., p. 1860: 'Non è già da lodare, gloriosissimo Cesare, chi per appetito di avere troppo, abbraccia più che non può tenere, ma non merita di essere manco biasimato chi, per

superchio sospetto e diffidenza, si priva da se stesso delle occasioni grandi acquistate con tante difficoltà e pericoli; anzi, essendo l'uno e l'altro errore gravissimo, è più dannabil, in uno tanto principe, quello che procede da timidità e abiezione di animo che quello che nasce da generosità e grandezza, è più laudabile è cercare, con pericolo, di acquistare troppo che, per fuggire pericolo, annichilare le occasioni rarissime che l'uomo ha.

35. Ibid., pp. 1864–5: 'Meglio è Cesare, e più conviene alla dignità dello imperio, alla vostra grandezza, sottoporsi di nuovo alla fortuna, mettere di nuovo ogni cosa in pericolo, che, dimenticatosi il grado vostro, l'autorità di principe supremo di tutti i principi e il nome cesareo, e vincitore tante volte d'un potentissimo re, accettare da preti e da mercanti quelle condizioni che, se voi fussi stato vinto, né più gravi né più indegne vi sarebbero state poste ... si debbe pure fidarsi più di uno re di Francia con tanto pegno che degli italiani senza alcuno pegno, più della fede e parola di uno tanto re che della cupidità immoderate de' preti e della sospettosa viltà de' mercatanti; e più facilmente possiamo avere, come molte volte hanno avuto i passati nostri, congiunzione per qualche tempo co' franzesi che con gli italiani, inimici nostri naturali ed eterni'.
36. Ibid., p. 1863: 'E chi non sa che cosa sia Italia? Provincia regina di tutte l'altre, per l'opportunità del sito per la temperie dell'aria per la moltitudine e ingegni degli uomini, attissimi a tutte le imprese onorevoli, per la fertilità di tutte le cose convenienti al vivere umano. Per la grandezza e bellezza di tante nobilissime città, per le ricchezze per la sedia della religione per l'antica Gloria dello imperio, per ininiti altri rispetti; la quale se voi dominerete tremeranno sempre di voi tutti gli altri principi'.

Conclusion

1. D. Kelley, *The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
2. E. Rosenthal, *The Palace of Charles V in Granada* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 251, 264.
3. F. Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. S. Alexander (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 435 (p. 2273 in Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 3).

A Note on the Text

1. *Autobiografia di Murcurino Arborio di Gattinara con dati fino al 24 luglio 1529*, Archivio di Stato Vercelli, Family Arborio di Gattinara, Mazzo 3, Fasc. 13. *Copia dell'Autobiografia di Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara. Copia del XVIII secolo*, Archivio di Stato Vercelli, Family Arborio di Gattinara, Mazzo 3, Fasc. 14.

The Autobiography

1. There is no evidence supporting his claim to Burgundian ancestry, which went back to his presidency of the parliament of Dôle. His purchase of a castle and claims of noble ancestry did not persuade the local nobility to consider him one of their own. See [Chapter 1](#) above. Named for his red beard, Frederick Barbarossa ruled as Holy Roman Emperor from 1152 to 1190. Claiming his authority directly from God rather than from the papacy, he was excommunicated in 1160. He carried on five invasions of Italy, but did not manage to gain a lasting foothold in the peninsula. See S. Ozment, *A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), pp. 55–7.

2. The town of Gattinara was not built by the nobility, as he claimed. Rather, it was established by the commune of Vercelli. See Gattinara, *Mémoire*, ed. Bornate, fol. 231 n. 1; and Gattinara, *Autobiografia*, trans. Boccotti, fol. 25 n. 3 and n. 4. The history of the state of Savoy is complicated. The Amadeus referred to here is Amadeus VIII, who greatly enlarged the territory of the state. Known for his piety, his secretary was the humanist Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who would later become Pope Pius II. After Amadeus VIII, Savoy engaged in almost constant warfare to maintain and extend its control over the Piedmont against the Marquisate of Monferrato and the Visconti of Milan. See M. Vester, *Sabaudian Studies: Political Culture, Dynasty, and Territory* (Kirkville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2013), pp. 5–6, pp. 49–62. The feudal claims of the nobility over the rural commoners had no juridical foundation. See also F. Ferretti, ‘Notizie sulla famiglia de Guliemlmo de Arborio di Gattinara, sulla nascita ed età giovanile di Mercurino’, in *Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara, Gran Cancelliere di Carlo V*, Atti del convegno di studi storici, 4–5 October 1980 (Gattinara: Associazione culturale di Gattinara, 1980), pp. 105–218.
3. The manuscript added the date and time in the margins, ‘die decimo mensis iunii mane oriente sole’. Gattinara, who put much faith in astrology, perhaps considered his birthday and horoscope to be significant. His claim to be born at dawn perhaps also held spiritual significance. See *Autobiografia* and *Copia dell’Autobiografia* in Archivio di Stato Vercelli (hereafter ASV), fol. 1.
4. From the Vulgate, Proverbs 30:18–19: ‘Tria sunt difficilia mihi, et quantum penitus ignoro: viam aquilæ in cælo, viam colubri super petram, viam navis in medio mari, et viam viri in adolescentia’.
5. The quote is from the Enactments of Justinian, Novel I, concerning the laws of inheritance. In the epilogue it states that no one shall remain in ignorance of the law, ‘which does not permit a man to live in poverty, or to die in anxiety’. S. P. Scott, *The Civil Law*, 16 (Cincinnati, OH: Central Trust Co., 1932). Interestingly, Justinian refers to the law itself for the people it is meant to serve. However, Gattinara seems to indicate that it is the profession itself that allows one to live without poverty and die without anxiety.
6. The phrase beginning with ‘Indeed’ and ending with ‘integrity’ appeared in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 4.
7. This is Gattinara’s only reference to Claude de Seyssel, a man whose career path greatly resembled that of his own. Seyssel is most famous for his political treatise, the *Monarchie de France*. Seyssel neither mentioned Gattinara by name nor ever made any reference to this particular case. See Boone, *War, Domination, and the Monarchy of France*.
8. Philibert died on 10 September 1504. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 245. The phrase indicating that he could not serve two masters recalls the biblical passage in Matthew 6:24. The sentiment is somewhat unusual, since feudal obligations often overlapped and one vassal could serve many lords. However, Gattinara understood that the interests of Margaret and Charles conflicted. Gattinara refers to Holy Roman Emperors as ‘Caesar’ throughout the work.
9. The phrase ‘and all the rights ... lived’ appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 5.
10. The entire paragraph appears in the margins. *Ibid.*, fol. 5.
11. The Charles mentioned here would become Charles V. His mother was considered mentally ill and unable to raise the children.
12. The League of Cambrai was an alliance between France, Spain, England, Germany and the papacy against the republic of Venice. Venice had extended its territory on the mainland, and Pope Julius II orchestrated the alliance in order to extend the Papal States at the

expense of Venice. The French wanted to make peace with the other European powers in order to secure Milan. The empire would gain Padua, Vicenza and Verona. The defeat of the Venetians at Agnadello on 10 May 1509 was devastating. However, shortly afterward, Julius II allied with Venice and the other members of the league against France. This ‘Holy League’ intended to ‘rid Italy of the barbarians’. See F. Gilbert, *The Pope, his Banker, and Venice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). The phrases ‘For this reason ... with them’ and ‘just ... stipulated’ appear in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 7.

13. An interesting encounter in which Gattinara scolds (*increpans*) the king, who then makes excuses to him (*excusavit*). The phrase ‘The fixed date did not give him enough time’ appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 7.
14. On these commissions, Gattinara was accompanied by the French ambassador, his former professor, Claude de Seyssel. Neither mentioned the other. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 251 n. 6. The phrases ‘one of the commanders ... back’ and ‘where ... honours’ appear in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 7.
15. The phrase ‘but before ... Spain’ appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 9.
16. The phrase ‘with a suitable oration’ appears in the margins. *Ibid.*
17. The *ius prelationis* is a feudal law from medieval Burgundy. In many parts of feudal Europe, a lord had the right to sell his land and then buy it back at the same price. Most of the time this right could not be transferred, but Burgundy had a customary law that allowed the transfer of this right. See B. de Chasseneuz, *Consuetudines Ducatus Burgundiae Commentariis Bartholomaei a Chansseno* (Paris, 1552), p. 1371.
18. The phrase ‘Even if he died ... silence’ appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 10.
19. The account of his legal battles over the castle at Chevigny is written in obfuscated and unclear prose laden with legal jargon. For this translation, I am indebted to Federico Goria’s and Giancarlo Boccotti’s Italian translations, *Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara Autobiografia*, pp. 52–4.
20. Acts 12:6–11.
21. In 1516 Philip of Spain died and Charles of Burgundy became Charles I of Spain. As Charles lived in Flanders with his guardian, Margaret, Gattinara was one of many courtiers seeking an audience with the new king.
22. Job 1:21.
23. The book discussed here is the *Oratio Supplicatoria*, reviewed in [Chapter 2](#) of this volume. The phrase ‘In the midst ... Spain’ appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 12.
24. Psalm 37:25–6.
25. Charles obtained a gift of 200,000 ducats from Aragon and another 100,000 from Catalonia. *Autobiografia*, trans. Boccotti, p. 67.
26. This sentiment appeared early in Gattinara’s career, in his *Oratio Supplicatoria* dedicated to Charles in 1516. See [Chapter 2](#) above.
27. John 10:16.
28. This refers to the Comuneros Revolt; see [Chapter 1](#) above, p. 14.
29. The Hungarian fortress of Belgrade had fallen to Suleiman the Magnificent on 29 August 1521. Rhodes fell on 21 January 1522. H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600* (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), p. 35. Historians remember the Diet of Worms as the setting of the famous meeting between Charles V and Martin Luther, but Gattinara omits any mention of the German reformer – a taboo subject at the imperial court – in his autobiography. He did make frequent mention of him in his memorials. See [Chapter 4](#) above, pp. 45–6.

30. Gattinara never mentions English and French kings by name. He refers to Francis I often as *rex gallorum* (king of the Gauls), and sometimes contemptuously, as in this case, as *gallus*, the Gaul. He refers to the English king as *rex anglicus*.
31. The dialogue, based on a French translation made by Claude de Chassey, appears in Weiss, *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, Vol. 1, pp. 125–241.
32. Gattinara repeats this information, perhaps to emphasize its connection to the omen.
33. The passage 'In the same year ... Empire' appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 19.
34. I have translated *respublica christiana* as 'Christian commonwealth' throughout the autobiography. The phrase beginning 'Caesar wanted ... Italy' appears in margins. *Ibid.*
35. The admiral of France was Guillaume Gouffier, seigneur de Bonnivet. The viceroy of Naples was the Burgundian Charles de Lannoy, a close companion of Charles V from childhood. See [Chapter 5](#) above, p. 60. Charles, duke of Bourbon, was of royal French blood and the most powerful vassal of Francis I. In addition to three duchies and sixteen domains in France, he also held three lordships in the Holy Roman Empire. He held the office of constable of France, the main commander of the French army. However, Louise of Savoy, mother of Francis I, claimed the rights to Bourbon's wife's inheritance. Francis I supported her claims, which amounted to an effort to dismantle his feudal domains. Charles V promised him the hand of one of his sisters in marriage with 100,000 écus. He led the imperial army in Italy from 1522 until his death in 1527. See R. J. Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France 1483–1610* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 97–101.
36. Guicciardini also recounts how the soldiers had been goaded on by speeches and promises of honour and profit. However, his account has the marquis of Pescara doing the persuasion, and does not feature Gattinara as involved in the battle. F. Guicciardini, *The History of Italy, Translated from the Italian of Francesco Guicciardini, by Austin Parke Goddard, Esq.; the Third Edition*, 10 vols, trans. A. Parke Goddard (London: Z. Stuart, 1763), vol. 10, pp. 183–4.
37. In 1524 Gattinara planned to go to Rome to negotiate with the pope. However, Marco Foscarini, the ambassador of Venice, reported that Gattinara refused to go because the emperor would not give him full power to act. H. Keniston, *Francisco de los Cobos: Secretary of the Emperor Charles V* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960), p. 99. Gattinara, in a letter to Clement VII, claimed to be too ill for the long journey and the hot summer in Rome; Burgos, 8 May 1524. In Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 440.
38. The phrase 'The pope ... Caesar himself' appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 22.
39. Hugo de Moncada was a Spanish commander captured by the French. Louis de Savoy, the mother of Francis I who acted as regent during her son's captivity, released him to negotiate a treaty with Charles that would serve her interests. Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, trans. Parke Goddard, vol. 10, p. 280. Gattinara believed that the viceroy, Charles de Lannoy, secretly favoured the interests of the French king. See [Chapter 5](#) above, p. 60.
40. The Latin idiom is *hec faba in eorum caput cuderetur*, literally, 'to cut the bean in their head'. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 24.
41. Gattinara is somewhat vague here, perhaps on purpose. Although here he speaks of balancing the interests of the various parties in Italy and Europe, elsewhere (particularly in his memorial to Charles V, September 1525) he detailed the enticements granted to each if they supported the imperial side. In the same memorial, he spoke also of the necessity of preparing an enormous fleet carrying all of the soldiers, horses, weapons and war

- machines necessary to take Italy by force if diplomacy proved insufficient. Gattinara, *Vita*, pp. 458–76.
42. The Duchess Alençon was Marguerite de Navarre, a famous humanist scholar and poet. See B. Stephenson, *The Power and Patronage of Marguerite de Navarre* (London: Ashgate, 2004). Guicciardini portrays Louise de Savoy as ambitious and formidable in state affairs. Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, trans. Parke Goddard, vol. 10, pp. 279–81.
 43. The reference is to a comedic play by Terence, *The Lady from Andros*. In this work Davos is a slave whose continual scheming causes trouble for the other characters. Boccotti suggested that Gattinara was implying a correspondence between the scheming slave and the imperial soldiers who ruined the imperial plan for peace. *Autobiografia*, trans. Boccotti, fol. 113 n. 276. See Terence. *With an English Translation by John Sargeaunt*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 1–111. Incidentally, Machiavelli's first attempt at playwriting was based on this work.
 44. 'To paint the devil blacker than he is' is an Italian proverb. The phrase 'For when ... It happened that' appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 24.
 45. The marquis of Vasto was Alfonso d'Ávalos, a cousin of Francesco Ferdinando I d'Ávalos, the marquis of Pescara. Their family was Neapolitan of Spanish origins. Antonio de Leyva, duke of Terranova, was a Spanish general from Navarre.
 46. Gattinara's portrayal of the Spanish commanders as 'barbarians' echoes Julius II's exhortation to 'rid Italy of the barbarians' more than a decade earlier. It is not clear whether Gattinara is expressing an Italian prejudice against those beyond the Alps, or if he is referring to the Germanic invasions in ancient Rome. Also unusual is Gattinara's addition of the phrase 'not with subtle skill and cleverness but by force', which appears in the margins. The entire phrase in Latin is 'Patiantur milites sine discretion vivere, predari, rapere, violentias multiplices inferre, ac ipsos barbaros a latinis, postergato ordine, non quidem subtili ingenio sed vi aurum et sanguinem extorquere'. For an analysis of the juxtaposition of cunning and brute force and its relationship to Italian identity, see [Chapter 5](#) above, p. 68.
 47. A detailed account and analysis surrounding the controversy of the Treaty of Madrid in the imperial court appears in [Chapter 5](#) above.
 48. Cicero, *De Officiis*, p. 82.
 49. Gattinara's collection of papers included nearly every treaty with France going back to the early fifteenth century. All included his marginal notes, indicating that he had investigated every claim. BRT, MS Storia d'Italia, no. 75, pp. 595–642.
 50. There were two treaties of Arras between France and Burgundy, 1435 and 1482. Gattinara probably refers to the latter. Louis XI of France, known as the 'Universal Spider' for his double-dealing and intrigue, broke treaties to claim the territory of Burgundy for the French crown. See M. P. Kendall, *Louis XI: The Universal Spider* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). It is interesting that Gattinara assumes that the nature of the French king does not change. It represents a mirror image of Kantorowicz's argument that the king never dies; instead of maintaining his sacred nature, he keeps his character as a liar and schemer. See E. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). The most famous account of the character of Louis XI and the history of Burgundy is given by the contemporary realist historian Philippe de Commines; see P. de Commines, in his *Mémoires* (1524), ed. J. Blanchard (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2001).
 51. The phrase 'Especially since ... to Caesar' appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 29.

52. According to the fundamental laws of the kingdom of France, the king could not alienate his own territory. Therefore it would be highly unlikely for the Estates General, a representative institution, to ratify the treaty. Gattinara certainly understood this. For an analysis of the nature of the Renaissance monarchy in France, see J. R. Major, *From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles, and Estates* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
53. Daniel 13:22. The story recounts how the innocent Susannah, falsely accused of adultery, was saved by Daniel. It remains in the Catholic bible, but Protestants have regarded the story as apocryphal.
54. Acts 9:5 in the Vulgate.
55. Gattinara could have been referring to the sin of sodomy. Contemporaries north of the Alps had often associated Italy with homosexuality, and this was especially true among reformers who linked sodomy with the Catholic Church. The idea that the Church would be purged of corruption by imperial power was present in biblical prophecy, which had an enormous impact on Gattinara. See [Chapters 2](#) and [4](#) above, p. 28 and p. 47. Martin Luther also linked the Roman Church with sodomy on several occasions. In 1520 he stated, 'It seems to me that the only hope of salvation left is that the emperor, kings, and princes take up arms and attach this pest of the earth, and thus bring matters to a conclusion, no longer by words but by steel ... If a thief is punished by a halter, and heretic by fire, why shouldn't we, with all our weapons, attack these teachers of corruption, these popes, cardinals, and all the rabble of Roman Sodom, and wash our hands in their blood?' L. von Pastor, *The History of the Pope: From the Close of the Middle Ages*, Vol. 7 (St Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1908), p. 393. See also J. Dillenberger, *Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings* (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 45, 115.
56. Hebrews 12:6.
57. Gattinara seems to be referring to the French, who allied with Suleiman the Magnificent after the Battle of Pavia in June 1525. Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France*, p. 124. The French ambassador had told the sultan that without their help, Charles V would become 'ruler of the world'. The answer to the imperial victory at Pavia was the Turkish victory at Mohács against Hungary in 1526; Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 35.
58. Proverbs 21:1. Concerning the sins of David, see 2 Samuel 12–29. The denial of Peter occurs in all four Gospels: Matthew 26, Mark 14, Luke 22 and John 18. His repentance appears in John 18:13–27, and the statement cited by the Church to defend the vicarship of Peter is Matthew 16:18.
59. Sallust, *Conspiracy of Catiline*, LII:11.
60. A reference to Aristotle, the 'philosopher', but the phrase is attributed to Hippocrates.
61. By foreshadowing the Sack of Rome, which will occur a year later in May 1527, he appears as eager to absolve himself as his emperor.
62. The Treaty of Madrid stipulated that Francis I would provide a fleet to take Charles V to Italy for his coronation. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 325 n. 5. The phrase 'prepare the way of the lord' (*viam domino preparet*) was repeated often by Gattinara to connect the advent of Charles V in Italy to the advent of Jesus into the world. Isaiah 40:3, Mark 1:3.
63. The League of Cognac, otherwise known as the Holy League. See A. Chastel, *The Sack of Rome, 1527*, trans. B. Archer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 26, and E. R. Chamberlin, *The Sack of Rome* (New York: Dorset Press, 1985), p. 108. The phrase 'Meanwhile the French king ... 22 May in the same year' appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 33.

64. For information on Charles V's reliance on loans to finance his wars, see C. Tracy, *Charles V: Impresario of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). The phrase 'The emperor ... Sicilies' appears in the margins. *Autobiografía*, ASV, fol. 34.
65. Bourbon had been in Monaco, but sailed to Barcelona for money and supplies. Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, trans. Parke Goddard, vol. 10, pp. 34–5.
66. Biremes, triremes and quinqueremes are all types of galley ships. The names correspond to the number of rows of oars, *remus* in Latin, two, three and five, respectively.
67. The work is the *Pro Divo Carolo*, published under the name of his secretary, A. de Valdès. See [Chapter 4](#) above, p. 47. The passage 'Meanwhile ... our subject' appears in the margins. *Autobiografía*, ASV, fol. 34.
68. Some ambassadors believed Gattinara was responsible for the failure of the peace talks. *Autobiografía*, trans. Boccotti, p. 149 n. 381. The passage 'Having arranged ... see it' appears in the margins. *Autobiografía*, ASV, fol. 35.
69. The Order of the Friars Minor is the official name of the Franciscans, a religious order inspired by St Francis of Assisi. In this case, he was Francisco de Angelis Quinones.
70. These interesting passages indicate that Gattinara had a sophisticated understanding of local custom, appeals to constitutional liberty, and social dynamics. He portrayed himself as a partisan of the commoners in this case, which corresponded to his propaganda, in which he often took the side of the people. However, when dealing with the Italian states, especially in his home region, he almost always sided with the nobility, the traditional supporters of the empire. For a discussion of the Spanish crown's increasing reliance on the nobility to the detriment of the commoners, see Tracy, *Charles V*, p. 311.
71. It is not clear why Gattinara took a leave of absence from the court. Many have suggested that it reflected Caesar's disfavour towards him. See [Chapter 1](#) above, p. 21.
72. According to the ambassador Dantiscus, Gattinara joked about Caesar's request for him to return, stating, 'If I had been born a girl, and had given in to Caesar's demands so willingly, I would not have remained a virgin very long'; Bataillon, *Erasmus y España*, p. 229.
73. Incidentally, the duke's main advisor was the regent of Naples and Gattinara's cousin, Bartolomeo di Gattinara. He acted as a mediator between imperial troops and the pope during the sack, and afterward wrote a report detailing the attack to Charles V. It is published under the wrong name as Mercurino di Gattinara, *Il Sacco di Roma nel 1527* (Geneva: G. Fick, 1866).
74. The passage 'The most powerful ships ... intercepted' appears in the margins. *Autobiografía*, ASV, fol. 41.
75. The phrase 'when they heard ... at dusk' appears in the margins. *Ibid.*, fol. 41.
76. Matthew 27:29, Mark 15:18 and John 19:3. In the Vulgate, Matthew 26:49, 67. Clement VII is recorded as using the same passage to describe the first attack by Hugo de Moncada in 1526. Gattinara, *Vita*, p. 356 n. 7.
77. Philibert de Châlon, Prince of Orange, a Burgundian knight from the Franche-Comté.
78. For the constitutional issues inherent in the separate crowns of Spain during this era, see I. A. A. Thompson, 'Castile, Spain and the Monarchy: The Political Community from *patria natural* to *patria nacional*', in R. Kagan and G. Parker (eds), *Spain, Europe, and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John Elliott* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 125–59.
79. This was Ferdinand de Aragón y de Bancio, duke of Calabria, not to be confused with Ferdinand II of Aragon, who married Isabella of Castile. This Ferdinand was the son of the king of Naples, and acquired his title in Aragon by marrying Germaine de Foix,

- widow of Ferdinand II, with whom he became a co-viceoy of Valencia. *Autobiografia*, trans. Boccotti, fol. 179 n. 461.
80. Lautrec was Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec, Marshal of France. Andrea Doria, the famous Genoese admiral, had been in the pay of the pope and Francis I for several years. He had several reasons to leave the alliance, including late payments and a desire to free Genoa from the power of the French. According to Headley, Gattinara had been trying to entice him to the imperial side since 1523. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor*, pp. 120–1. For Doria's motives, see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, trans. Parke Goddard, vol. 10, pp. 407–8.
 81. The passage 'Andrea Doria ... Naples' appears in the margins. *Autobiografia*, ASV, fol. 45.
 82. This was the 'Ladies' Peace of 1529'; see J. Russell, 'Women Diplomats: The Ladies' Peace of 1529', in *Diplomats at Work: Three Renaissance Studies* (Wolfeboro Falls, NH: A. Sutton, 1992) pp. 94–152.
 83. The bishop of Vaison, majordomo of the pope, was Girolamo Bencucci (Girolamo da Schio), who replaced Baldassar Castiglione as papal nuncio. *Autobiografia*, trans. Boccotti, fol. 193 n. 497. Castiglione, the author of the celebrated work *The Courtier*, died in Spain in February 1529. Although he seems to have had friendly relations with Gattinara, the latter never mentions the famous humanist by name in his autobiography. This is probably due to a bitter feud between Castiglione and Alfonso de Valdés, for which see [Chapter 4](#) above, pp. 56–7.
 84. The authority *de latere* denoted the privilege of representing the person of the pope. It was restricted to cardinals. See C. M. Richardson, *Reclaiming Rome: Cardinals in the Fifteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 98.
 85. The natural daughter was Margaret of Parma, granddaughter of a rich Flemish tapestry maker. She had been raised as a princess under the care of Margaret of Austria. See C. Steen, *Margaret of Parma: A Life* (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Alessandro had been officially recognized as the son of Lorenzo de Medici, duke of Urbino, but many historians think he was the son of Guilio de Medici (Clement VII). Gattinara uses the phrase 'ipsius pontificis nepoti' to describe him. See F. Schevill, *The Medici* (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 206–7. There is also more recent speculation that his mother had been an African servant in the Medici household. See C. Hibbert, *The House of Medici: Its Rise and Fall* (New York: Perennial, 2003), pp. 230–60.
 86. The Treaty of Barcelona had two main results: it established a lasting union between Spain and the papacy, and ended 250 years of republican government in Florence. See Schevill, *The Medici*. A re-evaluation of Clement VII and the 'Calamity of Italy' appears in the edited volume K. Gouwens and S. Reiss (eds), *The Pontificate of Clement VII: History, Politics, Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).
 87. Francis de Bourbon, Count Saint-Pol, was defeated and captured by Antonio de Leyva at the Battle of Landriano in June 1529. The battle marked the end of Francis I's ambitions in Italy. See Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France*, pp. 132–3.

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